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Executive summary 
The record price development in commodity markets during the boom period lasting from 
early 2000 to mid 2008 highlighted a perceived scarcity particularly in metal markets that 
contrasted the preceding period beginning in the late 1970s of largely abundant availability 
and falling real metal prices. 
While the fly ups in metal prices were most visible for exchange traded non-ferrous base 
metals, refractory metals used predominantly as alloys in the production of steel grades 
experienced an even stronger price rise. Whereas annual prices and production volume for 
non-ferrous metals rose by 12.2 percent and 4.9 percent respectively from 2001 to 2008, the 
aggregate price index for refractory metals rose by 17.6 percent annually, despite an average 
annual increase in the production volume of 9.6 percent.  
Scholars are in disagreement how to evaluate the recent commodity boom with respect to its 
long-term impact on metal prices. Also, the primary focus of the discussion on metal markets 
and metal price development is based on insights derived from non-ferrous base metal 
markets. An in depth analysis of refractory metal markets matching the level of quantification 
found in works on non-ferrous base metals is missing. 
The upward trend in demand for refractory metals ascribes to both an unprecedented surge in 
demand and to structural changes in the supply of alloyed materials. Contained only in traces 
in the end product, these invisible metals effectuate indispensable functions in steel grades, 
predominantly corrosion resistance, strength and high temperature strength. Driving the 
demand for these functions are long-term industry trends, which may be clustered as weight 
saving, advancement of operating parameters, quality improvement and operations in 
increasingly corrosive environments. 
While these trends are not new, the surge in demand for sophisticated steel grades in 
developing countries to establish an adequate industrial infrastructure, a rising class of 
influential consumers in emerging economies, an increasing awareness for climate change and 
for a sustainable, efficient use of resources as well as constructions in increasingly corrosive 
environments such as the gulf region and polluted areas in emerging economies have all 
accelerated the demand for lighter and more enduring steel grades during the last decade. This 
development is reflected in the increasing intensity of refractory metals in steel not only in 
emerging but also in advanced economies during the commodity boom.  
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The solidity of these trends lends credence to the hypothesis that they will continue 
undeterred by the current economic crisis. Furthermore, the concentration of molybdenum and 
niobium in domestically produced steel in advanced economies is still higher by a factor of 
three compared to emerging ones. This implies that emerging economies, notably China as the 
dominant global steel producer have still a long way to come to catch up to advanced 
economies’ levels. Both developments suggest solid demand growth for refractory metals 
going forward. 
The growing economic relevance of refractory metals underlines the importance of a reliable 
and secure supply. Here, selected refractory metals have undergone a structural change in the 
composition of supply and are particularly exposed to induced scarcity situations and 
consequently price fly-ups and have become a weighty factor with respect to cost, risk, 
revenue and profit of hitherto unknown relevance.  
Suppliers begin to reevaluate the significance of these metals in their portfolio and the 
revenue and profit opportunities that stem from it. Strong demand secures the profitability of 
developing hitherto uneconomic assets and introduces a new floor price as the cost position of 
the marginal producer rises and the tail of the cost curve becomes steeper. 
Metal consuming industries, notably steel producers in countries relying on imports, are faced 
with a highly concentrated production profile in most refractory metal markets and are 
dependent on the willingness of exporters to trade. In this context, China’s role deserves 
special mention. During the last decade, it has become a leading consumer of raw materials to 
sustain its economic growth. Yet its role on the supply side changed equally fundamental. It 
has become the largest exporter by far for many refractory metals, not only for those in which 
it holds domestic mining assets such as molybdenum but also for metals in which is has 
assumed a dominant position in the smelting and refining stage such as chromium. 
China’s determination to pursue its domestic interests over unobstructed trade has led to the 
introduction of export tariffs on raw and refined refractory metal to limit the unconstrained 
export of these metals in their intermediate forms and to nourish a downstream steel industry. 
The effect on China’s role in the alloyed steel market is considerable. During the past decade, 
the country has switched from being a net importer to becoming a net exporter of alloyed 
steel, a trend, which correlates strongly with the increase in the intensity of advanced alloyed 
metals molybdenum and niobium in its domestic steel production. In parallel, exports of 
ferro-molybdenum, an intermediate product in which China held a dominant export position 
until 2003, have been replaced by alloyed steel exports containing molybdenum. 
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This indirect subsidy of downstream capacities in Chinese alloyed steel production has severe 
consequences for alloyed steel producers outside China reliant on imports of refractory metals 
in their intermediate forms. Their position is doubly inferior to their Chinese counterparts. 
Access to raw materials is restricted and average global raw material costs carry a surcharge 
of Chinese export tariffs. Furthermore, the competitiveness of their products outside their 
domestic markets, which are often protected by import tariffs, is challenged. 
Changes in the global alloyed steel market during the last decade bear witness to the 
consequences of these distortions. Traditional exporters of alloyed steel, notably in Europe 
and Japan have lost significant market shares from the mid 1990s to 2008. The share of net 
alloyed steel exports of major Western European producers relative to total global alloyed 
steel exports fell from around 9 percent in 1994 to below 4 percent in 2008 measured by 
weight and to just above 5 percent measured by value. During the same period, Japan’s share 
of global alloyed steel exports dropped from around 11 to 8 percent measured by weight and 
to 6 percent measured by value. 
Yet Sweden, Austria and Finland have managed to keep stable their share in global alloyed 
steel export markets. The business model of steel producers in these countries highlights a 
path to successfully stand the ground against global competition. Home to highly specialized 
steel producers, which is visible in the highest average concentration of refractory metals per 
ton of domestically produced steel in these countries, they are pursuing a strategy of 
innovation and specialization to maintain a competitive edge going forward. 
The work intends to contribute to the discussion on the long-term impact of the commodity 
boom on metal prices. It enlarges the scope of metal markets in the focus of research to date 
by focusing particularly on refractory metal markets and illustrates through which forces 
structural changes in metal markets occur and how this may impact level and volatility of 
metal prices. 
This approach complements existing metal price research by integrating industry insights and 
research findings in a framework to establish a holistic approach to price analysis. The 
approach chosen in this work owes to the author's practical industry background and focuses 
on the integration of solid industry knowledge. The insights gained are meant to contribute to 
prospective studies by scholars from various backgrounds and to the lively debate about the 
future development of metal prices. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem definition and objective 
The boom in commodity prices beginning in early 2000 and lasting till the second half of 
2008 is widely thought to be unprecedented both in magnitude and duration compared to 
other price booms in the 20th century.1 On the back of global GDP growing at an annualized 
rate of 4.4% between 2003 and 20082, commodity markets experienced unprecedented price 
hikes. Particularly the prices in metal markets showed record real price increases after 
decades of falling real prices3. The lack of availability of some metals highlighted an either 
real or perceived scarcity. 
The unexpected price rally in metal markets took most market participants by surprise. After 
the high oil prices in 1973 and 1979 followed low growth and stagnation in mining 
commodities4 affected by underinvestment in the development of new supply. Consequently, 
markets ran into supply shortages as established mining companies rushed to add capacity and 
faced constraints for key goods and logistics.5 Financial markets faced additional risk to 
finance future exploration under increased economic and political uncertainty. At the same 
time, financial investors speculated increasingly on stock traded metals, further fueling short-
term price spikes. 
On the demand side, metal consuming companies, having enjoyed real falling prices6 and 
largely free access to raw materials via trading on the global market for most of the two 
decades prior to the economic boom period, were unprepared for the severity of volatility and 
the increase in raw material costs. High, volatile prices, and a shortage in raw materials were 
the cause of uncertainty and threatened growth options and impeded additional investment. 
The 2009 economic crisis put a sudden end to the raw material bonanza and prices for most 
metals markets plunged. New capacity expansion projects were put on hold or were 
                                                 
1 World Bank (2009), p. 51 
2 International Monetary Fund (2009)  
3 Compare chapter 2.2, Exhibit 2 
4 Tilton (1985) 
5 Pley/Rajagopaul/Rittner (2008), p. 21 
6 Krautkraemer (1998), p.2080ff.  
 2
terminated as demand collapsed and mining companies scaled back capacity to preserve 
prices, cut costs and improve liquidity. 
Such price instability is a common phenomenon in metal markets and metal prices are known 
to undergo pronounced cycles7. Because of short-term inelastic demand and capital intensive, 
inelastic supply, metal industries are characterized by periods of excess supply as well as 
excess demand causing frequent, volatile price changes. In this context, many analysts and 
scholars concur with the widely stated explanation that strong demand growth for metals and 
other commodities notably in China and to a lesser extent in India was a key driver for global 
supply constraints triggering the price boom8.  
Providing an outlook for future price development, leading mineral economists, while 
acknowledging the distinctiveness of the boom, withdraw to obvious statements such as that 
prices will be punctuated "as soon as new capacity is in place"9. A similar reasoning is 
expressed by TILTON/LAGOS who conclude that "With time, as happened historically, 
industry may reasonably be expected to construct new capacity eventually causing the price of 
copper to decline"10, repeating the mantra of ever falling real metal prices, which some have 
observed throughout the last century11. 
Such reasoning may be premature as it ignores important developments in metal markets, 
which have been fueled by the commodity boom and which have lost none of their relevance 
in the face of the crisis. First of all, the above mentioned authors make no explicit assumption 
about the nature and cost structure of newly installed capacity, other than that once available 
it will end the price boom. However, this does not provide an answer to the obvious question, 
to which level prices will withdraw, nor which factors may influence a new price level. Nor 
are potential changes in the structure of the industry and their impact on metal prices 
addressed. Rather, RADETZKI et al. implicitly assume that no structural changes in metal 
markets have occurred and that the price boom in metals is only driven by a temporary surge 
in demand.  
This perspective is questioned by several scholars. HUMPHREYS voices the hypothesis that 
prices may plateau at a new level rather than proceed in cycles.12 HEAP suspects structural 
                                                 
7 World Bank (2009), p. 54. Compare also chapter 3.1.1 
8 World Bank (2009), p. 51; Radetzki (2006), p. 63 
9 Radetzki/ Eggert/ Lagos/ Lima/ Tilton (2008), p.125 
10 Tilton/Lagos (2007), p.22 
11 Tilton (1999), p.200 
12 Humphreys (2009), p.103; Humphreys (2010), p.11 
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changes on the supply side as a driver of the price boom and states that additional supply will 
come at higher cost.13 JERRETT/ CUDDINGTON in their most recent analysis of the 
existence of super cycles in metal prices acknowledge that understanding the underlying 
factors behind the recent super cycle is "a high-priority task"14, implicitly questioning that 
answers to this question can simply be deduced from earlier booms. Similarly, 
KRAUTKRAEMER argues against generalizations by emphasizing the need for a better 
understanding of unanticipated price changes on the basis of more detailed information 
tailored to individual metal industries.15  
Secondly, the perceived scarcity during the boom has highlighted the importance of metals for 
the global economy, changed the perception of unconstrained availability of raw materials and 
brought the issue of resource security back on the agenda of major importers16. Whereas 
PORTER regarded domestic access to raw materials as a diminishing competitive edge due to 
the globalization of commodity markets in 1986,17 it is an increasingly important factor again 
for companies competing globally as well as nationally. In their overview of mineral 
economics as an academic discipline, TILTON/GORDON give an implicit warning that the 
"the availability and security of at least their [consuming countries] nonenergy mineral 
supplies today […] could change, however"18. Market participants observe differences in 
price and availability of material between regions driven by trade restrictions constituting an 
either real or perceived competitive advantage for companies with preferential access to raw 
materials.19 
In this context, the availability of minor metals, also called less common metals or spice 
metals20 appears to be of particular concern. These metals, albeit used only in minuscule 
quantities in the end product, fulfill indispensable functional roles. Refractory metals, a sub-
group, are used as alloying elements in steel. Other minor metals are vital parts of electronic 
components in modern products. While the importance of minor metals and of refractory 
metals in particular is often justified by their relevance in strategic applications, the overall 
economic relevance particularly of refractory metals has grown significantly during the 
                                                 
13 Heap (2006), p.17 
14 Jerrett/ Cuddington (2008), p.195 
15 Krautkraemer (1998), p.2102f. 
16 A search on the press search data base factiva for the key words "resource" and "security" rendered 19,261 hits in 2001 
and 55,345 hits in 2008. Compare also chapter 2.2, Exhibit 3 
17 Porter/Baldwin (1986), p.4  
18 Gordon/Tilton (2008), p.10 
19 Horninger (2008) 
20 Reller et al. (2009), p.131 
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commodity boom21, emphasizing a growing importance to the cost, risk, revenue and profit 
positions of market participants.22 At the same time, fear of availability constraints is highest 
for minor metals due to an often highly regionalized supply structure.23 
However, the markets for minor metals are largely excluded from economic analysis. 
Scholars analyzing the price, demand and supply economics of metal markets focus 
predominantly on iron and steel, the six non-ferrous base metals aluminum, copper, lead, 
nickel, tin, and zinc as well as well as three precious metals gold, silver, and platinum24. 
Consequently, the factors influencing the economic dynamics of minor metals are not fully 
understood and differences in market size as well as in the structure of supply and demand25 
prohibit a per se transferability of insights from non-ferrous base metal markets and demand a 
focused analysis of these markets. 
In this context, the author wants to make additions to existing research on two main accounts. 
In order to expand the scope of economic analysis of metal markets, refractory metal markets 
are singled out of the heterogeneous group of minor metals as the most important sub-group 
from an economic standpoint. Their demand, supply, and market structure are distinguished 
from non-ferrous base metal markets and demand development before and during the 
commodity boom period is analyzed. 
Furthermore, to enrich the discussion on structural changes in metal prices, a framework is 
defined that integrates the relevant structural forces impacting level and volatility of metal 
prices. Specific differences between refractory and non-ferrous base metal markets along the 
framework's structural dimensions are highlighted and the framework is applied to a 
refractory metal market to provide an example for the occurrence of structural changes in a 
metal market and illustrate the corresponding impact on the price. 
Specifically, the following steps are conducted. The distinctiveness of the boom in metal 
prices is emphasized and the rising economic importance of refractory metals during this time 
period is quantified. Drawing on existing research from mineral economists and experts of 
                                                 
21 Compare chapter 2.3 
22 Langhammer/Zeumer (2010), p.21 
23 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (2006), p.47f. A EU report classifies niobium, vanadium, chromite, manganese, 
tantalum, and vanadium as critical. EU (2008), p.17. The French geological survey Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et 
Minières (BRGM) identifies 16 minor metals as carrying a short to medium risks to their supply: antimony, chromite, 
cobalt, germanium, gallium, indium, lithium, magnesium, molybdenum, platinum, palladium, rhodium, rare earths, 
rhenium, titanium, and tungsten. Dechamps et al. (2002); Hocquard/ Samama (2006); Hocquard (2008) 
24 Compare chapter 3 
25 Compare Chapter 5 
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metal industries, a perspective on the coverage of metal markets in literature as well as on 
underlying structural drivers of metal prices is developed. Research gaps are then deduced 
with respect to the insufficient coverage of refractory metal markets and the lack of an 
integrated approach to capture the relevant structural forces that impact the level and volatility 
of metal prices. Subsequently, distinctions between refractory metal markets and non-ferrous 
metal markets on the demand and supply side are stressed to justify a separate analysis of the 
former. The distinct demand structure of refractory metals used predominantly as alloying 
elements in steel is disaggregated and traced back to the functions individual metals effectuate 
in steel. Growth of apparent consumption is then decomposed based on the concept of the 
intensity of use technique to quantify the influence of a metal's individual functional profile 
on its demand development. Furthermore, alloyed steel trade as a major channel for hidden 
imports and exports of refractory metals is examined. An investigation of further trends 
specific to individual refractory metal markets complements the analysis of refractory metal 
demand. 
In a next step, conclusions are combined in an integrated framework to capture the structural 
forces that influence the long-term level and volatility of metal prices along four relevant 
structural forces. Characteristics within these forces distinctive to refractory metals are 
emphasized. This framework is then applied to the molybdenum market to shed light on 
structural changes in this market influencing the long-term price level and volatility as a 
consequence of the commodity boom. Finally, implications for scholars and market 
participants are drawn and recommendations for further research are suggested. 
In differentiation to existing research and from the perspective of a practitioner, the author 
intends to address the underrepresented role of refractory metals in literature and to identify 
and consolidate the major structural forces that impact the level and volatility of metal prices. 
In particular, answers to the following research questions are sought: 
What are distinguishing elements of non-ferrous base metal markets and refractory metal 
markets that justify a separate examination of the latter? 
How does the distinct demand structure of refractory metals influence the demand 
development of such metals? 
How can the impact of influences related to the demand structure of refractory metals be 
quantified and which other factors influence refractory metal demand? 
What are the structural forces in a metal market that impact the long-term level and volatility 
of a metal price and which characteristics within these forces are specific to refractory metal 
markets? 
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1.2 Structure  
After describing the problem definition and objective of this work in Chapter 1.1 the author 
will lay out its structure and next steps. 
In chapter 2 the situation with regards to the extraordinary metal price development during the 
recent commodity boom between 2001 and 2008 is illustrated and the rising importance of 
refractory metals is stressed. Chapter 2.1 provides a categorization of metals into aggregate 
groups and classifies the group of minor metals and the sub-group of refractory metals. The 
distinctiveness of the recent price rally in metal commodities is covered in chapter 2.2. In 
chapter 2.3, the rising economic importance of refractory metals is quantified. Chapter 2.4 
summarizes insights and implications. 
In chapter 3, existing research is reviewed, research gaps are deduced and research questions 
defined. Chapter 3.1 is concerned with literature analyzing metal prices and the relevant 
underlying market forces identified to impact price level and volatility. Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 
are concerned with a review of literature on demand and supply of metal markets to gain an 
overview of relevant forces identified to impact metal prices, assess the coverage of refractory 
metal markets, and review methodologies to analyze refractory metal demand. In chapter 3.4, 
research gaps are deduced and research questions are devised. 
In chapter 4, approaches to analyze metal markets are evaluated. Furthermore, data sources 
and data preparation are critically discussed and metal markets for quantitative analysis 
selected. In chapter 4.1, methodologies and concepts to analyzing metal demand are evaluated 
and the choice of the intensity of use concept in this work justified. Additionally, structural 
forces on the metal supply side are deduced based on reviewed literature. In chapter 4.2 
sources of raw data on refractory metal markets as well as necessary assumptions and 
simplifications for the preparation of data are critically discussed. In chapter 4.3, four decision 
criteria to select refractory metal markets for further quantitative analysis in this work are 
presented and refractory metals are evaluated accordingly. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the comparison of non-ferrous base metals and refractory metals. 
Structural supply side differences between the two groups of metals are discussed in chapter 
5.1, differences in the structure and development of demand are illustrated in chapter 5.2. 
In chapter 6, the demand development of refractory metals is analyzed. The relevance of a 
metal's individual functional profile it brings to bear as an alloy in steel is elaborated and 
linked to major industry and consumer trends (chapter 6.1). In chapter 6.2, the quantitative 
analysis of apparent consumption growth is prepared and a concept suggested to cluster the 
economies in the focus of this work. The subsequent chapters 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 are 
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concerned with the decomposition of growth of apparent consumption of chromium, 
manganese, molybdenum, and niobium. In chapter 6.7 the influence of alloyed steel trade on 
the concentration level of refractory metals in domestic steel production is demonstrated. A 
perspective on micro trends within individual metal markets in chapter 6.8 complements 
preceding analyses. A summary and conclusions are provided in chapter 6.9. 
In chapter 7, a framework is developed integrating major structural forces that impact the 
long-term price level and volatility of metal prices. Within these forces, characteristics of 
refractory and non-ferrous base metal markets are differentiated (chapter 7.1). Subsequently, 
the framework is applied to the molybdenum market to illustrate its applicability as well as 
the structural changes occurring as a consequence of the boom period (chapter 7.2). 
Chapter 8 serves to summarize findings and develop conclusions and recommendations. In 
chapter 8.1, findings of this work are summarized along the research questions deduced 
earlier. In chapter 8.2, implications for further research are deduced and restrictions of this 
work critically assessed. Chapter 8.3 contains implications for practitioners. 
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2. Situation background 
The following chapter provides background information regarding the categorization of 
metals (chapter 2.1) and the distinctiveness of the commodity price boom since early 2000 
lasting till mid 2008 in the context of historical price development (chapter 2.2). Chapter 2.3 
provides an approach to quantify the growing economic importance of refractory metals In 
chapter 2.4 findings are summarized. 
2.1 Categorization of metals 
The term non-ferrous base metals, precious metals and minor metals describe aggregate 
groups of metals. Metals are categorized in the wider context of mineral materials as 
illustrated in Exhibit 1. They are classified as non-energy minerals and usually split into four 
groups: iron ore, non-ferrous base metals aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc, the 
three precious metals gold, silver and platinum group metals comprising iridium, osmium, 
palladium, platinum, rhodium, and ruthenium, and minor metals, also called less common or 
spice metals, the latter term reflecting the small quantities but essential functions these metals 
effectuate in the end product. Minor metals are further categorized as refractory metals, which 
are predominantly used as alloying elements in steel and other minor metals, for which a 
growing use in electronic applications is observed26. 
                                                 
26 Bilow/ Reller (2009), p.647f. 
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Exhibit 1 – Classification of minor metals 
Source: Own illustration27 
As the group of minor metals is the most diverse comprising over twenty metals28, an 
individual analysis of all markets of these metals is beyond the scope of this work. Given the 
individual market forces influencing each market, any general conclusions relating to this 
group of metals have to be drawn with care, considering the wide range of markets included. 
2.2 Distinctiveness of the commodity price boom since 2000 
Scholars and practitioners are in agreement that the price rally in commodities lasting till 
early 2008 was distinctively different from earlier booms both in terms of magnitude and 
duration. According to a World Bank report, the boom in non-energy commodities was "the 
largest and longest of any boom since 1900"29, dating its beginning around 2003. 
Scholars investigating the cyclicality of metal prices concur that the boom should be classified 
                                                 
27 Following Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (2006), p. 22f. Some elements such as magnesium and titanium are 
classified as industrial minerals as well as metals depending on the refined form. 
28 Rare Earths is here counted as one metal group but comprises 18 elements: cerium, dysprosium, erbium, europium, 
gadolinium, holmium, lanthanum, lutetium, neodymium, praseodymium, samarium, terbium, thulium, ytterbium, yttrium, 
ferrocerium, monazite, and bastnasite 
29 World Bank (2009), p.51 
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as a new super cycle with a complete cycle length, i.e. price rise and slump, between 20 and 
70 years30 as opposed to a mere business cycle with a complete cycle length between 1 to 2  
years and below 8 years31. HEAP defines super cycles as "a prolonged (decade or more) trend 
rise in real commodity prices, driven by urbanization and industrialization of a major 
economy".32 JERRET/ CUDDINGTON suggest that there have been three previous super 
cycles and observe that "the most recent SC [super cycle] in all metal prices begins sometime 
between 1995 and 2000."33 
RADETZKI analyzing commodity price indices also comprising a metal index identifies only 
three commodity booms and estimates that the third began in 2002. Coming from a 
practitioner's perspective, HEAP analyzes non-ferrous base metal prices and agrees with 
RADETZKI and JERRET/CUDDINGTON that the beginning of the new millennium marks 
the beginning of a new super cycle. 
                                                 
30 Jerret/Cuddington (2008), p. 188 
31 Roberts (2009), p.93 sets the minimum length for expansion and contraction periods at 6 months, i.e. 1 year for one 
complete cycle. Jerret/Cuddington (2008), p. 190 range business cycles from 2 to 8 years 
32 Heap (2006), p. 2 
33 Jerett/Cuddington (2008), p. 194 
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Exhibit 2 – Real metal price development by metal category34 
Source: Own illustration 
Exhibit 2 displays the indexed real price development of non-ferrous base metals, refractory 
metals and other minor metals between 1960 to 2008. The indices for the non-ferrous base 
metals and refractory metals are weighted according to their trade value35. For other minor 
metals reliable global trade data were not available and therefore the price series are weighted 
by their market value.36  
By visual inspection of data, the perception of above mentioned authors regarding the 
distinction of the most recent price boom in non-ferrous base metals can be confirmed. From 
2001 to 2008, the real price index for this aggregate metal group (solid curve) rose by an 
annualized 12.2 percent, surpassing previous real price records. This boom in metal prices 
                                                 
34 Prices are based on USGS reported prices. Prices are deflated by GDP deflator, 2000 = 100. The index for other minor 
metals excludes prices for lithium and tellurium and from 1960 to 1991 excludes the reference price for rare earths. 
Compare Appendix, chapter 9.2 for details 
35 The weighting factor of each metal is based on the metal's average 2002 to 2004 trade value relative to the total trade 
value of the respective metal group to which the metal belongs in accordance with IMF methodology 
36 Compare Appendix for details and chapter 4.2 for data sources 
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was preceded by a period of overall long-term falling prices37. Between 1980 and 2001, the 
price index for non-ferrous base metals fell by 3.9 percent annually. 
A slightly different picture emerges when inspecting the price development of refractory 
metals (dashed red line). The refractory metal index appears to track the non-ferrous base 
metals index since early 1970s, but the real price increase during the boom exceeds that of 
non-ferrous base metals. From 2001 to 2008, the annualized price increase of refractory 
metals was 17.6 percent. The period of falling prices after late 1970s is also more pronounced 
than for the non-ferrous metal index. Refractory metal prices fell by an annualized 4.9 percent 
between 1980 and 2002. 
Finally, the price index for other minor metals (dotted line) displays an overall falling trend 
since 1960 interrupted by pronounced yet short-term price spikes. The price increase during 
the boom remained below that of other metal groups with an annual growth rate of 9.8 percent 
from 2001 to 2008. Between 1980 and 2001, price fell by 6.6 percent per annum. 
The period of long-term falling prices preceding the boom is thought to have created the 
conditions for the following price development. It effectuated supply shortages as investment 
into new capacity was deterred.38 When prices picked up, mining companies were quick to 
bring on line mothballed capacity but ran into supply shortages for key goods and logistics39. 
The introduction of export restrictions on metals notably by China as a major exporter of 
metal commodities in reaction to tightening resource availability further fuelled the price rally 
and sparked fear of resource security both among policy makers, companies dependent on 
imports and in the general public (Exhibit 3): 
 
                                                 
37 World Bank (2009), p. 51 
38 World Bank (2009), p.52 
39 Pley/Rajagopaul/Rittner (2008), p. 21 
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Exhibit 3 – Hits of words "resource" and "security" in press 
Source: Own illustration40 
A press-clipping research for the combination of the words "resource" and "security" in the 
factiva press database yielded 7,000 hits in 1995 and 55,000 hits in 2008, illustrating the 
rising attention the topic received.  
The WTO does not prohibit such export restrictions provided that they are applied non-
discriminatorily41 and while not uncommon in other commodities, such as food42 and non-
mineral raw materials43, in the past they have rarely been applied to metal commodities. The 
reason for this may be twofold: 
 During the long-term period of falling metal prices and an overall abundant supply of 
metal raw materials, such tariffs would have made exports less competitive on a global 
market and burdened domestic downstream industries with potentially higher raw material 
cost. 
 Export tariffs divert domestic production volume away from the global market to 
domestic industries. For countries with only a small share of global trade, export tariffs 
harm the competitive position as importers are able to turn to other exporters, 
compensating the higher raw material costs. Major metal exporting countries in the past 
                                                 
40 Factiva (2009). Based on search in media classified "All English speaking publications". 
41 Piermartini (2004), p.2 
42 Nogués (2008) 
43 Tykkylainen/Lehtonen (2008) 
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rarely had a domestic market able to absorb quantities large enough to generate an impact 
on the global market and often rely heavily on raw material exports to buttress 
government revenues. 
This is changing with the rise of China. China's role in the metal commodity boom is widely 
identified as the major source of surging demand driven by industrialization and 
urbanization.44 However, its role on the supply side is less well understood. China's rise as a 
major consumer of metals and other commodities was preceded by China's rise as a growing 
global supplier of metals. In a tightening market for raw materials, the introduction of export 
restrictions generally serves several goals45: 
 Shielding the domestic markets from higher raw material cost 
 Nourishing a domestic manufacturing industry: As exports restrictions do not apply to 
finished products, export restrictions give Chinese manufacturers a raw material cost 
advantage over foreign manufacturers. Overall, export restrictions lead to distortions in 
the efficiency of production as it encourages inefficient producers in the exporting country 
and discourages efficient ones in the importing country. 46 
 Buttressing government revenues 
 Preserving domestic assets 
Such policy action by a major metal exporter is unprecedented and no other significant 
exporter except Russia on a much smaller scale and India for chromite ore followed this 
example.47. Whereas export tariffs increase the cost of raw materials for foreign producers at 
times of already high prices, export quotas seriously impede the availability of supply as 
exports quotas set a definite limit to the volume available regardless of the price the importer 
is willing to pay. 
As a reaction to tightening markets, a growing perception of resource scarcity and increasing 
export restrictions by China, three large importers took policy actions to target resource 
security: 
                                                 
44 World Bank (2009), p. 55; Pley/Rajagopaul/Rittner (2008), p. 21 
45 Barfield (2008), Nogués (2008), p.2 
46 Piermartini (2004), p.4 
47 United States Geological Survey reports a temporary ban of cobalt concentrates in 2008 issued by the government of 
Congo, the leading producer of cobalt. USGS (2008zo) 
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 In November 2008, the European Commission launched a new integrated raw material 
strategy to secure and improve access to raw materials for EU industry.48 
 The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) initiated metal specific 
policies in 2007. In the case of tungsten this includes assistance in the development of 
new mines abroad, increase of recycling rates and promotion of research for substitutes.49 
 In June 2009, the US and the EU jointly filed a WTO suit against China over export 
restrictions on certain industrial raw materials.50 
The outcome and the impact of these counter actions are pending at the time of writing not 
least because the current economic crisis has lessened tension on metal markets for now and 
diverted attention to more urgent topics. In any case, the extraordinary length and duration of 
the metal price boom is rooted in physical supply constraints resulting both from a long 
period of underinvestment as well as government measures distorting global markets. 
The economic crisis following the boom in commodities punctuated the price rally in 
commodities. Prices plunged in early 2009 or already in 2008 and demand for metals shrank 
across all markets. Companies put on hold or cut back investments to expand capacity of 
existing mines and to develop new assets in an effort to reduce costs and to address liquidity 
shortages. In some cases, far reaching decisions were made to abandon new projects and to 
merge with or to acquire competitors. 
Yet, two developments stand out, which raise doubt that this boom has indeed come to an 
end. Demand from China, the engine for growth in metal commodities during the boom, 
which prior to the crisis was thought by some to be driven mainly by exporting activities51 
turned out to be surprisingly robust, lending credence to HEAP's claim that Chinese demand 
growth is fueled mainly by domestic demand52. 
Also, prices, albeit plummeting from record heights, are still above their real historical 
averages in some metal markets. This is illustrated for selected metal markets in Exhibit 4: 
                                                 
48 EU (2009)  
49 USGS (2007f), p.4 
50 Euractiv (2009) 
51 Radetzki (2006), p.63 
52 Heap (2005), p.2 
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Exhibit 4 – Price change before and after price boom  
Source: Own illustration53 
Despite experiencing one of the worst economic crises in history and a major drop in metal 
demand, prices in some metal markets appeared to remain above their historical average in the 
first half of 2009 as illustrated in Exhibit 4. While aluminum and zinc dropped below their 
pre-boom average, nickel, copper, tin and lead stabilized noticeably above their pre-boom 
average. This development was even more distinct for selected refractory metals. Manganese, 
molybdenum and tungsten prices were more than double their historical average in the first 
six months of 2009. 
2.3 Rising economic importance of refractory metals 
The latest metal price boom beginning in early 2000 illustrated in Exhibit 2 was accompanied 
by strong growth in production volume. Between 2001 and 2008, cumulated production 
volume grew by an annualized 4.9 percent for non-ferrous metals and 3.4 percent for other 
minor metals. Output for refractory metals grew at an annual rate of 9.6 percent; double that 
of non-ferrous base metals as illustrated in Exhibit 5:  
                                                 
53 2009 price data from IMF (non-ferrous base metals) and InfoMine.com 
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Exhibit 5 – Cumulated metal production in 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Just as metal prices experienced a long period of stagnation prior to this boom, production 
volume also grew at a much slower rate between 1980 and 2001. Production volume for non-
ferrous base metals grew at an annualized rate of 2.1 percent. Production volume for non-
ferrous base metals stagnated on average over two decades. Other minor metals expanded by 
4.2 percent during the same period.  
Despite the stronger production growth of refractory metals, aggregated production volume of 
non-ferrous base metals in 2008 dominated refractory metal volume by a factor of 3.2 and 
other minor metals by a factor of 200. In order to assess the rising economic relevance of 
metals for consumers, it is necessary to capture how the amount spent for metals develops 
over time. The price of a metal reflects its opportunity cost, in the sense of what a consumer 
has to give up in order to purchase another unit of a metal.54 A rising price indicates that a 
consumer has to give up more, if he is to obtain another unit of the metal. Whether the 
consumer indeed purchases another unit is measured by the consumption development. 
Multiplying global production volume iV  of metal i  measured in metal content as an 
approximation of global consumption with the price iP  of metal i  yields the absolute amount 
                                                 
54 Tilton (2003), p.28; Tilton/Lagos (2007), p.20 
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spent on the metal, which may also be interpreted as the metal's market value, the revenue 
related to or consumer spending for the metal. Aggregating the market value of all metals in 
the aggregate metal group j  denotes the market value of the aggregate metal group: 



n
i
ijijij
n
i
ij cVPMV
11
        (1) 
ijc  is a conversion factor. If the unit price of the metal refers to the pure metal 1ijc . If the 
unit price refers to a processed form of the metal, e.g., a concentrate or oxide, which contains 
only a portion of the metal, 11  ij
ij
ij ss
c , with ijs  denoting the metal content in the 
processed form.  
It should be noted that calculating the market value by taking the price of the pure metal 
implicitly assumes that all the metal produced can be valued according to this price. Whereas 
non-ferrous base metals are mostly traded in this form, refractory metals are often traded in 
the form of ferro-alloys or concentrates and only a small amount is refined further and sold as 
pure metal. Ideally, all forms of processed metal should therefore be valued by their 
respective market price. Most of the time price information is not available in such 
granularity. However, the published price of a metal is usually the price of the metal in the 
most commonly traded form. This listed price is usually a reference price for other processed 
forms. By evaluating the relative change of market value based on this reference price rather 
than the absolute level, the margin of error is reduced.  
Also, aggregating the individual market values obscures differences between metal markets. 
General statements based on the market value development of the aggregate metal group must 
therefore be interpreted with consideration for the individual metal markets. Nonetheless, 
given the large amount of metals, an aggregated view helps to develop a first focus in the 
context of a top down approach, followed by a metal specific assessment. Finally, 
approximating consumption by global primary production neglects secondary production 
from recycled scrap, which implies that the absolute market value may be higher. However, 
the effect from omitting secondary production on the relative change of market value during a 
time period is assumed to be small. 
Having these caveats in mind, developing a perspective on metal markets by assessing their 
market value yields important insights. Exhibit 6 depicts the growth rates in market value of 
aggregated metal groups before and during the boom based on three-year moving averages to 
receive more stable results. For reasons of simplicity, the periods are referred to as 1980 to 
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2001 and 2001 to 2008 in the text and in the exhibit caption to illustrate the span of years 
covered. 
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Exhibit 6 – Real market value growth by metal group before and during the commodity 
boom 
Source: Own illustration 
It is apparent that for the two decades prior to the commodity boom, real market value growth 
was stagnant or slightly negative across all metal groups, reflecting falling real prices and low 
production growth. However, during the boom from 2001 to 2008, rising real prices and a 
significant increase in production yielded higher growth rates of market value. Particularly the 
growth of refractory metals dwarfed that of other metal groups. Annualized growth in market 
value was 33 percent for refractory metals, compared to 21 percent for non-ferrous base 
metals and 13 percent for other minor metals. In other words, the absolute amount consumer 
spent for refractory metals rose faster by a factor of 1.5 annually compared to that for non-
ferrous base metals. After a period of seven years at the end of the boom, consumers spent on 
average 2.4 times more on other minor metals, 3.8 times more on non-ferrous base metals and 
7.2 times more on refractory base metals compared to spending at the beginning of the boom. 
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Exhibit 7 to Exhibit 9 show the market value growth for individual metal markets and the 
decomposition55 into the respective value drivers real price and production as an 
approximation of consumption for the period 2001 to 2008. 
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Exhibit 7 – Growth and decomposition of non-ferrous base metals market value  
from 2001 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
                                                 
55 The decomposition of market value growth is estimated keeping either growth (or decline) in production or price zero and 
calculating the market value growth had only one of the factors occurred. The percentage share of each driver was then 
calculated based on its portion of the actual market value growth. Because the product, not the sum of production and 
price determines the market value, a residual remains due to multiplicative effects, which was attributed to production 
and price based on the respective share of growth. 
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Exhibit 9 - Growth and decomposition of other minor metals market value 
 from 2001 to 2008 
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Source: Own illustration 
The market value growth rates of non-ferrous metals span a range of 15 percent for aluminum 
to 27 percent for nickel. The increase in market value from 2001 to 2008 was predominantly 
driven by an increase in real price across all metal markets, attributing over 80 percent to total 
growth. The exception was aluminum, were market value growth resulted equally from 
growth in production and real price.  
A mixed picture exists for refractory metals. Growth rates for market value range from 20 
percent for niobium to over 50 percent for molybdenum. For molybdenum and vanadium, an 
increase in real price was the major driver, contributing over 85 percent of market value 
growth. The dominant share of real price increase holds true as well for tungsten, manganese, 
chromium, and cobalt, albeit to a lesser extent. For titanium and niobium, an increase in 
market value stemmed to over 60 percent from a rise in production. On average, rising 
production reflecting an increase in consumption attributed more to market value growth than 
for non-ferrous base metal markets. 
Finally, other minor metals display an equally mixed record. For the majority of metals, 
market value growth stemmed from an increase in real price, which overcompensated falling 
production in the case of thallium. In the case of rhenium and germanium, growth resulted 
mainly from a rising production. Market value growth for gallium and beryllium was negative 
despite rising production due to falling real prices. Market value of tantalum fell due to falling 
prices and falling production. 
2.4 Summary 
The recent boom in commodity prices beginning in early 2000 is extraordinary both in 
duration and magnitude, even compared with earlier super cycles as illustrated in chapter 2.2. 
Particularly refractory metals, albeit smaller in volume and absolute market value than non-
ferrous metal markets, experienced a remarkable growth in market value since the beginning 
of the boom, driven by an increase in real prices as well as growing consumption 
approximated by production.  
Both the distinctiveness of the price boom and the rising economic relevance of refractory 
metals carry several implications. The extraordinary persistence and magnitude of the boom 
and the fact that in several metal markets prices remained at an elevated level compared to 
their historical average despite experiencing one of the worst economic crises in history lends 
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support to HUMPHREYS' argument that prices may stabilize at a higher level56. It also casts 
doubt on the view that marginal production costs will remain largely unchanged after the 
boom compared to historical levels. Rather, it is a reasonable hypothesis that selected metal 
markets experienced a supply side structural change, which essentially means marginal 
production costs may be irreversibly higher than before the boom. 
With respect to refractory metals, they have emerged as a new class of raw materials during 
the boom. Formerly taken as available abundantly at low cost, an industrial consumer's 
spending reserved for a basket of refractory metals had increased by a factor of over seven by 
the end of the boom compared to pre-boom levels, an increase almost twice that of non-
ferrous base metals during the same time period. This increase in spending can only be 
justified by a correspondingly high economic value these metals add to steel grades and to the 
end products and is a reflection of the growing importance of refractory metals to economic 
growth. Thus, the role of refractory metals with respect to their cost and revenue position has 
changed significantly.  
Furthermore, the perception of resource scarcity has brought up the question of resource 
security from the realms of the past. The measures taken both by China as a major consumer 
and exporter of metals as well as the countermeasures of major importing regions illustrate 
how serious the threat to resource security is evaluated. The growing importance of refractory 
metals therefore also carries a new risk component to be considered by market participants 
and policy makers. 
In this context, it is imperative to understand the underlying demand structure of refractory 
metals to explain the roots of the growing economic value these metals effectuate, the factors 
influencing the supply and availability of refractory metals and to trace these structural 
influences back to their impact on price. 
                                                 
56 Humphreys (2009), p.104 
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3. Research background  
In the previous chapter, the distinctiveness of the price boom lasting from early 2000 to mid 
2008 as well as the rising economic importance of refractory metals as a sub-group of minor 
metals were emphasized.  
In this chapter, existing literature is reviewed examining the development of metal markets. 
Chapter 3.1 is concerned with research on long-term metal prices and underlying factors 
identified to impact the long-term price level and volatility. In chapter 3.2, literature on metal 
demand is covered to assess the relevant structural influences and their impact on the price of 
a metal as well as to review methodologies to analyze metal demand. In chapter 3.3, research 
on metal supply is examined to gain an overview of relevant structural factors influencing the 
supply of metals and their corresponding impact on the metal price. In all chapters, the 
coverage of refractory and minor metal markets compared to non-ferrous base metal markets 
is assessed. Chapter 3.4 provides a summary in the form of research gaps deduced and devises 
research questions to be answered in this work. 
3.1 Review of literature on long-term metal price development 
The formation of prices for commoditized products such as metals is the result of demand and 
supply factors. However, short-run price elasticities of demand and supply are both low. 
Demand for metals is usually not deferred in the short-run when prices are high as measures 
to switch to alternative materials take long to implement once destocking has been carried out. 
Short-run price elasticity of supply is also low as short-run capacity expansions are 
constrained in mining and processing, i.e. smelting, refining, and treatment. Short-term price 
development of metals is therefore rarely a reliable indicator for the longer term.  
Scientific research on metal prices relevant in the scope of this work thus focuses 
predominantly on analyzing prices over a longer period of time. Under such extended scope, 
price development may reflect long-term trends and discontinuities with a persistent impact 
on prices. Literature in this field may be clustered along its objective, which is either to 
analyze the cyclicality, the overall long-term trend or the volatility of metal prices and the 
approach, which is either based on statistical analysis or visual inspection combined with 
industry knowledge. Exhibit 10 provides a schematic overview: 
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Exhibit 10 – Classification of research on price development 
Source: Own illustration 
Research concerned with the cyclicality of metal prices attempts to identify regularities in the 
movement of real prices, i.e. identifying reoccurring periods of real price booms and slumps 
as well as measuring amplitudes and lengths of periods of price contraction and expansion. 
Scholars generally distinguish between business cycles with a complete cycle length, i.e. price 
rise and slump, between 1 to 2 year and below 8 years57 and super cycles with a complete 
cycle length between 20 and 70 years58. 
A major motivation for analyzing metal prices under the premise of identifying a long-term 
trend stems from the use of real prices as an indicator for growing metal scarcity. Given the 
nonrenewable character of metals, the depletion of metal assets has been predicted for a long 
time. The cost of depletion should consequently be reflected in the rising real prices of metals. 
However, scholars fail at large to detect long-term rising prices. Generally, studies maybe 
categorized according to the detected price trend, which is either falling, stagnating or 
developing along a u-shaped form. 
Factors influencing the long-term volatility of metal prices are thought to originate in the 
market organization, i.e. the interface between supply and demand as well as in the degree of 
supplier concentration. 
                                                 
57 Roberts (2009), p.93 sets the minimum length for expansion and contraction periods at 6 months, i.e. 1 year for one 
complete cycle. Jerret/Cuddington (2008), p.190 range business cycles from 2 to 8 years 
58 Jerret/Cuddington (2008), p.188 
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In the following subchapters 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3 literature on the three objectives is 
reviewed with the intention to identify underlying market forces initiating persistent price 
discontinuities and to assess the consideration of refractory metals. In chapter 3.1.4 findings 
are summarized. 
3.1.1 Metal price cyclicality 
As discussed in chapter 2.2, the price boom in metal prices is widely classified as a new super 
cycle59 rather than a mere business cycle. A review of literature focusing on the former is 
therefore justified to gain a better understanding of underlying market forces. Nonetheless, 
literature on business cyclicality may yield important insights regarding the underlying 
drivers of discontinuities in prices.  
Representative studies concerned with business and super cycles are listed in Table 1 along 
with the metal sectors and the time period covered. 
Sub-
category 
Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Roberts (2009)  Cyclicality statistically 
insignificant for most 
metals due to great 
variability 
 Booms and slumps offset 
each other, therefore no 
evidence for long-term 
trend 
Aluminum, 
copper, nickel, 
lead, tin, zinc, 
silver, 
platinum, 
mercury, 
ferrous scrap, 
iron ore 
1947-2007 Business 
cycles 
Cashin/ 
McDermott/ 
Scott (2002) 
General asymmetry in 
commodity price cycles: 
 Price slumps last longer 
than booms 
 Prices fall larger in 
slumps than during 
rebound, therefore 
Aluminum, 
copper, nickel, 
lead, tin, zinc, 
gold, iron ore 
1957-1999 
                                                 
59 Jerret/Cuddington (2008); Cuddington/Jerret (2008) 
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Sub-
category 
Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
evidence for long-term 
falling price trend 
 Probability of slump end 
(boom) independent of 
time already spent in 
slump(boom) 
Labys/ 
Kouassi/ 
Terraza (2000) 
 Evidence for cyclicality 
 Differences within metal 
markets concerning 
number of cycles, length 
and amplitude 
Aluminum, 
copper, gold, 
lead, nickel, 
silver, 
tungsten, tin, 
zinc 
1960-1993 
Labys/ 
Lesourd/ 
Badillo (1998) 
 Cyclicality statistically 
significant 
 Shorter term cyclicality 
than previously 
confirmed 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, tin, 
zinc, gold, 
silver, tungsten 
1960-1995 
Davutyan/ 
Roberts (1994) 
 Degree of cyclicality for 
duration can be 
established 
 Standard deviation too 
large to predict turning 
point 
Lead, zinc, 
mercury, tin, 
copper 
1850-1991 
(sometimes 
shorter 
depending 
on metal) 
Cuddington/ 
Jerret (2008) 
 Strong evidence for super 
cycles in analyzed metals 
Aluminum, 
copper, nickel, 
lead, tin, zinc 
1850-2006 
(depending 
on metal) 
Super 
cycles 
Jerret/ 
Cuddington 
(2008) 
 Strong evidence for super 
cycles in analyzed metals 
Molybdenum, 
steel, pig iron 
1912-2004 
 28
Sub-
category 
Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Heap (2005)  Recent boom period 
beginning of new super 
cycle driven by demand 
from China 
Copper 1885-2004 
Nelson/ Kang 
(1981) 
 Little evidence for super 
cycles in commodity 
prices 
Not applicable 
Radetzki 
(2006) 
 3 commodity booms 
since 2nd World War 
 All booms are demand 
driven 
Metal index 1949-2006 
Radetzki/ 
Eggert/ Lagos/ 
Lima/ Tilton 
(2008) 
 Recent boom caused by 
lag in establishment of 
new capacity 
Not applicable 
Humphreys/ 
(2009) 
 Capacity lag alone 
inconclusive as driver for 
price boom 
Not applicable 
Table 1 – Studies on cyclicality in metal series 
Source: Own illustration 
 Business cycles 
Research on this topic argues that commodity prices reflect short-term economic development 
or business cycle activities.60 Researchers are generally divided as to whether the price 
development of the past incorporates a degree of recurring periodicity and therefore if it is at 
all justified to speak of cyclicality. Most authors reject the hypothesis of a random walk on 
the grounds of statistical analysis, thus emphasize the relevance of their work. Yet, their data 
suggests a large degree of variability. DAVUTYAN/ ROBERTS point out that while they 
                                                 
60 Labys/Lesourd/Badillo (1998), p.147 
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have been able to establish a duration dependence of price cycles, the standard deviations are 
too large to develop "any ability to predict the turning points"61. ROBERTS notes that "there 
is such great variability in the duration of these phases that there are few cases of statistically 
significant differences"62. CASHIN et al. point out that there appears to be a general 
asymmetry in price cycles. Slumps last generally longer than booms and the probability of 
slump end (boom) is independent of time already spent in slump (boom). Also, prices fall 
larger in slumps than during rebound, therefore supporting the view of a long-term falling 
price trend. This latter point is rejected by ROBERTS who concludes that "price rises during 
expansions are by and large offset by falls during contractions thus there is little evidence for 
long-term trends in real metal prices"62. 
LABYS et al. fall back to perceived structural breaks in metal prices based on macroeconomic 
developments to meet required conditions of non-autocorrelation and homoscedasticity for 
their sample period. They then go on to identify business cycles in between these structural 
breaks. They divide the sample period from 1960 to 1993 into five "appropriate sub-periods, 
representing the major macroeconomic expansions and recessions since 1970, i.e. structural 
benchmarks"63. They refer to work of BADILLO et al. who, however, identified only one and 
not five structural breaks based on statistical analysis within a similar time period,64 so the 
origin of the chosen sub-periods remains unclear. No attempt is being made to relate these 
alleged structural breaks to metal specific underlying industry drivers. 
 Super cycles 
Super cycles are defined as long-term cycles spanning 20 to 70 years according to 
CUDDINGTON/JERRET. Research on super cycles is motivated by the long gestation 
periods of mining projects. DAVIS/SAMI observe that "An analysis of 54 major base-and 
precious-metal deposits around the Pacific rim by Sillitoe (1995) reveals that the time from 
initial exploration spending to the discovery drill hole averaged 14 years for base metal 
deposits and 22 years for gold deposits. There is then an average of a further 13.5 years to 
first production for base metal deposits and seven years to first production for gold deposits. 
That is, where exploration is successful there is an average of 27.5 years from initial spending 
to cash flow generation for base metal deposits. The average at gold deposits is 29 years"65. 
                                                 
61 Davutyan/ Roberts (1994), p.56 
62 Roberts(2009), p.97 
63 Labys/Lesourd/Badillo (1998), p.152 
64 Badillo/Labys/Wu (1999), p.324 
65 Davis/Sami(2006), p.?; Sillitoe (1995), p.119 
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Obviously, some mining projects will ramp up faster, since not all are greenfield projects. 
Also, exploratory drilling is rarely followed directly by setting up a production site. Rather, 
initial drilling results may be put on hold to secure financing or to replace depleting sites. 
Nonetheless, evidence for the existence of long-term cycles would be important for mining 
companies for investment decisions, for countries relying on mining revenues through direct 
ownership or taxes and royalties and not least for consumers of metals to assess their future 
cost position.  
Research on super cycles in commodity prices goes back to so-called Kuznets or Kondratiev 
cycles, named after their authors. However, due to inappropriate statistical techniques, 
findings regarding the existence of such cycles have been met with some skepticism.66 
Consequently, analysis of longer term cycles with specific attention to metal prices is scarce 
and work on shorter business cycles prevailed. However, recent work by 
CUDDINGTON/JERRET and JERRET/CUDDINGTON, motivated by efforts of economists 
focusing on macroeconomic data, e.g.,COMIN/GERTLER67, has addressed earlier critic of 
lack of statistical rigor. Using band pass filtering techniques the authors conclude that they 
have strong evidence for the presence of super cycles in the six non-ferrous base metal prices 
as well as in prices for steel, pig iron and molybdenum.  
Having observed the existence of three previous super cycles based on statistical analysis, 
CUDDINGTON/JERRET and JERRET/CUDDINGTON emphasize the need for 
understanding the underlying drivers for this behavior and relate the cyclicality to structural 
changes on the demand and supply side: "Now that SCs have been measured and detected, 
explaining the factors driving these large price cycles becomes a high-priority task. Building a 
multi-sectoral model of the structural changes accompanying economic development, with 
explicit supply and demand roles for metals, would appear to be a productive approach to this 
modeling effort"68. 
RADETZKI, in his study of the anatomy of previous commodity price booms based on visual 
inspection, notes that "global growth of GDP and industrial production accelerated strongly in 
the periods just preceding or marking the beginning of the three commodity booms. This 
coincidence is so clear that I venture the assertion that all three commodity booms were 
importantly, though not exclusively, triggered by 'demand shocks'"69. He further concludes 
                                                 
66 Nelson/ Kang (1981), p. 741f. 
67 Comin/Gertler (2006), p. 523f. 
68 Jerett/Cuddington (2008), p.195 
69 Radetzki (2006), p.63 
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that "In my view, changed supply responses are not needed to explain the past and current 
events"70, thus exempting structural supply side changes from bearing any influence on long-
term price development. He also does not expect a long-term effect on raw material price 
levels from the economic rise of China and India: "Will this scenario [economic successes of 
China and India] have a bearing on the frequency, strength and duration of future commodity 
booms and the long run raw material price levels? I think not"71. He asserts that increasing 
demand for raw material in these countries results in increasing exports of manufactures and 
will be offset by reduced imports of raw materials from importers of these manufactures. 
Interestingly, he does not address the demand increase driven by rising domestic demand in 
these countries but treats the demand for raw materials between developing countries and 
developed countries as a zero sum game. He furthermore reasons that "Commodity producers 
can ordinarily accommodate speedily expanding demand without inflating costs if the demand 
trend is anticipated"72. Accordingly, supply capacity can always be added at the same cost of 
existing capacity.  
An analysis of HEAP draws a slightly different conclusion. He is in agreement with 
RADETZKI and JERRET/CUDDINGTON that the beginning of the new millennium marks 
the beginning of a new super cycle. While he concedes like RADETZKI that demand is the 
driver for the boom he differentiates that "Greatest metals demand exists in China's domestic 
market – not its export market"73. Furthermore, he explicitly names structural changes on the 
supply side as drivers of the price boom by stating that "production costs are likely to 
continue rising on a structural basis. The additional supply required to meet higher trend 
demand growth will be higher cost"74. However, he does not elaborate on factors that would 
drive a supply side structural change. 
In a later work, RADETZKI et al. label the recent boom in commodity prices as distinguished 
compared to other booms due to its durability. They suspect that a lag in the installation of 
new capacity is the main cause, i.e. they concede that supply side factors are also responsible 
for the price upswing. They conclude however, that once capacity is available, the price boom 
will end.75 This is questioned by HUMPRHEYS, who hypothesizes whether prices may 
plateau at a new elevated level. He also argues that "There may, nevertheless, be a supply-side 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Radetzki (2006), p.63 
73 Heap (2005), p.2 
74 Heap (2005), p.17 
75 Radetzki/Eggert/Lagos/Lima/Tilton (2008), p.125 
 32
dimension to this argument about structural change that could possibly have longer lasting 
significance for mineral prices"76. He sees the dramatic growth in availability of low-cost 
labour as key driver for the reduction of manufacturing cost, but estimates the effect on 
capital intensive extraction to be much smaller. The recent price boom according to him is 
therefore to a certain extent driven by "the resurgence of manufacturing [that] has a 
galvanizing effect on the demand for raw materials"77.  
3.1.2 Long-term trends in metal prices 
Given that academic literature in this field attempts to isolate a single trend over a long period 
of time, the scope of each study with respect to the time period concerned and the metal 
markets covered may influence results greatly. The time period chosen has an obvious 
influence on the results. The time around 1975 is an often declared "structural break" in many 
studies. The notion of falling metal prices in real terms is very much influenced by a 
perceived persistent decline in metal prices since the end of the 1970s. Furthermore, for lack 
of accounting for spurious correlation, some analyses based on statistical methodology rather 
than solid industry knowledge may reach different conclusions than others.78 Finally, the 
outcome of the analysis depends very much on the deflator used to discount nominal prices.79 
Numerous empirical studies on the long-term trend of commodity prices have been conducted 
and it is beyond the scope of this work to review them all. Representative studies, which for 
the most part focus on metal prices are listed in Table 2: 
                                                 
76 Humpreys (2009), p. 103 
77 Humpreys (2009), p. 104 
78 Ahrens/Sharma (1997), p.59 
79 Svedberg/Tilton (2006), p.501f. 
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Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Potter/ Christy 
(1962) 
 Falling trend in mineral 
commodity index comprising 
14 metals, 4 energy 
commodities, 14 nonmetal 
prices 
 Drivers for trend not specified 
 Index of iron 
ore, pig iron, 
steel, ferro-
alloys, ferro-
manganese, 
nickel, 
tungsten, 
copper, lead, 
zinc, bauxite, 
aluminum, tin, 
magne-sium  
1870-1957 
Smith (1979)  No continuous trend 
 Price series analysis 
insufficient for price 
predictions 
 See 
Potter/Christy 
(1962) 
1900-1973 
Slade (1982)  Prices follow u-shaped price 
curve, first falling, then rising 
 Copper, 
aluminum, 
lead, nickel, 
tin, zinc, 
silver, iron ore 
1870-1978 
Berck/ Roberts 
(1996) 
 Evidence that real prices of 
metals are trendless 
 Copper, 
aluminum, 
zinc, silver, 
iron ore 
1870-1991 
Ahrens/ Sharma 
(1997) 
 No particular trend in metal 
prices can be generalized 
 Copper, 
aluminum, 
lead, nickel, 
tin, zinc, 
silver, iron ore 
1870-1990 
 34
Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Krautkraemer 
(1998) 
 Falling trend in metal real 
prices 
 Copper, 
aluminum, 
lead, nickel, 
tin, zinc, silver 
1967-1995 
Cashin/ 
McDermott/ Scott 
(2002) 
 Declining price trend 
 No evidence for break in this 
trend 
 Industrial 
commo-dity 
index 
1982-1999 
Svedberg/ Tilton 
(2006) 
 Trend in prices depends on 
adjustment of inflation deflator 
 Copper 1870-2000 
Table 2 – Studies on long-term trends in metal price series 
Source: Own illustration 
As summarized in Exhibit 10, Table 2 indicates the range of conclusions reached by authors 
analyzing the long-term development of metal prices. Rather than reviewing all studies, a 
summary is provided to distill relevant opinions and patterns. 
Several theoretical models have predicted a rise in metal prices due to growing scarcity for 
centuries.80 Later studies, initiated by a first systematical approach conducted by 
POTTER/CHRISTY found that a mineral price index comprising fourteen metals, four energy 
commodities, and fourteen nonmetals, fell by 40% in real terms during the observed period.81 
POTTER/CHRISTY's systematic analysis triggered a range of scientific studies, which 
identify two general opposing market forces influencing metal prices: 
 Increase of extraction costs due to declining ore quality 
 Declining cost of production due to technical innovation 
The perceived interaction of these two forces is a strong determinant of the predicted price 
trend. In this context, a study by SLADE received considerable attention. Based on an 
analysis of the six non-ferrous base metals and silver and a model that uses as variables 
exogenous technical change and endogenous change in the grade of ores mined, she 
                                                 
80 For a review of the earlier evolution of such concerns, compare Tilton(2003), p. 7ff. 
81 Potter/Christy (1962) 
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concludes that there is "a U-shaped time path for relative prices"82. This trend is driven by 
"the historic counterbalancing influences of improvements in technology and deterioration in 
ore quality in determining production cost"83. For an industry example, she points to the 
copper industry in the US, where copper ore graded declined from 1900 to 1980 from 5% to 
0.7%. Despite such fall in ore quality, real copper prices fell until 1940 due to innovations in 
mining technology and equipment. As since then prices have been on the rise, she reasons that 
technological innovation is saturated and that declining ore grade continues to dominate 
production costs. 
Several authors object her findings. For one, it is pointed out that despite warnings of growing 
scarcity and rising cost of depletion, prices continued to fall after the period examined by 
SLADE. KRAUTKRAEMER observes that "nonrenewable resource prices did not continue 
to trend upward after the 1970s"84, thus rejecting SLADE's findings. He concludes that "there 
isn't a stable linear trend to most resource price time series"85. As a major reason for the lack 
of an upward trend in prices he points to technological innovation overcompensating the cost 
increases of declining ore grade. The same argument is repeated by GOMEZ et al. who 
conclude that the decline in the real price of copper is "a decline largely driven by the highly 
successful efforts of primary copper producers to reduce their production costs over this 
period"86. TILTON/LAGOS go even further and suggest that the ability of technical 
innovation to reduce extraction cost may go on indefinitely: "the challenge for innovation and 
new technology in keeping the cost-increasing effects of depletion at bay may be no greater in 
the future than it has been in the past"87. 
Other authors generally oppose the idea of identifying any trend on the basis of mere price 
analysis. Refining POTTER/CHRISTY's analysis, SMITH concludes that their and others 
findings that metal prices are following a certain trend is premature. He emphasizes that 
drawing conclusions on price series alone is unwise as a detailed knowledge of the underlying 
market structure and its changes is inevitable: "evaluations of resource scarcity without 
                                                 
82 Slade (1982), p.126 
83 Slade (1986), p.126 
84 Krautkraemer (1998), p.2079 
85 Ibid. 
86 Gómez/Guzmán/Tilton (2007), p.189 
87 Tilton/Lagos (2007), p.22 
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detailed analysis of the character of the markets for the specific commodities within each 
aggregate, as well as the institutional changes during the period, do not seem possible"88. 
3.1.3 Price volatility 
Academic literature on commodity price volatility focuses predominantly on two main topics 
influencing the level of volatility:  
 the impact of market organization 
 exchange prices versus administered producer prices  
 trading of futures and forwards 
 the impact of supplier concentration  
An overview of studies focusing on metal price volatility is presented in Table 3: 
Sub-
category 
Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Slade (1991)  Volatility increased due 
to structural change in 
market organization 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, silver, 
zinc 
1970-1986 
Brunetti/ 
Gilbert (1995) 
 Volatility is stationary 
 Speculation has only 
short-term influence 
 Medium-term influence 
on volatility stems from 
physical factors 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, tin, zinc 
1972-1995 
Market 
organization 
Figuerola-
Ferretti/ Gilbert 
(2001) 
 No evidence for increase 
in volatility 
 Change on market 
organization has no 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, silver, 
zinc 
1970-1997 
                                                 
88 Smith (1979), p.426 
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Sub-
category 
Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
impact on volatility 
McMillan/ 
Speight (2001) 
 Decomposition of 
volatility in long and 
short-term common 
factors 
 Long-term factors found 
to be influenced by other 
metal prices 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, tin, zinc 
1972-2000 
Slade (2006)  Volatility and volume 
forward trading 
positively correlated 
 No direct influence, 
linked by common factor 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, tin, zinc 
1990-1999 
Cox (1976)  Forward trading 
increases market 
efficiency 
Not applicable 
Simpson/ 
Ireland (1985) 
 Future trading first 
decreasing, then 
increasing effect on 
volatility 
Not applicable 
Carlton (1986)  Higher level of industry 
concentration correlates 
with lower volatility 
Steel, index of 
non-ferrous 
metals  
1957-1966 Supplier 
concen-
tration 
Slade/ Thille, 
(2006) 
 Higher level of industry 
concentration correlates 
with lower volatility 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, tin, zinc 
1990-1999 
Table 3 – Studies on volatility in metal price series 
Source: Own illustration 
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 Market organization 
In a much recognized study on the impact of market organization, SLADE identifies five 
distinct areas from which price volatility originates:89 
 Horizontal market structure, i.e. the concentration of the supply side industry90 
 Marketing method, including the impact of market organization, more specifically 
price setting mechanisms in metal markets, namely so-called producer price setting, 
where prices are set by an oligopoly of major producers and exchange-price setting. 
This in turn influences the motivation of buyers, i.e. if buyers are solely consumers or 
consumers, hedgers, and speculators 
 Demand factors, comprising the stability of output of the consuming sector and the 
ease of substitution 
 Supply factors, including the influence of cost stability, by-production, recycling on 
price stability 
 Time-period factors, i.e. exchange rate and rate of inflation 
Of these five factors she determines two, horizontal market structure and marketing method to 
be significant, i.e. measurable "with statistical accuracy".91 Of these two, her analysis of the 
time period from 1970 to 1986 reveals that the structural change in the marketing method 
appears most influential: "The increase in metal-price instability that has occurred in the last 
decade is entirely explained by changes in underlying market-structure and organization 
variables considered here. Foremost among these is increased reliance on commodity 
exchanges, which accounts for a significant fraction of the systematic variation across 
markets."92  
Subsequent studies question both the finding that volatility has increased and the conclusion 
that a structural change in market organization is to blame. In their research on the price 
volatility of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin and zinc between 1972 and 1995, using daily 
prices, BRUNETTI/GILBERT find no evidence that volatility has increased over time. On the 
contrary they observe that "except in the case of tin, volatility levels were beneath their 
                                                 
89 Slade (1991), p.1311ff. 
90 Slade does not specifically name the supply side when speaking of horizontal concentration. From the data she uses for 
her analysis, however, it becomes clear which industry she means. 
91 Slade (1991), p.1311. It is unclear on what basis she excludes the other three. 
92 Slade (1991), p.1337 
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historic average levels over 1993-95, a period of increased speculative interest in the metals 
markets"93. However, they find that volatility is itself volatile and distinguish three 
explanations for changes in metal market volatility:94 
 Information considerations: price adjustments on the basis of new information 
 Hedging or speculative pressure 
 Physical availability 
They argue that while informational considerations and speculative pressure do have an 
impact, theirs appears to be only short-term. They conclude that "much of the medium-term 
variability in the volatility of non-ferrous metals prices on the LME may be explained by 
physical (or fundamental) factors"95. Without elaborating what these fundamentals are 
specifically, they observe that a tight supply market with low stocks and little leeway to 
respond to demand or supply shocks is more volatile than a market with lower demand and 
large stocks. 
Building on the findings of BRUNETTI/GILBERT, MCMILLAN/SPEIGHT decompose the 
volatility of six metals in common short- and long-term factors in an attempt to further 
quantify their impact. Yet they link the price volatility of metals to one another rather than 
attempting to develop a deeper understanding of the drivers for this proposed connection or 
generally of the impact of underlying industry factors on volatility. 96 
FIGUEROLA-FERRETTI/GILBERT extend the time period used in SLADE's analysis from 
1970-1997. They divide this period into four sub-periods based on SLADE's example and 
visual inspection of data. Using similar statistical methods and monthly data they concur with 
SLADE that volatility till 1986 increased, but point out that silver was a dominant driver for 
this and that once silver is excluded, evidence for an increased volatility is much weaker. 
Extending the time period to 1997, they refrain from observing a "general tendency for the 
variability of exchange prices to increase over time"97, thus rejecting SLADE's notion that a 
structural change in the market organization of metal markets had any influence on price 
volatility. 
                                                 
93 Brunetti/ Gilbert (1995) , p.237 
94 Derived from Brunetti/ Gilbert (1995), p.244 
95 Brunetti/ Gilbert (1995), p.245 
96 McMillan/Speight(2001), p.206 
97 Figuerola-Ferretti/Gilbert (2001), p.175f. 
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Another topic that has received considerable attention when comparing administered prices 
with exchange prices is the influence of forward trading on price volatility. Forward trading is 
made possible through the introduction of exchange trading of commodities. Scientific 
opinion on whether this form of trading increases of decreases price volatility is divided. An 
influential work by COX summarizes the empirical findings of his time and concludes that "a 
significant price effect of future trading reflects an increase in market information"98, and 
more specifically that the comparison of seven non-metal commodities across a period 
including times of future trading and no future trading conceded a lesser volatility when 
future trading was allowed.  
SIMPSON/IRELAND investigate the impact of financial futures on the cash market for 
treasure bills. Summarizing the scientific work of their time, they can find little evidence "on 
destabilizing speculation in financial futures markets "99. Based on their own analysis they 
conclude that there was indeed a volatility reducing effect when future trading was introduced 
but this effect vanished when trading volume increased.100 
SLADE/THILLE conclude that while predictions of destabilizing speculation models is 
mixed, a positive correlation between the two variables price volatility and forward trading 
volume exist. However, testing for a direct connection between the two, they conceded that 
"the link between the two is not direct and that both variables are influenced by a common 
factor such as the arrival of new information"101, thus refining earlier research, which 
observed a directly destabilizing effect. Their work is also a notably exception insofar that 
price data are analyzed together with underlying industry data, namely supplier concentration. 
This is unique as the focus on price data alone is the prevalent method of most price analyses. 
 Supplier concentration 
The impact of the level of concentration of the supplier side on price level and volatility has 
been investigated and debated for some time. Researchers analyzing the impact of industry 
concentration on price volatility are unusually unanimous in their findings that prices appear 
to be more stable in oligopolies. Two representative works on this topic are therefore only 
briefly presented. 
                                                 
98 Cox (1976), p.1232f. 
99 Simpson/Ireland (1985), p.372 
100 Simpson/Ireland (1985), p.378 
101 Slade/Thille (2006), p.251 
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Analyzing the price rigidity of steel and a price index of non-ferrous metals as well as other 
commodities and some manufactures, CARLTON concludes that "The level of industry 
concentration is strongly correlated with rigid prices. The more concentrated the industry, the 
longer is the average spell of price rigidity."102 SLADE/THILLE observe the prices of the six 
non-ferrous base metals between 1990 and 1999 and concur with earlier observations that " 
commodities that are produced in more concentrated markets tend to have more stable 
prices."103 
Another aspect of supplier concentration that is often analyzed together with its impact on 
volatility is the influence on price level. Several authors conclude that a higher supplier 
concentration leads to higher price levels. SLADE/THILLE suggest that "strong evidence that 
a more concentrated industry is associated with higher prices, as the conventional wisdom 
predicts"104. MAXWELL predicts a change in the price level of nickel due to a decreasing 
supplier concentration.105 
3.1.4 Summary and evaluation 
One can summarize that scientific studies of long-term price trends and price cyclicality based 
on statistical analysis generally assume an "agnostic view"106 of the subject. The majority of 
studies are concerned with finding evidence for the existence of a phenomenon in price 
development, i.e. the "what" but fall short of the "why", i.e. the change in underlying market 
forces. In the majority of cases, scholars are concerned with analyzing price data and make 
little effort to relate findings to underlying market forces. The statistical rigour of many 
studies to identify and define price cyclicality or a long-term trend is thus unmatched by 
comprehensive empirical research on the causes of such phenomenon. In studies based on 
visual inspection attempts are made to relate price trends and discontinuities back to 
underlying market drivers. However, a reference to the stylized fact of technical innovation 
overcompensating the cost of depletion prevails. A notable exception is RADETKI's study on 
the anatomy of commodity super cycles. However, his conclusions are based on the analysis 
of a metals and mineral and other indices, thus remaining on an aggregated level. 
Studies on price volatility yield more tangible explanations as to which underlying industry 
factors influence volatility. Albeit divided in opinion, evidence suggests that a changing 
                                                 
102 Carlton (1986), p.638 
103 Slade/Thille (2006), p.249 
104 Slade/Thille (2006), p.246 
105 Maxwell (1999), p.14 
106 Cuddington/Jerret (2008), p.2 
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market structure towards exchange trading as well as supplier concentration has a measurable 
impact on metal price volatility. 
A further insight from all reviewed studies on metal price development is that refractory or 
other minor metal prices are rarely in the scope of mineral economists. The exceptions 
reviewed in this work are listed in Table 4:  
Author Refractory 
metals covered 
Other minor metals Data/ analysis 
constraint 
Potter/ Christy 
(1962) 
Manganese, 
magnesium, ferro-
alloys 
 Part of a metal 
index 
Labys/ 
Kouassi/ 
Terraza (2000)  
Tungsten   
Jerret/ 
Cuddington 
(2008) 
Molybdenum   
Labys/ 
Lesourd/ 
Badillo (1998) 
Tungsten   
Table 4 - Coverage of refractory and other minor metals in literature on metal price 
series 
Source: Own illustration 
Of thirty studies reviewed on metal price development, only four contain price series of 
refractory metals. POTTER/CHRISTY include manganese and magnesium as well as ferro-
alloys in their work but only as part of an index with non-ferrous base metals. LABYS et al. 
include a price series of tungsten. Neither authors specify their choice. A notable exception 
are JERRET/CUDDINGTON, who justify their choice of a price series of molybdenum by 
assessing that the metal is "critical in the early phases of industrial development and 
urbanization"107. 
                                                 
107 Jerret/Cuddington (2008), p.188 
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3.2 Review of literature on metal demand 
The purpose of the following chapters is to review economic literature on metal demand with 
the aim to identify structural factors that are thought to predominantly influence metal prices 
as well as to gain an overview of methodologies to analyze metal demand. While the 
importance of these structural factors rooted in demand for metal price development is being 
acknowledged in studies on metal price development, a proper verification and substantiation 
in metal price research is largely absent.108 Also, the metal markets covered are evaluated to 
assess whether the omission of refractory or other minor metals in literature on metal prices 
prevails. 
Myriads of factors may potentially influence metal demand and numerous studies are devoted 
to understanding underlying structural factors and deduce demand models accordingly. Which 
factors are considered depends often on the analytical approach chosen. RADETZKI/TILTON 
identify four methodologies in academic literature109 to analyze metal demand: 
 Intensity of use technique 
 Demand function estimation 
 Production function estimation 
 Input-output analysis 
Of all methodologies, the intensity of use (IU) technique appears to be the most prominent. A 
series of theories emerged from it, attempting to find recurring, metal independent patterns of 
the development of metal used by an economy per unit of national income. The IU technique 
and theories derived from it will be reviewed in chapter 3.2.1. Another albeit less commonly 
applied methodology is the demand function estimation, which will be reviewed chapter 
3.2.2. The production function estimation, which is employed less frequently is covered in 
brief in chapter 3.2.3. The input-output analysis is rarely used anymore and is therefore not 
explicitly reviewed in this work. 
3.2.1 Intensity of use concept 
The intensity of use concept constitutes that an economy's metal demand depends on the 
economy's macroeconomic development usually measured by GDP as well as by the 
                                                 
108 Compare chapter 3.1 
109 Radetzki/Tilton (1990), p.25ff. 
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economy's mix of product output and the individual metal concentration in each product.110 
Specifically, demand tD  of a metal may be expressed as: 


 t
n
i
ititt PaD
1
          (1) 
where iP  denotes the economy's output of the ith final good in physical units, ia  the amount 
of the metal used for the ith good, and tn  the number of goods produced in the economy in 
the period of time t. Dividing the total output of the ith good itP  by the economy's income tY  
during t yields 
t
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From equation (4) it becomes clear that the intensity of use (IU) in time period t is a function 
of the material composition of product (MCP) ita  and the production composition of income 
(PCI) itb . The former expresses the mix of materials used to produce individual goods while 
the latter expresses, which goods are produced in the economy. 
The technique of applying the IU concept to a given metal consumption comprises a set of 
consecutive steps to analyze an economy's metal demand. Exhibit 11 provides an overview: 
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Intensity of
use technique
(IU)
Separation of
influence on
metal demand in
Changes in GDP Changes in IUStep 1
Underlying drivers
for GDP change
Change in MCPChange in PCI
Underlying
drivers for
PCI change
• Intersectoral
shifts
• Intrasectoral
• shifts
• Trade shifts
Underlying
drivers for
MCP change
• Substitution
• Trade shifts
• Other
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Level of 
quantifi-
cation
high
low
 
Exhibit 11 – Steps in intensity of use technique 
Source: Own illustration, following Radetzki/Tilton (1990) 
The first step separates to the extent possible changes in GDP from changes in IU. In a second 
step, if relevant, underlying causes for changes in GDP are assessed. As this step is a field of 
its own and often beyond the scope of studies analyzing metal demand, mineral economists 
tend to draw on research from this field or take GDP change as given. In a third step, it is 
attempted to split changes in IU into the two general drivers: product composition of income 
(PCI) and material composition of product (MCP). Naturally, changes in PCI and MCP are 
ultimately driven by changes in underlying drivers, which are examined in a final step. For 
changes in PCI, intersectoral shifts, e.g., a declining industry sector versus a rising service 
sector or intrasectoral shifts, e.g., the rise of information technology and the subsequent shift 
towards different materials can be reasons for change. Underlying drivers for changes in MCP 
are thought to be driven, e.g., by substitution of new materials for older ones. An often quoted 
example is the replacement of copper by fiber optics in telecommunications111. 
As indicated on the right hand side in Exhibit 11, the level of quantification is decreasing with 
every step. While the separation of changes in metal demand between change in GDP and 
change in IU is relatively simple, the latter steps often have to be based on qualitative 
assessment and solid understanding of the industry and its interrelations. Nonetheless, the top 
                                                 
111 Key/Schlabach (1986), p.433f. 
 46
down procedure and the in-depth analysis of the IU technique is a reliable approach to 
identify underlying relevant industry drivers.  
On the basis of the IU technique, several economic theories have been developed. The most 
influential is the concept of dematerialization, also named intensity of use hypothesis. The 
concept and academic literature concerned with it will be reviewed in chapter 3.2.1.2. 
The development of the transmaterialization and the rematerialization theory was sparked by 
several short-comings of the dematerialization theory. Both theories offer an alternative 
approach to dematerialization and are reviewed in chapter 3.2.1.2.  
In the following subchapters, academic literature on both the intensity of use technique as 
well as the economic theories that are based on it are reviewed with the intention to identify 
empirically relevant underlying drivers for metal consumption. 
3.2.1.1 Studies applying intensity of use technique 
In this chapter, studies applying the intensity of use technique to metals and economies are 
reviewed in the attempt to identify underlying structural factors with a measurable influence 
on price. Also, the coverage of refractory or other minor metal markets is assessed. Table 5 
contains and overview of relevant studies and their findings: 
Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Tilton (1985)  Major structural 
change in 
intensity of use 
Aluminum, 
nickel, 
copper 
1950-
1982 
Intensity of use 
technique 
Roberts 
(1988) 
 Change in GDP 
and PCI are main 
drivers for 
structural break in 
metal 
consumption 
Aluminum, 
copper, 
nickel, lead, 
zinc, steel, 
manganese, 
tin 
1948-
1984 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Radetzki/ 
Tilton (1990) 
 Major structural 
change in 
intensity of use 
after 1973 
 Economic 
performance alone 
not cause, no 
single factor 
dominant 
Aluminum, 
copper, 
nickel, lead, 
zinc, steel 
1960-
1986 
Labson/ 
Crompton 
(1993) 
 No evidence for 
relationship 
between economic 
growth and metal 
consumption 
Copper, lead, 
zinc, steel, 
tin 
1946-
1989 
(deviates 
for some 
metals) 
Labson 
(1994) 
 Evidence for lock-
step development 
of metal 
consumption and 
economic growth 
for selected 
metals 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
zinc, steel, 
tin 
Updated 
data set, 
based on 
Tilton 
(1990) 
 Tilton (1983)  Different 
occurrences of 
substitution 
 Strongest impact 
from 
technological 
change 
Tin 1960-
1980 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
 Key/ 
Schlabach 
(1986) 
 Technological 
change split in 
evolutionary and 
revolutionary 
 Strongest impact 
from 
revolutionary 
change 
Copper, 
gold, cobalt, 
lead 
1955-
1985 
 Ebensperger/ 
Maxwell/ 
Moscoso 
(2005) 
 Industry sectors 
can be categorized 
according to life 
cycles 
Lithium 1984-
2003 
Table 5 – Studies on metals applying the intensity of use technique 
Source: Own illustration 
One of the first systematic analysis of change in intensity of use of metals was triggered by a 
persistent decline in metal consumption per unit of GDP beginning the mid 1970s. TILTON is 
one of the first to address this phenomenon. According to him, "This change […] involves a 
sharp break or discontinuity in the growth of world demand for metals"112. He analyzes that 
only a part of metal consumption decline can be attributed to decline in GDP and conjectures 
that changes in material composition of product (MCP) and product composition of income 
(PCI) may be responsible for much of the unexplained change. 
Continuing his research TILTON five years later investigates the decline in metal demand 
growth for the OECD countries, applying the framework as illustrated in Exhibit 11 to five 
non-ferrous metals and steel. He calculates that for most metals a change in intensity of use 
(IU) was the dominant driver of consumption decline and goes further to analyze how the 
change in IU can be split in change in MCP and PCI by reviewing case study literature on 
occurrences of substitution and resource-saving technology as well as inter- and intrasectoral 
trend patterns. A relevant conclusion in the context of this work is that he is not able to 
pinpoint a single dominant responsible factor explaining the differences in IU between OECD 
                                                 
112 Tilton (1985), p.131 
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countries nor the overall decline in consumption. His final remark illustrate the difficulty of 
singling out any major factors in the final step of the IU framework: "The slowdown and in 
many instances reversal of IU growth are the result of important changes in both the material 
composition of products and the product composition of income, which in turn reflect the 
combined effects of material substitution, resource-saving technology, an expanding service 
sector, and the rise of high-technology products within manufacturing"113. 
In the context of TILTON's work on OECD countries, RADETZKI focuses on the 
development of metal consumption in developing countries. He notes that IU does indeed rise 
in such countries and points out that "difference between the two groups [OECD and 
developing countries] is primarily due to their investment performance. […] Indeed, when IU 
is measured on the basis of GDI  [real gross domestic investment], the rising trend in the 
developing countries remains only for aluminum and nickel, the 'new metals'. For the other 
metals the IU trend declined in striking parallel with developments in the industrialized 
economies"114. He furthermore points out that there is a large degree of variability in IU 
values between countries and concurs with TILTON that metal consumption by country does 
not follow any coherent pattern. Rather he relates differences in consumption to national 
policies and identifies these as the most important drivers for structural changes in metal 
consumption. He therefore concludes that any attempt to explain or forecast metal 
consumption based on general economic performance is flawed as it does not take into 
account these individual factors which greatly influence structural change. 
Summarizing both findings on OECD countries and developing countries as well as centrally 
planned economies, TILTON concurs that economic growth and metal demand are linked but 
rejects the notion of a simple relationship. He suggests that the growth in GDP and growth in 
metal demand can be plotted as a linear relationship but axis intercept and the incline depend 
on the metal and the trend in intensity of use.115 
Focusing on eight metals, ROBERTS investigates a similar time period as TILTON and 
RADETZKI. He attempts to calculate the rates for MCP and PCI on a global scale using 
metal dependent indices and then analyzes the impact of the two and GDP on the declining 
metal intensity of use. He shows that a drop in GDP and a declining product composition of 
income is to blame for a drop in IU, while the development of the MCP rate, albeit falling, is 
not accelerating its decline after 1973. He concludes that an increase in resource-saving 
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technology or sudden material substitution is therefore not driving the decline in IU and 
speculates that the falling economic performance could be the reason for a change in 
consumer preference measured through PCI: "Lower per capita income has influenced 
consumers to shift away from purchases of heavy manufactured (durable) goods and 
investments towards more immediately necessary non-durables and other less metal-intensive 
products"116. However, analyzing a continuous decline in MCP over the time period of 1960 
to 1985, he conjectures that while a decline in PCI and in income may be causing short-term 
changes in metal intensity of use, MCP appears to be the long-term factor for gradual 
structural change: "PCI explains the short-term (cyclical) variations. However, over the long 
term the overall trend in intensity of use, and therefore metal consumption, is controlled by 
factors which are most dependent on technology (measured by MCP)"117.  
LABSON's research questions that MCP related factors such as innovation and technological 
change cause structural changes. From a classical statistical perspective he analyzes metal 
intensity of use in selected countries and the OECD over a similar time period as ROBERTS, 
TILTON and RADETZKI. He concludes that if one accounts for a structural break in 1973, 
selected metals on OECD level exhibit a stationary process, which means that metal intensity 
of use follows indeed economic activity. He concludes that "for the most part, innovations are 
not of such a deep nature as to impart a permanent influence of intensity of use over 
reasonably interesting time horizons." According to his interpretation, "technological shocks 
are not as pervasive as one might have thought and that only the relatively large, but sporadic 
events have a measurably lasting influence on metal demand"118. However, he concedes that 
general conclusion based on his analysis should be considered with care as his findings are 
rather mixed, with the outcome varying by both metal and country. 
The controversy of interpreting statistical findings on metal intensity of use analysis is 
illustrated by the fact that research published two years earlier by the same author, LABSON, 
rejects a stationary relationship between metal intensity of use and economic growth and 
suggests technological change, expressed by MCP, as an important driver for structural 
change. LABSON/CROMPTON analyze the same data as LABSON (1995) except that they 
exclude aluminum. They concede that "An important implication is that other random factors, 
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such as technological change perhaps, have a permanent effect on the relationship between 
economic activity and metals consumption"119. 
In his in-depth review of the development of MCP in the case of tin, TILTON focuses on 
substitution occurring in three sectors of the tin industry: beverage containers, solder, and tin 
chemicals. Table 6 illustrates the different types of substitution he identifies120: 
Substitution related to material 
composition of product 
Substitution related to product 
composition of income 
Material-for-material substitution 
Technological change in manufacturing 
Quality change of product 
Interproduct or functional substitution 
Table 6 – Causes for material substitution 
Source: Own illustration, based on Tilton (1983) 
Material-for-material substitution comprises the substitution where one material is substituted 
for another. An often quoted example is the substitution of the aluminum can for the glass 
bottle.  
Technological change in manufacturing may result from a change in input factors that impact 
the material intensity of production, e.g. the automated production of electronic products 
using of printed circuit boards is more tin intensive than hand soldering but the automated 
process is less labor intensive and therefore less costly. Interproduct or functional substitution 
describes the change in the mix of goods needed by a society. One example is the rise of 
cellular phones and the decline of landlines, which impacts the use of copper for telephone 
lines. 
The change of quality of a product may influence the material composition or material 
intensity of a product. TILTON suggests the use of lightweight glass bottles as an example for 
the reduction of the amount of glass used per bottle. He identifies three prevailing forces for 
material substitution: 
                                                 
119 Labson/Crompton (1993), p.149 
120 The following paragraph follows Tilton (1983), p.1ff. – Tilton defines in fact five different types of substitution. The 
occurence "technological change in manufacturing" in Table 6 summarizes both his definition for "other-factors for 
material" substitution and "technological" substitution. 
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 Relative material price 
In contrast to the wide spread belief that the price of a material relative to a substitute 
is the principal motivation for substitution, TILTON finds that evidence on this topic 
is mixed. He concludes that the impact of the relative price depends on the share of 
tin's price of total production cost, which lessens with the proceeding stage of 
production: "the price of tin has its greatest impact on material substitution at 
relatively early stages of production […].This is in contrast with the material 
substitution at later stages of production, which has significantly increased the use of 
tin. […] At […] these stages, the price of tin has had a small impact on final costs, and 
has easily been offset by other considerations"121. 
When price is affecting material substitution, the author distinguishes three different 
responses:122 
 Immediate change between substitutes according to material prices 
 Lagged substitution due to high lock-in costs with the material to be substituted. 
Substitution occurs only when it is assumed that relative price gap between old 
material and substitute is not temporary. Switching back requires price of the 
replaced material to fall considerably and sustainably below old threshold price. 
 Lagged substitution because new technology is required to replace the old by new 
material. High capital cost make a switch back unlikely even in the event of falling 
prices of the original material relative to the substitute 
TILTON describes the last type of response as the one with the strongest impact on tin 
consumption. He therefore concludes that "change in material prices typically have 
little effect on the mix of materials in the short run because producers are constrained 
by existing technologies. Over the long run, they have more impact"123. 
 Technological change 
The importance of technological change as a response to increasing relative material 
prices directly corresponds with the case of lagged substitution due to the introduction of 
new technology. Embarking on technological change to substitute for a material appears 
to be the most sustainable and irreversible form of substitution according to TILTON. He 
also emphasizes the unpredictable nature of this form of substitution: "its impact has often 
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been abrupt and uneven, at times stimulating and at other ties curtailing tin use. This 
random and discontinuous character of technical change makes it difficult to foresee its 
effects"124. 
 Government regulation 
"While less important than technological change, the influence of this factor appears to be 
growing over time"125. TILTON identifies the growing influence of numerous 
government agencies on material use, either directly through regulation of material use 
due to health concerns, or indirectly through promoting technologies such as more fuel 
efficient automobiles as a driver for substitution whose importance is rising, albeit less 
prevalent than the two others mentioned above.  
Though not mentioned explicitly by TILTON, the differentiation between the prevailing 
forces of substitution is difficult as they may be interconnected. E.g., technical change may be 
triggered by government regulation.  
Based on his findings, TILTON concludes that several assumptions in demand function 
estimation126 are implausible. In particular, he questions the concept of reversibility and the 
stability of the demand-price function, as commonly assumed in economic theory: "if the 
principal effect of a change in price on material demand occurs indirectly via induced 
technological change, as the studies here suggest, this approach reduces the demand curve to a 
sterile academic concept with little practical use"127. Furthermore, he conjectures that 
substitution can alleviate supply shortages based on structural changes in supply such as 
depletion of low cost, high-grade ores but appears insufficient to make a significant 
contribution to short to medium-term cyclical changes in supply causing corresponding price 
cycles, because of the lagged response of substitution measures, notably technological 
change. 
With respect to supplier power in concentrated markets he concludes that "Material 
substitution, however, can severely limit market power even in highly concentrated industries. 
Collusive efforts by established producers to raise prices substantially are likely to stimulate 
new technological activity, and eventually end in failure, with markets irretrievably lost"128. 
In the context of forecasting consumption he emphasizes the need to consider explicitly the 
complexities of substitution. 
                                                 
124 Tilton (1983), p.6 
125 Ibid. 
126 Compare chapter 3.2.2 
127 Tilton (1983), p.8 
128 Tilton (1983), p.9 
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The importance of technological change as an impactful occurrence of substitution is reflected 
by research of KEY/SCHLABACH who analyze the intensity of use of the US 
telecommunications industry for copper, lead, gold, and cobalt. They distinguish two types of 
technological change and identify respective drivers for each type129: 
 Evolutionary change 
 Miniaturization (all metals) 
 Material effectivity (gold) 
 Supply security (cobalt) 
 Revolutionary change 
 Copper for optical fibers 
 Lead for polyethylene 
They authors thus refine TILTON's analysis of technological change and concur that 
revolutionary technological change is "associated with major, rapid replacement of an existing 
technology"130, i.e. they indicate the profound impact of such change on the structure of 
demand and its lack of predictability. 
3.2.1.2 Dematerialization 
As mentioned in the introduction of chapter 3.2, the most influential economic theory that 
emerged from the intensity of use (IU) technique is the dematerialization hypothesis. It 
postulates that the IU of an economy is a function of its economic development, which is 
expressed as GDP per capita, and that intensity of use of a metal is dependent on the stage of 
economic development of a nation. At an early stage of economic growth, per capita GDP is 
low as are material requirements due to the dominance of an agricultural sector largely relying 
on manual labor. As the economy shifts towards industrialization, material-intensive and 
particularly metal intensive activities such as manufacturing, construction, and establishment 
of an industrial infrastructure expand. This leads to a rising intensity of metal use. At some 
stage, however, these metal intensive activities reach a level of saturation, as infrastructure is 
installed and demand for houses, roads, factories and technical equipment is satisfied and 
demand shifts towards services, which are less metal intensive. Thus, according to the 
                                                 
129 Key/Schlabach (1986), p.442ff. 
130 Key/Schlabach (1986), p.450 
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hypothesis, intensity of use peaks and starts to decline, while the economy continues to grow 
in the service sector. In academic literature this last step is often termed dematerialization, 
implying that economic growth in developed countries is decoupled from rising metal 
consumption.131 The theory also implies a gradual structural change of the product 
composition of income (PCI), which according to the theory dominates other trends such as 
substitution and technical change. 
The rationale underlying this concept gained popularity not least because of its simplicity. It 
also offers an explanation why the threats of scarcity and depletion of non-renewable 
materials have not yet materialized. The theory is widely dismissed today, yet initiated a 
series of studies on metal demand development and a host of other theories. 
Numerous studies analyze the veracity of this theory. A representative overview is given in 
Table 7: 
Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Malenbaum (1978)  Consistent 
dematerialization of 
developed industries due to 
structural change towards 
less intensive services 
Steel, iron ore, 
nickel, 
manganese, 
chromium, 
cobalt, tungsten, 
copper, 
aluminum, 
platinum, zinc, 
tin 
1951-1975 
Fischman (1980)  Declining intensity of use 
in developed countries 
Aluminum, 
chromium, 
cobalt, copper, 
manganese, 
lead, zinc 
1950-1977 
                                                 
131 Radetzki/Tilton (1990), p.27f. 
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Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Auty (1985)  Existing evidence for 
dematerialization flawed 
 Indication of cyclical 
substitution 
Tin, nickel, zinc, 
copper, lead, 
aluminum 
1970-1982 
Wernick/ Herman 
Govind/ Ausubel (1997) 
 Mixed evidence of 
dematerialization along the 
value chain 
Aluminum, 
copper, zinc, 
lead, steel 
1900-1990 
Cleveland/ Ruth (1999)  Existing research on 
dematerialization exhibits 
significant short-comings 
 No compelling evidence for 
dematerialization 
- Review of 
studies 
covering 
time period 
between 
1890-1994 
Fortis (1994)  IU development follows 
specific macroeconomic 
phases 
 Microeconomic 
developments cannot be 
ignored 
Aluminum, lead, 
copper,  pig 
iron, steel 
1860-1990 
(USA) 
1946-1990 
(Italy) 
Labys (2004)  Indication of cyclical 
substitution as opposed to 
dematerialization 
- - 
Bringezu/ Schütz/ 
Steger/ Baudisch (2005) 
 No evidence for consistent 
trend towards 
dematerialization 
 Declining 
Aggregated 
index of metals 
and minerals 
Not specified
Table 7 – Studies on dematerialization 
Source: Own illustration 
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One of the most influential analyses, which sparked a lively discussion on dematerialization 
stems from MALENBAUM. He analyzes the IU for twelve metals between 1951 to 1975 for 
the world economy by dividing them into groups and comparing them to the IU of the US. He 
finds that the IU for metals has the form of an inverted U-shape in developed countries. While 
he acknowledges different growth rates for raw materials among different regions, he 
identifies structural forces that cause "consistencies [that] are critical to the process of future 
demand estimation"132. Specifically, he identifies the following forces behind the declining 
IU trend: 
 Shift in economic sector composition towards less material intensive services away from 
manufacturing 
 Technological developments that increase material efficiency along the value chain from 
discovery to use in end products 
 Substitution 
However, he qualifies his findings when he notes that a complete analysis would account for 
materials consumed by a country through the import of finished goods. 
Several authors readily embark on this theory. Albeit not mentioning explicitly the concept of 
dematerialization, FISCHMAN, in a comprehensive study on global metal consumption and 
US supply difficulties, assumes an a priori decline of metal demand in relation to GDP in 
developed countries.133 FORTIS compares the development of the US and Italy by a priori 
assuming the veracity of the theory. He divides the economic development and the parallel 
intensity of use of several materials in three development phases called "take-off", 
"technological maturity", and "mass consumption"134. While he attempts to cluster the time 
period between 1865 to 1990 for the US and 1946 to 1990 for Italy accordingly, it is 
interesting to note that he occasionally points to microeconomic developments in Italy, which 
revived demand for certain metals counter to the expected trend. With respect to lead, he 
attributes a revival of consumption to the rise of the Italian ceramics industry,135, which 
implies that factors other than macroeconomic growth, dependent on country and metal 
industry also play a role in metal demand development. 
                                                 
132 Malenbaum (1978), p.12ff. 
133 Fischman (1980), p.17ff. 
134 Fortis (1994), p.83 
135 Fortis (1994), p.94 
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VAN VUUREN et al, develop a system dynamics model to estimate long-term demand and 
supply for thirteen world regions and assume a priori the validity of the IU hypothesis for the 
demand side of the model. Accordingly, they calibrate their average global demand function 
to result in a U-shaped global IU curve with a default "saturation level" for the metals 
analyzed.136  
WERNICK et al take a more cautious approach. They argue that dematerialization has to be 
analyzed along the value chain and attempt to measure the effect along four stages: resource 
extraction, industrial manufacturing, end user consumption, and waste. Focusing on the US, 
they conclude that the rise of alternative materials suggests a substitution rather than 
dematerialization and notice that end user consumption measured by weight is by no means 
dematerializing. Waste appears to be dematerializing due to recycling efforts.137 
Several authors raise fundamental critique of the theory of dematerialization. The dynamics of 
substitution suggest a dynamic change in metal consumption and thus in IU, which counters 
MALENBAUM's prognosis of a permanent decline in IU. Furthermore, the erratic nature of 
technological innovation as described by TILTON138 is difficult to reconcile with apparent 
consistencies critical to demand estimation identified by MALENBAUM. Others voice direct 
criticism. One of the earliest is AUTY, who disputes findings by MALENBAUM and others 
on the grounds that they are ignoring the complex and often unpredictable role of innovation 
and substitution on demand development. He suggests that rather than witnessing a permanent 
long-term trend, changes in material intensity of use may be cyclical: "An alternative route to 
determining the direction of structural change and tracing underlying trends in materials 
intensity is provided by research on the long-wave economic cycles"139. 
BRINGEZU et al. analyze the material flow of EU countries, the US and China to assess the 
development of resource productivity. An increase in resource productivity would indicate 
decoupling of resource consumption and economic growth. In order to receive a 
comprehensive picture, they account "for all (primary) materials directly used and at the 
second step comprise all resource requirements of an economy in order to consider the overall 
effect of substitution and efficiency increase"140. They aggregate various materials to a 
number of indices and include metals in the index metals and minerals. The authors note that 
                                                 
136 Van Vurren/ Strengers/ De Vries (1999), p.241ff. 
137 Wernick/Herman/Govind/Ausubel (1997) 
138 Tilton (1985) 
139 Auty (1985), p.282 
140 Bringezu/ Schütz/Steger/Baudisch (2004), p.99 
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this index' share of total material requirement fluctuates widely among high-income countries. 
With respect to a rising share of this index in Finland the authors concede that "The Finnish 
example shows that a development away from resource-intensive domestic supply industries 
towards manufacturing does not necessarily lead to a reduction of total resource 
requirements"141, thus, a structural change between sectors towards intuitively less material-
intensive sectors may not unilaterally reduce the metal intensity of the economy. 
 
CLEVELAND/RUTH provide a comprehensive and exhausting overview of the work 
conducted to date on the topic of dematerialization. They criticize existing work on the 
subject on five major accounts142: 
 Lack of statistical rigour has led many authors to make conclusions based on 
visual inspection of data. 
 Objectionable aggregation based solely on price or weight. The authors demand 
that any index should account for partial substitutability of the materials. 
 Failure to account for metals included in imported, finished goods. This can 
potentially cause two effects: the share of the manufacturing sector is sinking 
relative to the service sector as a product is imported and not produced 
domestically. At the same time, domestic consumption of raw material is reduced. 
While the material intensity of the importing country remains the same as before, 
calculating IU based only on raw material consumption may yield a declining 
development. This phenomenon has been termed import substitution by 
OPSCHOOR/REIJNDERS.143 
 Lack of empirical evidence that services are indeed less metal intensity  
 Neglect of factors offsetting dematerialization such as rising affluence and the 
rebound effect, which suggests a rising consumption in material that enables 
efficiency increases. 
Focusing on the US economy, the authors conclude that there is no evidence for a decoupling 
of the US economy from material consumption.144  
                                                 
141 Bringezu/ Schütz/Steger/Baudisch (2004), p.120f. 
142 Cleveland/Ruth (1999), p.45 
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Additional critique is voiced by LABYS, who identifies three other major short-comings of 
the dematerialization theory:145  
 The time period analyzed is often covering data only till the 1970s according to the 
author. This is not confirmed by studies reviewed by CLEVELAND/ RUTH, 
which cover time periods between 1890 and 1994. 
 The raw materials in focus of dematerialization theorists are only metals and 
industrial materials. LABYS criticizes that plastics, less common metals, and 
compound materials need to be considered as well.  
 Ignorance of a life cycle theory, which LABYS claims covers better the demand 
pattern of developed economies, as technologically advanced materials are 
replaced for older materials. 
The observation of a cyclical rather than permanent structural change initiating a long-term 
trend together with the highlighted short-comings of the dematerialization theory has given 
birth to the transmaterialization theory and the rematerialization theory, which are reviewed in 
the following chapter. 
3.2.1.3 Transmaterialization and rematerialization 
The popularity of the dematerialization theory is unmatched by other economic theories. 
Nonetheless, the methodological and theoretical short-comings of studies on dematerialization 
sparked two alternative but similar concepts, which are briefly discussed in this chapter, the 
transmaterialization theory and the rematerialization theory. However, few studies have 
investigated theses concepts further. Table 8 provides an overview of the five most relevant 
studies: 
Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Labys/ Waddell 
(1989) 
 Cyclical materialization 
suggests shift between 
material classes, not 
dematerialization 
Iron, copper, lead, 
tin, zinc, bismuth, 
molybdenum, 
nickel, manganese, 
vanadium, 
chromium, lithium, 
1885-1986 
                                                 
145 Labys (2004), p.3f. 
 61
Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
aluminum, cobalt, 
gallium, hafnium, 
platinum, titanium, 
titanium, rare earth 
Humphreys (1982)  Life cycle concept  for metal 
demand is of little value 
 Changing end use 
applications suggest 
superposed or sequential 
cycles instead 
Aluminum, 
molybdenum, 
gallium, chromium, 
copper,  tungsten, 
cobalt, antimony, 
tin, mercury, lead  
 
De Bruyn/ 
Opschoor (1997) 
 Intensity of use is N-shaped, 
suggesting periods of 
rematerialization 
Steel 1960-1995 
Hüttler/ Schandl/ 
Weisz (1999) 
 Specific shape of intensity of 
use country specific 
Aggregated 
material index in-
cluding metals 
1975-1990 
De Bruyn (2002)  Intensity of use is N-shaped, 
suggesting periods of 
rematerialization 
  
Table 8 – Studies on transmaterialization and rematerialization 
Source: Own illustration 
 Transmaterialization 
The transmaterialization theory postulates that rather than decoupling economic growth from 
material consumption as suggested in the face of declining material intensity of use (IU) for 
some metals, "a number of material IOU [intensity of use] patterns follow the commodity life 
cycle theory;[…] these life cycles occur in waves"146. This implies that "industries continually 
replace old materials with newer, technologically more advanced materials"147. A notable and 
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often cited example is the rise of plastics. In this context, "Transmaterialization recognizes a 
recurring transformation in the way in which economic societies use materials, a process that 
has occurred regularly, if not cyclically, throughout history"148. Consequently, developed 
economies' needs for materials are shifting to advanced materials: "Many developed countries 
have thus undergone an industrial transformation in which materials basic to 20th-century 
society are being replaced by materials with ramifications to the 21st century"149. Substitution 
and technological change are thus explicitly considered. Nonetheless, this implies that a 
permanent decoupling of mature metals is possible, as more advanced composite materials 
replace them.  
LABYS/WADDELL expand their analysis of material demand to engineered materials such 
as plastics and composites. They suggest that structural changes in demand explained by 
dematerialization is misleading and that such changes are better explained as cyclicalities. The 
authors argue that because these new materials tend to be lighter and more robust, the decline 
of materialization is inevitable. This only implies, however, the composition of materials 
change and that a quantity based ratio as used in IU analysis may not be a sufficient measure 
over time. The authors concede, however, that "To find a replacement measure is an 
extremely difficult task"150. They formulate two hypothesis which are applied to the US 
consumption of twenty metals and ten non-metals: 
 Hypothesis 1: materials follow a life cycle with five phases comprising introduction, 
growth, maturity, saturation (peak in intensity of use), and decline, based on 
HUMPRHEYS151 
 Hypothesis 2: life cycles for different materials occur in consecutive waves reflecting 
"changing economic, technological and social needs that have accompanied changing 
industrial development"152 
The authors cluster the commodities in focus in five groups with group one comprising the 
most mature materials and group five the most modern. They conclude that both hypotheses 
are confirmed. For each group, a life cycle curve with a peak in intensity of use is identified. 
Furthermore, the peaks of these life curves occur consecutively, with each group superseding 
the previous group, which dematerializes after being replaced by its successor. The authors 
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concede that their concept is entirely " technologically deterministic and does not include 
economic factors"153. This lack of consideration for economic factors, price interaction and 
production is also criticized by HUMPRHEYS concerning his own life cycle methodology. 
He concludes that the concept of a life cycle for metal commodities is of little value and 
suggests that given the changing end use of metals, cycles may relate to a specific application, 
and so cyclicality in a commodity is the result of superposing or consecutive subcycles.154 
 Rematerialization 
The concept of rematerialization is similar to transmaterialization insofar as it suggests that IU 
is not declining permanently but recovering in the period during the late 1980s, thus 
rematerializing after a period of dematerialization. DE BRUYN suggests that instead of 
MALENBAUM's U-shaped curve, intensity of use follows an N-shaped curve in the long run, 
implying a degree of cyclicality as the transmaterialization theory. He argues that "the 
phenomenon of dematerialization has often been explained by structural changes"155 and 
concedes that the notion of the rising service sector at a later stage of a nation's development 
is indeed appealing as "citizens in developing countries first show an appetite for material 
welfare […] and that only at certain high income levels do services become more 
important.[...] Structural changes thus provide a logical explanation for an inverted U-shaped 
pattern of resource use"156. The observation of an N-shaped pattern, however, does not fit into 
this logic because it would imply that "consumers, in the course of economic development, 
start to prefer material consumption again, after a period in which they preferred more 
services"157. Plotting steel intensity of use between 1960-1995 for the UK and the 
Netherlands against two dimensions, the value in the current year and the value in the 
previous year, he observes periods in time, when IU remains relatively stable, "moving 
around an attractor point"158. At some point this equilibrium stage is distorted by "(radical) 
shifts in technological and institutional paradigms"159 and intensity of use falls. This, he 
claims is the beginning of a phase of rematerialization: "Then the positive relationship 
between economic growth and materials consumption is restored and throughput rises again at 
approximately the same rate as the growth in incomes until a new technological or 
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institutional breakthrough enables another dematerialization phase"160. The author concludes 
that "Predictions on the future development of material use and dematerialization must take 
into account the stochastic imbalances in the relationship between material use and 
income."161 
It remains unclear how such behavior leads to an N-shaped curve, because if during a period 
of rematerialization, throughput rises at the same rate as economic growth, this means that 
intensity of use passes through periods of stagnation before falling again. Thus, a more erratic 
decline rather than a gradual fall as suggested by MALENBAUM would be dominating. 
Nonetheless, intensity of use would still follow a permanently falling trend. 
HÜTTLER et al., analyzing an aggregated index of material inputs including metals and 
minerals for the three countries Japan, Germany and Austria suggest that dematerialization 
and rematerialization are dependent on a specific economy. While they identify an irreversible 
structural change in the dematerialization of Germany, they suggest that Japan's economy 
experiences cyclical delinking from and relinking into material input over time.162  
3.2.2 Demand function estimation 
The popularity of the estimation of demand functions owes to the perception that the intensity 
of use technique and its concept of material intensity of product and product intensity of 
income as the main influencing forces of material consumption next to macro-economic 
factors measured by GDP are insufficient to account for the complexities that influence metal 
consumption. Several demand models have been developed to offer an alternative approach to 
determine metals demand. Among the variety of different models, approaches can be broadly 
summarized into two categories: 
 Demand-economic activity variables, sometimes considering substitute price 
 Demand-price relationship models 
Examples for both categories that deem relevant in the context of this study are listed in Table 
9: 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Suslick/ Harris 
(1990) 
 IU-framework can be 
improved by adding 
variable for technical 
change, price of metal 
and price of substitute 
Aluminum 1979-2000 
Roberts (1996)  Demand function of 
economic activity 
variables investment, 
consumption and 
government expenditure 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
zinc 
1950-1994 
Demand-
economic 
activity 
variable 
Pei/ Tilton 
(1999) 
 Demand is function of 
price, substitute price 
and income 
 Accounting for 
technical change and 
shift in consumer 
preferences explains 
elasticity of short-run 
demand to income 
Aluminum, 
copper, nickel, 
lead, tin, zinc 
1963-1992 
Demand-
price 
relationship 
models 
Hughes (1972)  Stable relationship 
between price and 
demand for several 
metals 
 Common metal demand 
function 
Aluminum, 
copper, 
chrome, gold, 
iron, lead, 
niobium, 
nickel, 
platinum, 
silver, tin, 
titanium, 
vanadium, zinc 
1972 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Nutting (1977)  Relationship between 
metal price and demand 
stable over time 
 Common metal demand 
curve 
s. Hughes 
(1972) 
1977 
Jacobson/ 
Evans (1985) 
 Relationship between 
metal price and demand 
stable over time 
Tellurium, 
antimony, 
magnesium, 
lead, zinc, pig, 
iron, 
aluminium, 
cadmium, 
cobalt, copper, 
gold, mercury, 
nickel, 
selenium, 
silver, tin 
1961-1980 
Georgentalis/ 
Nutting/ 
Phillips (1990) 
 Relationship between 
metal price and demand 
stable over time 
 Deviations explainable 
by inflation and 
industrial activity 
s. Hughes 
(1972) 
1975-1983 
Evans/ Lewis 
(2002) 
 Strong evidence for 
individual rather than 
common metal demand 
curve 
s. Hughes 
(1972) 
1980-1999 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Evans/ Lewis 
(2005) 
 Each metal has 
individual demand 
function with different 
income elasticities of 
demand 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, zinc, 
iron ore, tin 
1969-1999 
Table 9 – Studies applying the demand function estimation methodology 
Source: Own illustration 
ROBERTS develops a model, which expresses global metal consumption for the metals 
aluminum, copper, lead, and zinc as a function of three factors (products): a) world 
investment expenditure, b) world personal consumption, and c) government expenditure. He 
reaches different levels of influence for all three factors depending on the metal. His major 
conclusion is that world economic activity in these tree factors serves to explain world metal 
consumption quite well and that material composition of product is by no means constant but 
experiences changes over time.163 
SUSLICK/HARRIS attempt to estimate Brazilian aluminum consumption thirteen years into 
the future. They suggest that the historical fit of the U-shaped intensity of use curve can be 
improved by a lognormal model that considers also the price of the metal, the price of the 
substitute as well as technical change next to GDP. They concede, however, that technical 
change is impossible to measure and suggest time as an appropriate measure. Furthermore, 
they implicitly assume that copper is the only relevant substitute for aluminum by integrating 
the price of copper as the substitute price into their model.164 
Using a similar demand model as SUSLICK/HARRIS, PEI/TILTON attempt to model the 
cyclicality of demand more accurately. They suggest that failure to account for technical 
change and shift in consumer preference is the reason behind failure to empirically verify that 
metal demand is elastic to changes in income in the short run. This elastic behavior would be 
expected as production output of metal intensive industry sectors tends to be much more 
cyclical than GDP and consequently, elasticity greater than one should be observable in the 
short-run for metal demand and income change. Using time as a variable for both technical 
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change and shift in consumer preferences, the authors conclude that for high-income 
countries, elasticity is much higher when the above mentioned time variable is considered. 
For low income countries the results are less obvious as the effect of the time variable reduces 
the short-run elasticity. The authors suggest that this because rising demand from increase in 
income is offset by a demand reducing effect from new technology.165 
Others attempt to express metal consumption as a function of its price only. As stated by 
economic theory, metal consumption should respond to price changes. Accordingly, several 
autors, including HUGHES, NUTTING, and JACOBSON/ EVANS and GEORGENTALIS et 
al. estimate a relationship between the price and the global consumption of several metals that 
follows the relationship 
)ln()ln()ln( itit CP          (1) 
where itP  is the metal price, and itC is the annual global consumption.166 )ln(  is intercept 
value of the )ln( itP -axis and the (theoretical) price at which consumption would drop to 
zero.  is the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. Its value is a measure for the ease of 
substitution of one metal by another. In this model, "world supply or production is 
predetermined by exogenous factors such as mining conditions and economic 
considerations"167. For JACOBSON/EVANS, the parameters   and   are also time 
dependent. The above mentioned authors calculate this relationship for different points in time 
and a variety of metals (compare Table 9 for details). They make two important observations. 
First, the values for   appear to be similar between the different metals. Second, the values 
for   remain constant from year to year, which implies that metals have a common price 
elasticity. This leads some authors to conclude that a number of metals share a common 
demand curve that is stable over time.  
EVANS/LEWIS (2002) and EVANS/LEWIS (2005) question the notion of a common 
demand curve. They state that this would imply that: "all the metals placed on it must be 
equally good substitutes in each of their end use markets"168. Furthermore, "the supply 
function for each metals would have to be perfectly price inelastic"169. They concede that 
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while some metals may be substitutes for others in specific end use applications, by no means 
does this account for all the metals reviewed by the authors (s. Table 9). They suggest that the 
allegedly common demand curve is a so-called mongrel function, a mixture of a supply and 
demand curve put through a set of individual metal demand functions. They test this 
hypothesis and find evidence that each metal has its own demand curve. They conclude that 
while metal price and consumption still have roughly the same price elasticity of demand: 
"this relationship should be interpreted as a mongrel function rather than a stable common 
metals demand curve. The stability over time probably reflects the fact that the same type of 
information is averaged each year"170. Furthermore, the speeds of price adjustments are found 
to differ greatly between metals. Finally, the fact that the long run demand elasticities of all 
metals to industrial activity is below one except for aluminum lets the authors conclude that 
these metals' share of world economic output has been shrinking over time, an implicit 
confirmation of studies concerned with shrinking intensity of metal use in certain economies. 
3.2.3 Production function estimation 
The production function is somewhat less popular than the demand function or intensity of 
use approach. Metal demand is derived through estimating the production function of an end 
product or an industry, of which metal is an input factor. By expressing metal input as a 
function of other complementing input factors such as energy, labor, and capital or of possible 
substitutes for other raw materials, total metal demand of a specific application or an entire 
industry may be estimated. The approach is thus used primarily to analyze material 
substitution.171 Table 10 contains a selection of studies from this field: 
Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Kopp, Raymond; 
Smith, Kerry 
(1980) 
 Estimation of production 
function for complex 
technology subject to far 
reaching assumptions 
Iron ore, scrap - 
                                                 
170 Evans/Lewis (2002), p.104 
171 Tilton (1990), p.30 
 70
Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Slade, Margaret E. 
(1981) 
 Production function approach 
has several shortcomings: 
 lack of dynamic change 
 aggregation of inputs  
- - 
Choe, Boum-Jong 
(1989) 
 IU-framework insufficient to 
explain structural change in 
demand after 1970 
 Production factors capital, 
labor energy also needed to 
explain change  
Metal index 1950-1985 
Table 10 – Studies applying the production function methodology 
Source: Own illustration 
SLADE provides a review of studies on production functions. She gathers that motivation for 
analyzing the substitutability of metals stems primarily from concerns of short-run availability 
and long-term depletion concerns.172 As major shortcomings of the production function 
approach she identifies the difficulty resulting from using aggregated inputs and from 
introducing dynamic change of elasticities between inputs. The former is inevitable to reduce 
the number of factorial inputs and technological processes but appears to reduce the 
informational value of the model considerably. Introducing dynamic change appears to be 
possible in very narrow market boundaries only.173 
KOPP/SMITH's work on three different cost-minimizing models for different types of steel 
production processes illustrates similar shortcomings. They too define nine aggregated factor 
inputs, including iron ore and scrap without addressing the possible dynamics of substitution 
between aggregated factors. In order to be able to account for the complex substitution 
elasticities between factor inputs, the authors qualitatively define a "conventional practice"174 
based on experimental analysis, which they concede are specific to the features of the 
experiment and are difficult to extrapolate. 
                                                 
172 Slade (1981), p.103 
173 Slade (1981), p.106f. 
174 Kopp/Smith (1980), p.631ff. 
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CHOE's study on how to explain falling metal consumption in several countries after 1974 is 
a direct response to TILTON's175 early work. CHOE expresses doubt that factors such as 
material substitution and material-saving processes experienced an accelerated development 
or a structural change since the 1970s as there appear to be no grounds to conclude a drastic 
change.176 He suggests that more factors are relevant than offered by the intensity of use 
framework and introduces a model, which includes the metal price, the labor wage rate, price 
of energy and the price of other materials including substitute materials. He defines structural 
change as a shift in the above mentioned factors of the demand model. His findings suggest 
that there is no compelling evidence of demand side structural change in metal consumption 
in the US. He further concludes that non-metal inputs, such as capital and energy, are more 
relevant variables for explaining structural change in metal demand than the price of the metal 
in focus. The substitutability and complementarity of inputs and metals and the fact that metal 
costs are usually small relative to non-metal inputs suggest that the latter have a strong 
influence on metal demand development. 
3.2.4 Summary and evaluation 
Scholars are largely in agreement that on a general level metal demand is to some extent 
influenced by  
 income 
 the price of the metal relative to the price of substitutes and complements 
 technological change (both manufacturing technology and product improvement) 
 consumer preference 
 government activities in the form of national policies 
as the six main determinants.177 Differences abound regarding the exact impact and nature of 
the influence. With respect to the influence of an economy's income, the theory of 
dematerialization is widely dismissed today. Nonetheless, the fact that metal intensity of use 
is falling in developed countries and rising in emerging economies is undisputed. The relative 
price of a metal is an important variable in demand and production functions but dismissed in 
                                                 
175 Tilton (1985) 
176 Choe (1989), p.7 
177 Tilton (1992), p.47f. 
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some empirical analyses as much less relevant than economic theory suggests.178 
Technological change on the other hand is thought to have a much stronger influence, though 
its impact may only be noticeable when it occurs in revolutionary form. While examples for 
revolutionary technological change exist throughout the history of metals, the evolutionary, 
gradual change appears to be more common.179 A change in consumer preference affecting 
metal consumption may often be an indirect effect of rising income and national policies.  
It is noteworthy that these conclusions are for the most part drawn based on the analysis of 
non-ferrous metal demand. Few authors include refractory or other minor metals and if they 
do, their analysis is confined by several constraints. 
Author Refractory 
metals 
covered 
Other minor metals Data/ analysis constraint 
Hughes (1972) Chromium, 
niobium, 
titanium, 
vanadium, 
 Global scope only, world 
production for global con-
sumption 
Malenbaum 
(1978) 
Manganese, 
chromium, 
cobalt, 
tungsten 
 Based on 12 global regions 
Fischbaum 
(1980) 
Chromium, 
cobalt, 
manganese 
 Based on 12 global regions 
Humphreys 
(1982) 
Molybdenum, 
chromium, 
tungsten, 
cobalt 
Antimony, gallium Global scope only, world 
production for global con-
sumption 
Key/Schlabach 
(1986) 
Cobalt  Qualitative perspective only 
                                                 
178 Tilton (1983), p.5 
179 Compare also chapter 3.3.2.2 on technical innovation in mining 
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Author Refractory 
metals 
covered 
Other minor metals Data/ analysis constraint 
Roberts (1988) Manganese  Global scope only, world 
production for global con-
sumption 
Jacobson/ 
Evans (1988) 
Cadmium, 
cobalt 
Tellurium, antimony Global scope only, world 
production for global 
consumption 
Labys/ Waddell 
(1989) 
Bismuth, 
molybdenum, 
manganese, 
vanadium, 
chromium, 
cobalt, 
titanium  
Lithium, bismuth, gallium, 
hafnium, rare earth 
US focus only 
Ebensperger et 
al. (2005) 
 Lithium Qualitative perspective only 
Table 11 – Coverage of refractory and other minor metals in literature on metal demand 
Source: Own illustration 
As illustrated in Table 11, the most common constraint in analysis of refractory or other 
minor metals is that it is conducted on a global scale with consumption approximated by 
world production, lacking an economy specific analysis. The opposite constraint is a too 
narrow focus, mostly on the US only. A further confinement is a purely qualitative approach, 
lacking quantitative analysis to support hypotheses. It should be noted that the reviewed 
studies on metal demand provide by no means a complete overview of all studies on metal 
demand, a task beyond the scope of this work. The conclusion that refractory or other minor 
metals are underrepresented is based solely on studies reviewed in this work. 
It emerges that the rigor of quantitative analysis found in most studies on non-ferrous metal 
demand is unmatched on the refractory metal front. Yet the demand structure of refractory 
metals in particular is distinctively different in many ways and it is therefore unclear, whether 
insights on metal demand development apply to refractory metal markets as well.  
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These metals are often only marginal constituents of the final product in terms of volume and 
cost, yet add important and indispensable functions to applications. As such, they play an 
important role in technical innovation. Given their small global production volume, the 
decision to use a certain refractory metal in a new application may have a significant impact 
on the entire demand structure and future demand growth. Also, substitution dynamics may 
differ. The decision to substitute a certain steel grade directly affects the alloying metals 
contained even though their price may not influence the substitution decision itself. Finally, 
but foremost, it is unclear whether the IU of refractory metals is indeed falling in developed 
countries and rising in emerging economies.  
3.3 Review of literature on metal supply 
The purpose of this chapter is to review academic literature on metal supply to gain a deeper 
understanding of the nature of market forces influencing metal supply and to develop an 
overview of the coverage of refractory metals. 
Metal supply may stem from three general sources180: 
 Individual primary supply 
Individual primary supply is the most common form of non-ferrous metal supply and 
relates to metal mined from non-renewable sources as the main product. 
 Co- and by-product supply 
This form of supply stems also from non-renewable deposits but the metal is mined as a 
co-product or a by-product. A co-product status indicates that in order to make the mine 
profitable the metal must be mined together with the main product and both metals 
influence output. A by-product status indicates that while the metal is mined together with 
the main product, its total value is insignificant compared to that of the main product and 
consequently the by-product's price has no influence on the output. 
 Secondary supply 
Secondary supply is metal recycled from scrap. Scrap may orginate from home scrap, 
generated in the refining phase, new scrap generated during manufacturing or old scrap, 
resulting from products disposed by consumers. 
The supply of a particular metal may stem from all three sources and the nature of factors 
influencing supply may differ depending on the individual metal and the source of supply. 
                                                 
180 Based on Tilton (1996), p.52ff. 
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Yet, authors do not always distinguish between them and often refer to total supply, i.e. the 
sum of all sources, or differentiate between primary supply and secondary supply only. It is 
therefore not advisable to cluster literature on supply along the three possible sources. Rather, 
there appear to be three main dimensions in metal supply research, which cut across the three 
sources of supply: 
 Long-term supply dynamics 
 Short to mid-term primary supply dynamics 
 Holistic industry perspective 
 Research on the supply structure of a metal industry 
 Secondary supply 
Research on long-term supply and availability of resources appears to dominate literature on 
metal supply and the topic has lost none of its controversy over the course of decades. In fact, 
the recent price boom, which is the focus of this study, has renewed the debate on scarcity and 
depletion on the one hand and sustainable supply on the other. The topic of long-term supply 
dynamics are therefore reviewed in chapter 3.3.1. The dimension short to mid-term supply 
dynamics includes literature, which is concerned with influences often of specific nature to 
metals' supply industries or countries that apply over a shorter time period (chapter 3.3.2). 
Finally, research on recycling, albeit interwoven to some extent with sustainability of long-
term supply will be discussed separately in chapter 3.3.3. 
3.3.1 Research on long-term supply dynamics 
While academic literature on concerns over resource availability dates back far in time, 
according to TILTON up to 3000 years181, the purpose of this chapter is not to review this 
development but to specify underlying dynamics in long-term metal supply, which influence 
metal prices. In this context, two approaches to this topic stand out in academic literature, the 
fixed stock paradigm and the opportunity cost paradigm.182 Table 12 contains a representative 
selection of studies concerned with both approaches: 
                                                 
181 Tilton (2003), p.7 
182 Tilton (1996), p.92f. 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Hotelling 
(1931) 
 Under certain modeling 
assumptions, prices of 
exhaustible 
commodities should rise 
in the future  
Not specified Not 
specified 
Meadows 
(1972) 
 Collapse of industrial 
output due to mineral 
resource exhaustion 
Aluminum, 
chromium, 
cobalt, copper, 
gold, iron, 
lead, 
manganese, 
mercury, 
molybdenum, 
nickel, tin, 
zinc, tungsten, 
silver, 
platinum 
1970 
Fixed-stock 
paradigm 
Gordon/ 
Graedel/ 
Bertram 
(2006) 
 Providing developed 
world's living standard 
to developing world 
requires exploitation of 
all physical stock 
Copper, 
nickel, zinc, 
platinum, tin, 
silver 
1900-2000 
Barnett/ Morse 
(1963) 
 Evidence that resource 
scarcity is diminishing 
Index of 
minerals 
1870-1957 Opportunity 
cost paradigm 
Krautkraemer 
(1998) 
 No evidence for 
physical resource 
depletion 
Aluminum, 
iron ore, 
copper, nickel, 
lead, tin, zinc, 
silver 
1968-1994 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector 
(s) 
Time 
period 
Tilton (2003)  Physical stock 
inadequate measure for 
assessing long-term 
supply 
 Price appropriate 
measure 
Copper 1975-1999 
Tilton/ Lagos 
(2007) 
 Copper shows signs of 
declining not increasing 
scarcity 
Copper Not 
specified 
Table 12 – Studies on the long-term availability of metal supply 
Source: Own illustration 
 Fixed-stock paradigm 
The above list contains by no means all studies on this topic as a comprehensive review is 
beyond the scale of this work. However, the recurring underlying and intuitive assumption of 
the fixed-stock paradigm is that against this physically fixed stock, growing demand 
eventually leads to physical exhaustion. Many economists argue that since the beginning of 
the 90s, the proponents of the fixed stock paradigm have begun to focus also on the 
environmental aspects of consuming non-renewable resources, a topic, which is often 
summarized as "sustainable development"183. The dominant argument that physical 
exhaustion is looming is thus accompanied by the notion that the current development is also 
environmentally harmful to future generations.184  
In his seminal work, HOTELLING argues that under certain conditions, including a mine's 
fixed resource stock, mining firms because of the exhaustible nature of their assets, behave 
differently than firms where inputs are unconstrained over the long run. As each unit of output 
today reduces their revenue and profit in the future, they have to consider opportunity costs, 
which reflect the present value of the lost output in the future. As mineral resources are 
                                                 
183 Hilson/Murck (2000), p.227 define sustainable development as "the combination of enhanced socioeconomic growth and 
development, and improved environmental protection and pollution prevention." 
184 Tilton (1996), p.91 
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effectively assets, they must earn a certain return rate comparable to other types of assets. If 
this return rate would be lower than that of comparable assets, it would pay to extract the asset 
and invest the resulting profits in asset with higher return rates. This would cause metal prices 
to decline today and increase in the future. The opposite scenario that return rates in 
exhaustible assets are higher than comparable assets, would cause asset owners hold on to 
them and reduce output. Consequently, current prices would rise and future prices fall.185  
In one of the most influential works at her time, MEADOWS forecasts a base case scenario, 
in which exhaustion of mineral resources lead to the collapse of per capita food and industrial 
output by the middle of the twenty first century. She bases this forecast on a physical measure 
of available metal supply against which she projects growing demand but fails to address the 
role of substitution and technical progress to mitigate depletion.186 GORDON et al. take her 
approach a step further. They contend that the available metal stock is split into three 
repositories: ore in the lithosphere, metal currently in use in products, and metal contained in 
waste deposits. They argue that as metal consumption grows, metal is transferred from ore to 
products and finally to waste, where it is occasionally recycled. The relative size of these 
deposits serves as a measure to estimate the depletion of the ore repository. Taking a 
predicted figure for the world population in 2100 of 10 billion people and assuming that each 
person will by then have reached the per capita consumption of the average North American, 
they conclude that consumption would exceed the total world copper resources, thus all 
copper would have to be the in use repository or exist as recyclable waste.187 Thus, the price 
of copper will rise and more common metals such as iron, aluminum, and magnesium will 
substitute for copper. Unfortunately, as is typical for the fixed-cost paradigm approach, the 
authors offer a point to point perspective, from a point in the past or the present to the time, 
when the resource will be exhausted. They provide no perspective on how this scenario will 
manifest, i.e. how supply and demand side will adjust in the course of time and how this will 
impact price other than that it will rise eventually. 
 Opportunity cost paradigm 
Advocates of the opportunity cost paradigm dismiss the fixed-cost paradigm on the grounds 
of several short-comings. BARNETT/MORSE in a seminal work on resource scarcity argue 
that previous authors proclaiming resource scarcity ignore the cost-reducing effect of 
                                                 
185 Hotelling (1931). Tilton (1996) assigns Hotelling's work to a third category of long-term supply research next to the 
fixed-stock paradigm and the opportunity cost paradigm on the grounds that Hotelling only assumes an individual 
company's stock to be fixed but not explicitly assumes fixed global nonrenewable resources. 
186 Meadows (1972) 
187 Gordon/Graedel/Bertram (2007) 
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substitution and technical progress. They conclude that nature imposes "particular scarcity, 
not an inescapable general scarcity"188. TILTON argues that both the concept of fixed stock 
versus growing demand and the assumption of a known growth rate or per capita consumption 
in the future are flawed. He points out that metals are not destroyed when used and its 
recyclability is a question of cost, not availability. Furthermore, substitution opportunities 
may occur, which render future per capita rates useless. Third, deposits other than on this 
earth may be explored at some point in the future. Lastly, he argues that in any exhaustion 
scenario, a rising price would extinct demand before supply would be depleted. He therefore 
argues to use a measure to account for the opportunity cost of a resource and suggests the 
price as a better measure to assess whether non-renewable resources are depleting.189 
TILTON/LAGOS apply this methodology in an assessment of the long-term availability of 
copper and conclude that overall stable prices over the past 130 years suggest that copper 
deposits show no sign of depletion. However, they conclude that there are a number of 
uncertainties, which make a long-term projection impossible. They list several points, which 
can be categorized as follows: a) supply side dynamics such as innovation and technical 
change, recycling development, and the economics of future deposits, b) demand side 
dynamics such as substitution and consumer preferences.  
KRAUTKRAEMER in his review of research based on the "Hotelling rule" concedes that 
relaxing some of HOTELLING's assumptions including the fixed stock assumption and 
considering a number of other factors changes his findings considerably. Furthermore, he 
concludes that it appears difficult to reconcile economic theory of nonrenewable resources 
with the empirically observed data based solely on "anticipated changes in extraction costs, 
interest rate, reserve discoveries, availability of backstop substitutes"190. He argues that 
accounting for factors causing unanticipated price changes is crucial but would demand much 
more detailed information and would have to be tailored to individual metal industries. 
Literature on the topic of long-term supply availability reaches different conclusions because 
of the different approach to the topic. There appears to be little evidence that the recent price 
boom originates from physical depletion. Consequently, its origins are to be found in 
underlying economic, commercial, and industrial dynamics. However, neither approach to 
long-term availability offers any insights into the underlying drivers influencing prices. 
Authors usually remain on the abstract level of a point to point perspective and make no 
attempt to develop a deeper understanding of specific factors, which accompany cost-
                                                 
188 Barnett/Morse (1963), p.11 
189 Tilton (2003), p.23ff. 
190 Krautkraemer (1998), p. 2102f. 
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increasing depletion and cost-reducing technical progress, let alone offer quantification of 
these factors. Finally, at times of research focusing not only on long-term availability but also 
on issues of sustainability in metal supply191 there is a stronger focus on non-ferrous base 
metals as their environmental impact exceeds that of refractory metals let alone minor metals 
by far given their larger volume192. 
In the following chapter, research concerned with these underlying dynamics is reviewed. 
3.3.2 Research on short to mid-term primary supply dynamics 
Research on metal supply, which is not concerned with a long-term perspective on availability 
and sustainability, can be broadly clustered into two categories: 
 Holistic metal industry perspective 
 Research on the supply structure of a metal industry 
Studies providing a holistic industry perspective are concerned with the overall, usually 
global development of a metal industry. This comprises developments on the supply side but 
may also contain a demand side perspective as well as political and regulatory implications if 
relevant (chapter 3.3.2.1). Research focusing on the supply structure attempts to isolate the 
influence of certain factors on the structure of the metal industry (chapter 3.3.2.2).  
3.3.2.1 Holistic metal industry perspective 
The studies reviewed in this chapter provide a perspective on a particular metal industry. The 
purpose of this review is to identify specific underlying dynamics of the supply side industry, 
either triggered by a surge in demand or intrinsic changes within the structure of the industry, 
which have a long-term impact and may cause a structural change in price levels. Findings of 
the studies must be interpreted with respect to the state of the industry at the time of writing. 
Nonetheless, the type of changes that occurred provide a picture of relevant underlying forces 
with a long-term influence on the supply side of the metal industry. Table 13 contains a list of 
representative studies: 
                                                 
191 Gordon/ Tilton (2008), p.9f. 
192 Compare Exhibit 5, p.17 
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Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Fisher/ Owen 
(1981) 
 Supply function of price, stock 
change, consumption and 
available old scrap 
Aluminum 1960-1978 
Mikesell (1979)  Industry influenced by 
complex combination of 
factors 
 Quantitative modeling difficult 
Copper 1960s-1970s 
Hojman (1981)  Primary supply mainly 
influenced by industrial 
activity 
Aluminum 1967-1977 
Roberts (2003)  Structural change through 
increase in recycling and rising 
demand in China 
Lead 1990-2000 
Ebensperger/ 
Maxwell/ 
Moscoso (2005) 
 Structural change through 
exploitation of low-cost 
deposits since 1997 
Lithium 1984-2003 
Crowson (2007)  Structural change mainly due 
to political intervention  
Copper 1945-1975 
Table 13 – Studies providing a holistic metal industry perspective 
Source: Own illustration 
FISHER/OWEN offer a classical attempt to model the aluminum market in the US from 
1960-1978 through a quantitative econometric model. Three equations are describing three 
sources of supply. According to the authors assumption, primary supply is dependent on the 
list price of refined aluminum and stock changes according to the authors. New scrap is found 
to be price independent and is related to consumption. Old scrap is assumed to be related to 
the price of aluminum and the available old scrap. Four other equations describe aggregate 
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consumption related to price and industrial production, producer price, transaction price and 
scrap price.193 
In his comprehensive review of the state of the copper industry from the perspective of the US 
in 1979, MIKESELL critically discusses quantitative approaches to modeling copper supply. 
In this context he rejects models, which attempt to express supply merely as a function of the 
market price as other factors, which the authors deems influential to copper supply, namely 
investment behavior, national policy implications such as changes in environmental policy, 
oligopolistic industry structure, level of vertical integration, and change in ownership are 
ignored. Econometric models, albeit introducing a host of other variables, fail to capture these 
complexities as well. E.g., he argues that the nationalization of Chilean copper assets may 
have altered the supply function of that country but concedes that such factors are impossible 
to model quantitatively.194 The author concludes that no existing model is sufficient in 
capturing the complexities of the copper industry. As important influences to the global 
supply side of copper during the 1960s and 1970s, he identifies the following factors: a) 
pollution abatement regulation (impacting mostly US producers), b) nationalization of assets 
owned by international mining companies, c) a poor investment climate for foreign direct 
investment in most developing countries, d)declining concentration in the industry due to the 
emergence of new producers, e) competition from scrap, f) introduction of the 
hydrometallurgical process as a new copper producing technology. He also finds that any 
cartel behavior by copper supplying companies and countries was short-lived as competitive 
forces in the industry proved intact, e.g. the attempt of a longer-term rise in prices was 
followed by investment in new capacity, making it impossible to sustain higher prices over 
the long-term.195 
HOJMAN raises similar critique as MIKESELL with regard to the incomplete specification of 
existing supply models, particularly those, which are based solely on a price-supply 
relationship. With respect to new developments in the market such as new entrants or 
discontinuities resulting from technological change, he concludes that "price movements 
cannot be predicted using econometric estimates"196. In his own supply model, the author 
accounts for two events leading to an unexpected reduction of supply after 1974 through the 
introduction of a dummy variable, namely a) the overall reduction of economic activity in 
OECD countries and b) the introduction of a new tax imposed by governments in major 
                                                 
193 Fisher/Owen (1981), p.150ff. 
194 Mikesell (1979), p.175 
195 Mikesell (1979), p.146ff. 
196 Hojman (1981), p.88 
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bauxite producing countries. He suggests that in the long-run only the first factor has a 
significant influence on supply. According to his assumption the second is eventually offset 
by the installation of new capacity in lower tax countries.197 The author concedes, however, 
that the time period of eleven years may be too short to reach reliable conclusions on this. 
ROBERTS identifies a structural change in the supply of lead throughout the 1990s. In 
particular he considers three developments to be pivotal to the industry: a) the diminishing 
role of primary lead caused by b) the increasing role of recycled lead and c) the rise of China 
as a dominant supplier and consumer.198 
EBENSPERGER et al. analyze the lithium market since 1984. The authors identify a 
structural change in the supply market due to the emergence of a new high volume supplier in 
Chile in 1997, who, by means of exploiting a different type of deposit compared to incumbent 
producers was able to reduce costs considerably. An aggressive pricing strategy drove prices 
down considerably and led to a decline of output and revenue from incumbent suppliers 
relying on higher-cost deposits according to the authors. Forecasting the future development 
of the industry, the authors suggest that given its favorable cost position and the large 
available resources of the Chilean market leader, a highly concentrated industry is likely in 
the future.199 
CROWSON's study on the copper industry from 1945-1975 is an example of a holistic 
industry perspective motivated by the price development of the metal, which showed 
increasing prices as opposed to other non-ferrous base metals, whose prices were largely 
declining. His findings suggest that factors other than economic activity were influencing the 
industry. Supply was subject to extraordinary influences, such as political disturbances, 
government influenced copper allocation schemes and strategic stock piling.200 
Studies attempting to provide a holistic picture of a metal industry largely concur that 
modeling metal supply through an econometric model falls short of capturing the number of 
factors, which are identified as influencing the supply industry in the longer term. This is 
because of the erratic and unpredictable nature of these factors. Nonetheless, when focusing 
on a particular time period, authors provide a comprehensive picture of factors influencing 
supply. Yet, no attempt is made to cluster and prioritize structural factors along certain 
general dimensions. 
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3.3.2.2 Industry supply structure 
Literature reviewed in this chapter is concerned with factors influencing the supply structure 
of an industry. Studies focus either on a set of factors occurring in a particular metal industry 
or attempt to isolate the influence of a dominant factor on supply, such as government control 
or an oligopolistic supply structure. Given the difficulty to quantify the impact of certain 
factors, some studies in this chapter remain qualitative in their assessment of how industry 
forces influence prices. Also, the case study approach of many studies limits the 
transferability of findings to other metal industries. Table 14 lists a set of representative 
studies reviewed in this work: 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector Time 
period 
Mackenzie 
(1981) 
 Canadian copper 
industry competitive on 
global scale 
Copper 1978 
De Sa (1991)  European non-ferrous 
industry loses 
competitiveness 
Non-ferrous 
metals 
1974-1993 
Crowson 
(1992) 
 Forces influencing 
metal supply rather 
political and economical 
than geological 
Copper, 
bauxite, iron 
ore, gold, 
nickel, zinc 
1960-1990 
Overall focus 
on particular 
metal 
industry 
Maxwell 
(1999) 
 Technological change 
and new entries will 
lead to structural change 
in industry 
Nickel 1991-1998 
Koscianski/ 
Mathis/ (1995) 
 Excess capacity 
effective barrier to entry 
Titanium 1970-1990 
Cariola (1999)  Development of 
industry hindered by 
endogenous entry 
barriers 
Titanium 1980-1992 
Wårell (2007)  Merger of leading 
producers was 
motivated by efficiency 
increases, not market 
power 
Iron ore - 
Specific 
focus on 
particular 
factor 
influencing 
supply 
Markowski/ 
Radetzki 
(1987) 
 No evidence that state 
ownership in mining 
destabilizes prices 
Copper 1964-1983 
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Subcategory Author Findings Metal sector Time 
period 
Radetzki 
(1989) 
 No evidence that public 
ownership in mining 
threatens private 
companies 
Aluminum, 
copper, iron 
ore, tin 
1960-1981 
Rami (2008)  State owned enterprise 
may oversupply and 
destabilize market  
Phosphate 1975-2005 
Bartos (2007)  Productivity increases 
and innovation in 
mining about the same 
rate as manufacturing 
sector 
- 1950-2000 
Schleich 
(2007) 
 Energy reduction in 
steel processing due to 
revolutionary and 
incremental technical 
improvements 
Steel  
Piermartini 
(2004) 
 Export restrictions lead 
to distortions in 
manufacturing and 
consumption 
- 2003 
Table 14 – Studies concerned with a metal industry supply structure 
Source: Own illustration 
CROWSON investigates changes in the geographical supply landscape of copper between 
1960 and 1990 and identifies factors influencing location and competiveness changes. He then 
attempts to mirror these influences in the development of supply markets for six other metals. 
One of his most important findings is the relevance of economical and political rather than 
geological conditions to the development of the metal supplying industry. In this context, he 
identifies complacency, lack of investment and reliance on government action as the main 
reasons for the decline in copper US production. The unexpected rise in US copper production 
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since 1985 after a recapitalization of the industry proves that declining ore grade and 
increasing cost of depletion were by no means the driving forces behind two decades of 
declining production according to the author. With respect to new investments in the copper 
industry during the time of the analysis, CROWSON notes that the larger size of new mining 
projects led to larger economies of scale and consequently a better cost position. Turning to 
bauxite the author points out another example of political forces leading to a structural change 
of metal supply. Political decisions in some Caribbean countries to impose taxes and control 
prices of bauxite fostered a shift in location and the rise of alternative sources in Australia, 
Brazil and Guinea. In the nickel industry, the author identifies a geographical diversification 
allegedly due to the unreliability of Canadian supply in the late 1960s. This triggered a wave 
of new projects in Australia and initiated a shift to laterite deposits.201 
MAXWELL analyses the development of the nickel supplying industry in the 1990s. He 
makes out a surge in low cost new projects and predicts that this may result in a structural 
change of the industry. According to him, several forces impact the supply side industry.  
Technological change allows the development of laterite deposits, in which cobalt is often 
mined as a by- or co-product. The authors thus identifies the price of cobalt as a new 
influence to nickel production in the future. A second major influence next to technological 
change is the emergence of new players, mainly in Western Australia. According to the 
author, this may impact the existing oligopoly of incumbent suppliers, lead to a decline in the 
concentration of the industry and exert pressure on existing high cost projects. Finally, rising 
palladium prices have influenced favorably Russian production and the export of nickel. 
MAXWELL concludes that these structural changes seem to "confirm the downward trend in 
nickel prices"202. 
The impact of oligopolistic forces in the titanium industry is the focus of CARIOLA's work. 
She identifies endogenous variables, i.e. those resulting directly from actions of incumbent 
players as "main limits to its development"203. Her analysis matches findings of CROWSON, 
that political and economical rather than geological factors such as depletion are the dominant 
forces shaping the metal industry structure. Despite an abundance of titanium in the earth's 
crust according to which titanium would have to be clustered with other alloys, it is still 
regarded as an almost precious metal according to the author. CARIOLA claims this is 
because of a set of key endogenous factors limiting the development of the titanium industry, 
among which are lack of technical innovation regarding the process of making titanium 
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sponge, overcapacity, reliance on the aerospace industry as the key demand sectors and lack 
of efforts to expand into new industry sectors.  
Focusing on the same industry, KOSCIANSKI/MATHIS analyze the impact of excess 
capacity the probability of a firm entering the US titanium industry. They conclude that the 
presence of excess capacity serves as an effective barrier to entry, concurring with CARIOLA 
that excess capacity is one of the factors limiting the development of the industry. 
Unfortunately, both authors remain qualitative in their assessment of how this is impacting the 
price of the metal. 
WÅRELL's work is equally concerned with the concentration of suppliers. She analyzes stock 
market reactions before and after the merger of Rio Tinto and North Ltd. in the iron ore 
industry to assess the motivations behind the consolidation, which under the assumption that 
both firms intend to maximize profit may either stem from efficiency increase or market 
power to increase prices. She concludes that efficiency increases rather than market power 
was the main motive behind the merger.204 
MARKOWSKI/RADETZKI investigate the effect of state ownership in the mining industry, 
specifically the claim that nationalized companies's output is insensitive to price change and 
thus public ownership of mining companies may lead to a destabilization of prices. Their 
findings suggest that this claim does not hold up. They suspect that differences in supply 
elasticity to price changes between private companies, which are mostly found in developed 
countries and publicly owned companies mostly found in developing countries stems from a 
lower share of variable cost in the latter. Thus, in the event of price decrease, state owned 
companies continue to produce as any revenue covers their fixed cost, whereas privately 
owned companies may find it easier to reduce their cost position significantly by reducing 
output and variable cost.205 
In a case study analysis of the Jordanian phosphate industry, RAMI reaches a different 
conclusion. He claims that the growth of state owned enterprises since 1960 "constituted one 
of the major structural changes in the world mining industry"206. Based on the observation of 
that the Jordanian state owned monopolists raised output despite falling prices between 1971 
and 2005, the author concludes that the main intention of the player was not profit 
maximization but adjustments to the national balance and the need for foreign exchange from 
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phosphate exports. He makes out a tendency by state owned enterprises to oversupply and 
destabilize the market.207 
RADETZKI investigates the impact of state ownership to the industry in general and to 
specific companies on a more general level. He concludes that while the act of nationalization 
itself posed a serious threat to the private industry, the effects have worn out over time. As 
nationalization is found to have come to an end according to the author, public ownership 
ceases to be a threat. Effects such as differences in supply sensitivity to price albeit intuitively 
existing appear difficult to quantify.208 
A different type of government intervention has upset global markets only recently. China as 
a major metal exporting country and other countries introduced export restricting measures on 
a wide range of metals mined and produced domestically. Such measures are not prohibited 
by the WTO209 and are usually intended to achieve one or more of the following goals from 
the viewpoint of the exporting country210:  
 Nuture an infant industry 
 Control inflation 
 Mitigate domestic prices 
 Buttress government revenues 
 Underpin social policy and income distribution 
The levying of such export restrictions on metal commodities is relatively recent. Most 
notably metal exports from China are subject to export tariffs and export quotas, after a long 
period of rebates on exports.211 As these exports restrictions do not apply to finished products, 
this gives Chinese manufacturers a raw material cost advantage over foreign 
manufacturers.212 According to PIERMARTINI, who investigates export restrictions on food 
commodities, the welfare effects of export restricting measures introduced by a dominant 
exporter are such that the terms of trade of the exporting country improve whereas the terms 
of trade of the importing country deteriorates. Overall, export restrictions lead to distortions in 
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the efficiency of production as it encourages inefficient producers in the exporting country 
and discourages efficient ones in the importing country. The same can be said for 
consumption according to the author. Consumption in the exporting country may be too high, 
whereas consumption in the importing country may be too low as a result of the export 
restrictions.213 Interestingly, despite the recent attention the topic has received in the 
public214, only scarce attention appears to have been paid to it to date by scholars in the field 
of mineral economics. 
Several authors mention technical innovation and productivity increase as the key reason why 
the cost increasing effects of depletion have not yet materialized. BARTOS compares the rate 
of innovation and productivity increases in the mining sector to that of other industry sectors. 
With respect to revolutionary technology triggering a structural change in the industry, the 
author concludes that mining has seen one to three innovations per century, about the same 
level as other mature industries. Productivity gains have been around 2.5 percent per year, 
about the same rate of manufacturing without the high-tech industry. Furthermore, he 
observes that with respect to investment in research and development, mining houses rely 
more and more on incremental improvement developed by third parties, rather than 
revolutionary techniques developed in-house. He concludes that there is no evidence for a 
slow down in productivity increases.215  
SCHLEICH investigates technical change in the German steel industry. As BARTOS he 
identifies both a revolutionary structural change, a switch from basis oxygen steel to electric 
arc furnace, as well as incremental improvements in energy efficiency as the main drivers for 
a reduction in energy costs.216 
Research concerned with factors influencing the supply structure of a metal industry is either 
conducted from the viewpoint of a specific industry or attempts to isolate the effect of specific 
factor. In the first case, a wealth of factors possibly influencing supply is named at the 
expense of prioritizing or clustering relevant ones and quantifying the impact of these factors 
in the context of structural changes in prices. Often, authors retreat to economic theory when 
estimating the impact on prices. In the second case, structural changes are more often 
quantified but isolating one particular factor is difficult and findings may be limited to a 
specific case. 
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3.3.3 Research on the interdependency of secondary supply and 
metal prices 
There is a wide range of literature on secondary supply and the recycling of metals and it is 
beyond the scope of this work to cover it all. The review will be limited to those works, which 
attempt to quantify the interdependency of recycling and metal prices to develop an 
understanding to what extend a structural change in metal supply and a corresponding price 
change may originate from developments in metal recycling. Table 15 covers the relevant 
studies in this context: 
Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Tilton (1999)  Secondary production from old 
scrap not competitive against 
primary production 
- - 
Henstock (1996)  Barriers to recycling are 
increasing 
Aluminum, 
copper, lead, 
nickel, cadmium, 
lead, mercury, tin, 
zinc, magnesium, 
titanium, 
chromium, iron, 
steel, cobalt, 
molybdenum, 
manganese, 
tungsten, rare 
earths 
1970-1993 
Roberts (2003)  Increasing market share of 
secondary production 
Lead 1990-2001 
Gomez/ Guzman/ 
Tilton (2007) 
 Stagnating secondary 
production in face of rising 
primary production 
Copper 1966-2005 
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Author Findings Metal sector (s) Time period 
Reller/ Bublies/ 
Staudinger/  
Oswald/ Meißner/ 
Allen (2009) 
 Innovative products may 
increase dissipation of metals 
Copper, iron, 
aluminum, nickel, 
tin, silver, gold, 
palladium, 
tantalum, indium 
2007 
Table 15 – Research concerned with the interdependency of metal recycling and metal 
prices 
Source: Own illustration 
HENSTOCK in his work on the recycling of non-ferrous metals emphasizes that "metal 
recycling is traditionally rooted in the economic laws of supply and demand"217. He notes 
furthermore that "Recycling has no virtue in itself. […] if it is profitable, it is done"218. Within 
these economical constraints, HENSTOCK identifies several benefits from recycling: 
extension of resource life, reduced material costs, energy conservation compared to primary 
production, reduced dependence on imports, waste reduction, availability of co-products.  
He defines three types of secondary material. Home scrap is generated in the smelting or 
refining phase and is usually reintroduced directly into the smelter or refiner or used as 
landfill. It is therefore highly insensitive to metal prices and its use limited by its availability. 
New scrap is produced during the manufacturing process, where it is collected for operational 
necessity and sold to scrap collectors. While its value depends on the metal price for primary 
material as well as its purity and composition, its collection and reintroduction as secondary 
material into the consumption cycle is usually insensitive to metal prices and so its use is also 
constrained mostly by availability. Old scrap on the other side comprises metal contained in 
post-use consumer goods. Collection of old scrap is usually the most costly of all three types 
of scrap as it is contained in products in often small traces, of unknown purity, long life time 
and widely dispersed. It is therefore the collection, sorting and processing cost of old scrap, 
which makes this type of scrap sensitive to primary metal prices. Secondary material from old 
scrap is therefore produced at marginal costs and thus hardly cost competitive compared with 
most primary sources. This fact together with the observation of real falling metal prices and 
increasing barriers to recycling from use of ever smaller quantities in new products and 
increasingly complex combination of materials makes the author wary of forecasting an 
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increasing role of secondary materials compared to primary sources. A recent study by 
RELLER et al. reflects the notion that new technology leads to an increasing amount of 
dissipated metal volume. The authors analyze different materials used in mobile phones and 
conclude that the recycling of spice metals, metals used only in traces in the end product but 
play a pivotal role due to their specific properties and functionalities, is currently not 
economical. This according to the authors may pose a risk for the availability of these metals 
in the near future.219 
TILTON voices a similar perspective on the future role of secondary production as 
HENSTOCK. He rejects the notion of a bright future for metal recycling as suggested by 
environmentalists and other scholars.220 While not sceptical of recycling to continue, he 
questions the competitiveness of recycling from old scrap against primary sources. He claims 
that the two events, which may increase the cost of primary production and make old scrap 
recycling competitive at large are increasing cost of depletion and environmental policies 
targeted at mining and refining. He estimates that neither appears likely in the near future, as 
mining companies have so far managed to counter both, increasing cost of depletion and 
tighter environmental regulation through efficiency increases and technological innovation, 
while at the same time facing real falling prices. He concludes that secondary producers may 
only gain market share if they manage to respond in a similar fashion. Combining this view 
with HENSTOCK's observation of the diverse state of the secondary industry consisting of 
small players compared to the rather consolidated primary industry221, one may conclude that 
the latter is in a better position to innovate and raise capital to implement these innovations. 
GÓMEZ et al. investigate why copper production from old scrap recycling appears to have 
grown much less than primary production and consumption and actually stagnated since 
1996, while at the same time the availability of copper from old scrap increased. The authors 
conclude that one needs to distinguish between the stock of old scrap and the flow of old 
scrap. Only the latter appears to be used for secondary production while all copper scrap not 
recycled immediately ends up as old scrap stock, where it is rarely recycled.222  
A study by ROBERTS on the supply of lead provides an example of a cost competitive 
secondary production. The author notes that in light of falling lead prices and falling demand 
due to the reduction of lead in environmentally and otherwise harmful applications, supply of 
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lead experienced a structural change away from primary production towards secondary 
production. This is fostered by the fact that a major use of lead is batteries, a product 
relatively easy to collect and recycle. The author estimates that nearly all future demand 
growth will have to be supplied from secondary sources.223 
Reviewed research on the role of recycling and their impact on metal prices is largely of the 
opinion that aside from home and new scrap, which is only limited by its availability, the 
majority of secondary production stemming from recycling of old scrap is far from cost 
competitive against primary production. In fact, many authors note that recycled volumes 
from old scrap are not keeping pace with the growth of primary production. A notable 
exception is lead, which has experienced a structural change in supply towards an increasing 
share from secondary sources. This development owes to special circumstances in the lead 
industry. The majority of demand for lead remains in batteries for cars, after the use of lead in 
dissipative applications such as fuel and paint was phased out due to tighter health regulation. 
For these batteries a well-established collection system exists. Furthermore, life time is 
relatively short and predictable and environmental regulation prohibits the disposal of car 
batteries as landfill.224 These factors contribute to the rise of lead from secondary sources. 
The lead example emphasizes that the role of recycling depends on metal specific factors. 
General conclusions on the basis of metal specific case studies are therefore to be viewed with 
care. 
3.3.4 Summary and evaluation 
Across the three possible sources primary production, co-, by-production, and secondary 
production, a wide range of factors may influence metal supply. Pointing to six general 
factors, TILTON summarizes and prioritizes the diversity of influences as follows225:  
 metal price 
 input costs 
 technological change 
 strikes and other disruptions 
 government activities 
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 market structure  
Yet to what extent these factors are indeed structural and may be the origin of a long-term 
influence on metal price remains unclear based on the reviewed literature. Furthermore, 
compared to literature on metal demand, studies on metal supply offer little guidance on how 
to approach the topic of supply analysis systematically. Authors are largely in agreement that 
myriads of factors influence supply and structural changes in the landscape of metal supply 
and consequently impacts on the long-term metal price may originate from any of them. As 
most of the studies reviewed are case examples of particular industries at certain periods in 
time, drawing general conclusions is difficult and findings must be treated with care. The 
following general insights may be extracted from literature: 
 Factors influencing supply side are very much dependent on time horizon, metal 
industry and the geographical scope of the study. 
 Political influence appears to have a large clout on metal supply given 
developments like nationalization of assets and establishment of export 
restrictions. 
 The role of secondary supply is very metal specific. In general, ongoing efficiency 
increases in primary supply challenge the competitiveness of secondary supply. 
With the exception of lead, primary supply still comes at lower cost than old scrap 
recycling. 
A structured approach to take a step back from observations specific to market and time 
period and trace back the influence of individual factors on the long-term metal price to 
consolidate them along general factors is missing. 
Furthermore, few quantitative analyses are concerned with refractory or other minor metals. 
The coverage of these metals in the reviewed supply studies is illustrated in Table 16: 
Author Refractory 
metals covered 
Other minor metals Data/ analysis 
constraint 
Meadows 
(1972) 
Chromium, 
cobalt, 
manganese, 
molybdenum, 
tungsten 
 Fixed-stock 
paradigm 
approach, no esti-
mation of price 
impact 
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Author Refractory 
metals covered 
Other minor metals Data/ analysis 
constraint 
Koscianski/ 
Mathis (1995) 
Titanium  US focus only, no 
estimation of 
price impact 
Henstock 
(1996) 
Chromium, 
cobalt, 
manganese, 
molybdenum, 
titanium, 
tungsten, 
Rare earths Qualitative 
assessment of 
recycling, no 
estimation of 
price impact 
Cariola (1999) Titanium  No estimation of 
price impact 
Ebensperger/ 
Maxwell/ 
Moscoso (2005) 
 Lithium Qualitative 
assessment, no 
estimation of 
price impact 
Reller et al. 
(2009) 
 Tantalum, indium Fixed-stock 
paradigm 
approach, no 
estimation of 
price impact 
Table 16 - Coverage of refractory and other minor metals in literature on metal supply 
Source: Own illustration 
The supply situation of refractory and other minor metals is sporadically investigated in 
literature on mineral economics, most commonly by authors applying the fixed stock 
paradigm. However, the shortcoming of this approach, namely its point-to-point perspective 
from today's supply and demand situation to the suspected point of depletion in the future 
illustrates a key shortcoming of most supply studies. The ultimate impact of an identified 
trend or change in metal supply on the market price or cost position is rarely estimated. 
Having identified a factor influencing supply, authors often retreat to economic theory such 
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that a decrease in the concentration of supply will lower the price level.226 Such statement, 
however, is rarely supported by empirical data. Also, supply characteristics specific to 
refractory or other minor metal markets, such as the reliance on co- and by-production sources 
are rarely taken into consideration. 
3.4 Summary and deduction of research questions 
The purpose of reviewing literature on long-term metal price development as well as metal 
supply and demand was to gain an understanding of underlying market forces identified to be 
influencing metal prices as well as to assess the coverage of refractory metal markets. Based 
on this review, research gaps are now evaluated and research questions deduced. 
Research gap 1: Insufficient distinction of refractory and other minor metals from non-
ferrous metals in economic analysis of metal markets 
Conclusions and insights on the general development of metal price, supply and demand are 
mostly based on the analysis of non-ferrous metal markets. E.g., the relationship between the 
development of metal consumption and economic performance has been tested for non-
ferrous metals only.227 It is implicitly assumed that refractory and other minor metal markets 
follow similar development paths as non-ferrous metals. Yet a proper comparison of both 
groups of markets to verify or dispute this assumption is missing despite the growing 
economic relevance of refractory metals. 
Research gap 2: No consideration of the distinct demand structure of refractory metals 
It was demonstrated in chapter 2.3 that market value growth of non-ferrous base metals and 
refractory metals between 2001 and 2008 followed different roots. With the exception of 
aluminum over 80 percent of the former's growth in market value resulted from a price 
increase and less than 20 percent from an increase in consumption approximated by 
production. For refractory metals on the other hand, the latter factor attributed a more sizeable 
share to growth of market value on average.228 Yet the underlying cause of refractory metal 
demand growth particularly during the commodity boom remains to a large extent unclear. 
Authors are content to accept the widely stated explanation that growth in emerging markets 
especially in China was the leading cause for the extraordinary boom across all metal markets 
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and that metal consumption relative to economic growth in advanced economies is falling. 
While China's role is beyond doubt, the demand structure of refractory metals is distinctively 
different compared to that of non-ferrous base metal markets. Whereas the former often 
comprise a substantial share of the total material as well as of the full cost of the end product, 
refractory metals are contained in often miniscule quantities in the end product and usually 
comprise a marginal share of total cost. Yet they are added to steel for the fundamental 
improvement they bring to bear. A thorough understanding of these characteristics is 
imperative to comprehend their influence on the demand growth of refractory metals.  
Research gap 3: No quantitative analysis of demand growth of refractory metal markets 
 
A quantitative analysis of factors influencing metal demand such as economic growth is 
possible up to a certain level as illustrated in several reviewed studies. Yet this quantitative 
investigation of metal demand growth is to date reserved for non-ferrous metals.229 With few 
exceptions that are either US focused only or aggregated on a global scale, a quantitative 
decomposition of refractory metal demand growth has not yet been conducted. Yet such an 
analysis is indispensable to complement and validate an understanding of the distinctive 
demand structure of refractory metals and its impact on demand growth. 
Research gap 4: No holistic perspective on structural forces in non-ferrous base metal and 
refractory metal markets affecting the long-term price level and volatility 
The popularity of the stylized fact that declining ore grade and increased production cost is 
overcompensated by cost savings from technical innovation in mining and refining has led 
many to dismiss the recent price boom as a discontinuity, which will be punctuated by the 
installation of new capacity230. The implicit assumption within this concept is that changes in 
the structure of the market, if at all occurring, will have no persistent impact on the long-term 
price other than that falling or stagnating real prices will continue to prevail. Particularly in 
research investigating the metal supply side, changes in the structure of supply are rarely 
quantified, let alone traced back to their impact on price. While numerous factors potentially 
impacting the supply structure are listed, a concept, which prioritizes and structures these 
factors and their impact on price is missing. 
Studies on metal prices offer few insights into underlying market forces influencing price 
development. While proponents of cyclicality acknowledge the important role of structural 
changes in metal price development, the underlying market forces influencing this 
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phenomenon have received inadequate attention. Claims by RADETZKI based on the 
analysis of a metal index that only demand shocks may accompany price super cycles and that 
supply responses do not impact prices231 are unrefuted as calls for a better understanding of 
individual metal industries232 and specifically of structural changes on the supply side233 are 
yet unanswered. 
Based on these research gaps and findings from chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, the following 
research questions are deduced: 
Research question 1: What are distinguishing elements of non-ferrous base metal markets and 
refractory metal markets that justify a separate examination of the latter? 
Having illustrated the rising economic importance of refractory metals, it is important to 
verify or dispute the implicit assumption that the latter follow the same trends and patterns 
and have the same underlying demand and supply structure as non-ferrous metal markets. To 
answer this question, a comparison of both metal groups is conducted with respect to trends 
and patterns on the demand and supply side to elaborate the distinguishing elements between 
both metal groups. Where possible, factors are quantified. 
Research question 2: How does the distinct demand structure of refractory metals influence 
the demand development of such metals? 
The extraordinary development refractory metals underwent during the commodity booms 
necessitates a thorough understanding of underlying forces that influence the demand for 
these materials. As a first step it is essential to develop a perspective on the nature of demand 
for these metals that are used mostly in small quantities in the end product yet effectuate 
indispensible functions in steel and combine this perspective with major industry and 
consumer trends identified to rely on refractory metals. 
Research question 3: How can the impact of influences related to the demand structure of 
refractory metals be quantified and which other factors influence refractory metal demand? 
A quantitative in-depth analysis of refractory metal demand is essential to complement and 
validate research question 2. Answering the latter allows to identify the roots of demand 
growth qualitatively. Yet in order to measure the effect of identified influences, a quantitative 
decomposition of demand growth on a regional level is indispensable. Selecting the adequate 
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model to analyze demand predates such step. Furthermore, apart from influences relating to 
the demand structure of refractory metals, metal specific trends such as substitution dynamics 
as well as country specific trends such as an import or export oriented steel industry may as 
well influence demand pattern of an individual refractory metal. Comprehending the impact 
of such microtrends is essential to complement a full perspective on refractory metal demand. 
Research question 4: What are the structural forces in a metal market that impact the long-
term level and volatility of a metal price and which characteristics within these forces are 
specific to refractory metal markets? 
The most recent metal price super cycle has led many pondering not only what caused it but 
also how metal markets will emerge from it. Particularly suggestions that prices may reach a 
new plateau234 due to structural changes in metal markets imply that prices for some metals 
will not fall below a new floor price level. To answer calls by authors both on price cyclicality 
as well as long-term trends in metal markets to complement the analysis of mere price charts 
with industry knowledge on individual metal markets235 and to enrich the discussion on 
structural changes in metal markets and their impact on the long-term level and volatility of 
metal prices, a framework is developed to capture the structural forces in metal markets that 
influence metal prices. Insights from the in-depth analysis of refractory metal markets are 
embedded within the structural forces identified and differentiated from non-ferrous base 
metal markets. Subsequently, the framework is applied to the molybdenum market to 
illustrate its applicability, the occurrence of structural changes in a refractory metal market, 
and the consequential impact on the long-term level and volatility of the molybdenum price. 
                                                 
234 Humphreys (2009), p.104; Humphreys (2010), p.11 
235 Smith (1979), p.426; Jerret/Cuddington (2008), p.195; Roberts (2009), p.97 
 101
4. Methodological and practical approach to metal market 
analysis 
4.1 Conception of research methodology 
In the preceding chapter, research questions were posed to shape and structure the direction of 
this work. The purpose of this chapter is to thoroughly select the methodological approach to 
be applied going forward. In order to analyze refractory metal demand, methodologies 
reviewed in chapter 3.2 are evaluated and critically considered (chapter 4.1.1). Based on 
literature reviewed in chapter 3.3, insights on factors influencing metal supply are transferred 
into universal structural forces according to their influence on metal price to deduce a 
satisfactory approach to analyze metal supply (chapter 4.1.2). 
4.1.1 Approach to analyze metal demand 
In the following chapter, methodologies for analyzing demand development are evaluated. 
Owing to its wide spread application in academic literature, a particular focus was laid on the 
intensity of use technique and the economic theories based on it (chapter 3.2.1). Furthermore, 
studies based on the concept of the demand function estimation (chapter 3.2.2) and the 
production function (chapter 3.2.3) were reviewed. Each of these approaches has its 
advantages and shortcomings, which justify their application depending on context and 
objective. 
The estimation of demand functions is usually done by econometric techniques. Economists 
attempt to model metal demand by defining a functional relation and elasticities to 
macroeconomic factors such as GDP and usually the price of the metal and its substitute. As 
shown in chapter 3.2.2, this approach may yield more complex yet quantifiable relationships 
to well documented factors of economic activity236 than the intensity of use concept, which at 
some level relies on qualitative assumptions. Yet the ability to quantify a functional 
relationship may lead to false conclusions with regards to the adequacy of such an approach. 
The factors causing structural changes, such as technical innovation are difficult to account 
for. Elasticity of factors to demand may not be constant and a functional relationship may 
itself change. Factors that have not been considered in one time period may have a sizeable 
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influence in the next. Another practical shortcoming is that the miniscule share of cost of 
refractory metals in the end product may eliminate any dependency between a metal's price 
and the price of a substitute. 237 These considerations render the approach of estimating a 
valid demand function often impossible.  
The production function is usually applied when assessing how metal as an input factor to 
production substitutes for or complements other input factors such as labor, capital and 
energy. Its primary focus is therefore material substitution, either from the perspective of an 
individual application or, more frequently, from the perspective of entire industries. This 
approach bears similar advantages and shortcomings as the estimation on a demand function. 
While allowing to express a functional, quantifiable relationship of metal demand with other 
factors, technical innovation and microeconomic differences between countries may alter the 
elasticity and functional relationship and are impossible to model through this approach.238 
Both approaches have another shortcoming in common. The very choice of the key 
influencing factors, which are to be included in the model is based not on empirical analysis 
but on economic theory and the ability to quantify such factors. For instance, the choice for 
including the price of a substitute in a demand or production function is based on the 
theoretical assumption that producers will switch once the price is persistently low enough to 
justify a switch. Yet other factors influence this choice as well, such as supply outlook, public 
and regulatory policy.239 These factors are difficult to predict and to measure and 
consequently they will not find their way into demand or production functions. 
The intensity of use technique on the other hand appears to be the most promising 
methodology to yield results satisfactory to answer the research questions posed in the 
preceding chapter. The step by step decomposition of metal demand change first in GDP 
related and IU related factors and second in material composition of product (MCP) and 
product composition of income (PCI) related factors is a compelling method, which allows to 
identify the most relevant forces systematically through a top down approach. If economic 
development is found to have no relevant influence on the consumption of a metal, this lack 
of relationship is quickly identified and attention diverted to IU related factors. As neither 
change in GDP nor MCP nor PCI are the ultimate causes of metal demand change, the top 
down approach leads to deeper-rooted underlying forces within an industry. Microeconomic 
factors, substitution complexities, functional demand changes and public policy influence 
may thus be explicitly considered. Doing this in a consistent, rigorous manner requires a 
                                                 
237 Tilton (1983), p.5 
238 Tilton (1990), p.30f. 
239 Radetzki (1990), p.111 
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comprehensive knowledge of both the metal industry and the individual economy. Data on 
this level may not always be available and may need to be replaced by qualitative 
assumptions. Critiques point out that stopping short of decomposing metal demand 
development beyond GDP, MCP or PCI renders a mechanistic technique lacking economic 
substance.240 However, isolating the relevant influences for demand change through this 
systematic approach can be of great assistance in identifying the causes of demand side 
structural changes. The top down approach of intensity of use technique ensures a 
comprehensive and exhaustive tree of relevant drivers influencing metal demand. 
4.1.2 Analysis of metal supply 
The purpose of the following chapter is to define universal structural forces on the metal 
supply side to analyze metal supply going forward. Based on the review of literature on 
supply in chapter 3.3 numerous factors may affect the structure of metal supply and not all of 
these changes may have a notable effect on the market price. To avoid pursuing numerous 
factors, a promising approach is to first define specific repercussions in the market perceived 
during the commodity price boom and then to retrace these to structural supply side forces 
valid across metal markets. The two dominant repercussions in metal markets were 
 Elevated price level during and after a boom241 
 Concern of supply availability, security, and price volatility242 
A metal price stabilizing at a new floor price level, while being triggered by sustained 
demand, must eventually result from a change in the production cost of the marginal producer 
and from a change in the devolution of the cost curve243. Such a change originates in the cost 
structure of existing or newly installed capacity. Several factors are suspected to impact the 
long-term cost structure of existing and new capacity:  
 Cost structure of new deposits (mineralogy, mine type and size, geographical remoteness, 
primary versus co-/ by-production) 
 Changes in the cost structure of existing deposits (changes in major cost drivers such as 
energy) 
                                                 
240 Considine (1987) 
241 Compare chapter 2.2 
242 Compare Exhibit 3, p.13 
243 Humphreys (2010), p.11f. 
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 Government activity (e.g., environmental regulation) 
Political and commercial risks influence supply availability and security. From the viewpoint 
of importing regions, supply availability and security is affected by 
 Elevated regional concentration in production and trade244 
 Concentration on company level245 
Finally, factors suspected to influence price volatility over the long-term are a change in 
market organization as well as the level of supplier concentration246. The forces influencing 
the structure of supply are summarized in Exhibit 12. 
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Exhibit 12 – Systematic approach to analyze structural changes in metal supply 
Source: Own illustration 
The column for market organization is dotted to illustrate that it is distinct from other factors 
as it is located at the interface of supply and demand and cannot be attributed unilaterally to 
the supply side247. 
Exhibit 12 depicts an ideal approach to analyze supply side structural changes. While 
information on regional concentration is usually available from public sources, the reliability 
                                                 
244 BDI (2006), p.43; Gordon/ Tilton (2008), p.10 
245 Gordon/ Tilton (2008), p.10 
246 Compare chapter 3.1.3 
247 Compare also chapter 7.1 
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of data appears to deteriorate for refractory metal markets compared to non-ferrous base metal 
markets as data from different sources become difficult to reconcile. Information regarding 
company concentration and sources of supply for a specific metal market are often proprietary 
or unreliable especially over a longer period of time. A perspective on company concentration 
is therefore excluded from the analysis going forward. Information on the cost structure of 
individual mines are difficult to collect and most available through proprietary sources only. 
Data on the cost structure of by- and co-production are usually not published at all. 
In the next chapter, necessary assumptions and simplifications are evaluated based on data 
sources and data availability. Refractory metal markets to be covered in this work are then 
selected. 
4.2 Data sources and data preparation 
Data on non-ferrous base metal markets such as demand and supply as well as prices are 
usually available from public sources. As non-ferrous base metals are stock traded, global 
price data are published daily by metal stock exchange such as the London Metal Exchange 
(LME). Metallstatistik publishes regional and global historical data on primary and secondary 
supply as well as demand annually248. Production cost are often published in aggregate form 
in company reports and surveyed in more detail by market observers. Data from the latter are 
levied with some degree of accuracy but are proprietary. 
In contrast, the availability and reliability of data poses a major problem when analyzing 
refractory metal markets, which may be one reason for the sporadic coverage in scientific 
literature. 
Until recently, refractory metals were not exchange traded and price data are usually 
published in trade journals. Data on production are available from different sources but are 
often not congruent, underlining a lack of transparency and reliability. Data on consumption 
are levied by proprietary sources and are usually not published at all. When refractory metals 
are produced as co- or by-products, transparency on specific production cost is limited as by-
producers usually do not separately account for co- or by-product cost. Even when refractory 
metals are mined as the main product, production cost may not be available as producers may 
not report them. In the following, information sources for production, consumption, price and 
cost data are critically discussed and constraints regarding the validity of data emphasized.249 
                                                 
248 World Bureau of metal statistics (2005); World Bureau of metal statistics (2009) 
249 The appendix contains detailed information on specific sources for metal and country 
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 Production 
Production figures by metal and country are taken from United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) and are verified with data published by Raw Materials Group (RMG) and the World 
Mining Data Report, published by the Austrian Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit 
(BMWA)250. Historical and recent data on steel production are published by country by the 
World Steel Association. 251 
 Consumption 
For non-ferrous base metals, consumption figures published by Metall Statistik are used. For 
refractory metals, most often, however, data are proprietary or not levied at all.  
Therefore, apparent consumption by metal and country is estimated based on import and 
export figures of metals in their various forms as published by UN Comtrade. In order to 
calculate apparent consumption, metal import and export data must be aggregated by weight 
across all refined forms. This may be done through two different methodological approaches.  
The average metal content by form of metal import and export may be estimated using either 
published figures, e.g., defined metal content in a ferro-alloy, or calculations based on 
chemical formulas, e.g., for vanadium pentoxide, or by using USGS figures, which report 
gross weight as well as metal content for United States import and exports. Apparent 
consumption is calculated as follows: 
 ijtijtijtijtijt SEIPC         (1) 
where ijtC  denotes apparent consumption, ijtP  domestic production, ijtI  the metal content of 
aggregated metal imports, ijtE  the metal content of aggregated metal exports and ijtS  producer 
and industry stock changes of metal i  in country j  in year t  with  



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k
ikijktijt cII
1
         (2) 



n
k
ikijktijt cEE
1
          (3) 
and 
                                                 
250Weber/ Zsak (2004); Weber/ Zsak (2005); Weber/ Zsak (2006); Weber/ Zsak (2007); Weber/ Zsak (2008); Weber/ Zsak/ 
Reichl/ Schatz (2009) 
251 Compare Appendix, 9.2 
 107
10  ikc , where ikc  denotes the content of refined metal i  in the form of k and ijktI , ijktE the 
gross weight of imports and exports of metal in the refined form k . As data on stock changes 
are not available, adjusting apparent consumption for stock changes is omitted. This method 
is based on the assumption that ikc is independent of t  and j , that is, constant over time and 
constant between countries. However, metal content may vary over time and within the same 
form of refined metal k . E.g., a ferro-alloy containing a specific refractory metal may be 
available with 20 percent of metal content as well as 40 percent. Sometimes this is country 
dependent as developed countries tend to import material of higher quality, usually expressed 
by a higher metal content. Therefore, the metal content in US gross imports and exports may 
not always be applicable to other countries' metal trade. In order to mitigate this effect, the 
aggregated weight of metal import and exports is verified using a second method. The metal 
content of imports and exports may be estimated calculating the specific value in USD per kg 
by dividing the gross weight of imports and exports by their gross value and comparing it to 
the annual metal price: 
ijkt
ijkt
ijkt VI
I
i   and 
ijkt
ijkt
ijkt VE
E
e         (4) 
with ijktVI , ijktVE  as the gross value of the import and export flow respectively and ijkti , ijkte  
the specific value of imports (exports) in USD per kg of country j  and metal i  in the refined 
form of k . Dividing the specific value of metal imports and exports by the annual metal 
price itp  yields 
it
ijkt
ijkt p
i
c            (5) 
with  
10  ijktc . 
ijktc  is the time and country specific metal content of metal i  in the refined form of k . This 
approach bears several caveats. It is implicitly assumed that the value of the residual material, 
which is not the metal in focus, is negligible. E.g., calculating ijktc  for a ferro-alloy containing 
40 percent of a metal compared to ijktc  for a ferro-alloy containing 20 percent will only yield a 
difference in content of factor 2 if the value of the contained iron in the ferro-alloy is very 
small relative to the value of the metal. Furthermore, the difference between the published 
price of a metal and the specific trade value lies not only in the lower metal content of the 
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latter. Both the specific trade value of a specific metal form and the metal price contain the 
value added by refining the metal. Depending on the form of refined metal, the published 
price may be an incorrect reference, either over- or underestimating the metal content. Finally, 
the value of a traded item depends on the date when the reporter invoices it. Trade flows are 
summarized and reported annually. Dividing annual trade flows by an annual average price 
may lead to a potential mismatch between the price of the metal when the trade items were 
invoiced and the average annual price. Both methods for aggregating the metal weight 
contained in imports and exports have shortcomings and may yield to different results. The 
decision, which value to use, may therefore not always be determined with accuracy but must 
also be based on informed assumptions. 
Aside from these method specific considerations, further shortcomings exist. Metal specific 
trade flows do not account for metal contained in high strength low alloyed steel grades 
(HSLA), semi-finished or end products. A country, which outsources production and 
manufacturing of refractory metal intensive products and imports the end product reduces its 
domestic consumption of raw material. While the material intensity of the importing country 
may remain unchanged, calculating IU based only on raw material consumption may yield a 
declining development. Also, data on stock and stock changes are not available for refractory 
metals. Stock additions, which are substracted from apparent consumption in formula (1) are 
not recognized as such and added to apparent consumption. Ignoring stock depletions may 
yield very low levels of apparent consumption up to negative values, if at times industrial 
consumers' consumption stems entirely from depleting domestic stocks. Changes in the 
amplitude of metal consumption may therefore be perceived higher than they really are. 
Finally, some skeptics view trade data itself as an equally unreliable source of information. 
While this view is not shared by the author, it is undisputed that for some countries trade data 
are of little use as reported data are unreliable. Furthermore, trade data never display a 
complete picture due to smuggling and unreported trade. Exchange rate fluctuations are not 
always properly recorded. As some countries do not report trade data (e.g., North Korea), one 
has to rely on mirror statistics, trade with the non-reporting country reported by trade partners. 
This may invert reporting standards by including transport, cost and insurance in exports and 
not in imports. Nonetheless, while trade statistics should not be the sole source of information 
nor accepted as ultimately precise data. Yet as by-products of custom control, they are fairly 
adequate and indicate an order of magnitude as well as a relative development trend.252 
                                                 
252 International Trade Center (2005), p.1f. :http://www.intracen.org/countries/structural05/reliability03.pdf 
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In summary, estimated apparent consumption may differ both in magnitude and volatility 
from real consumption on a country level and must be interpreted with care. Depending on 
country and metal, this may pose serious limitations to findings. A consideration of country 
specific microeconomic drivers of apparent metal consumption is therefore indispensable to a 
interpret figures and trends correctly. As such factors are explicitly considered in the intensity 
of use (IU) technique253, the above constraints for assessing metal demand further confirm the 
choice of the IU methodology for this work254. 
 Price 
For non-ferrous base metals, price data are published regularly by the World Bank as well as 
the LME. Data on refractory metal prices are reported in trade journals such as American 
Metal Market, Chemical Market Reporter, Engineering and Mining Journal, Industrial 
Minerals, Metal Bulletin, Mining Journal, Platt’s Metals Week, Roskill Information Services 
Ltd. commodity reports, and Ryan’s Notes and published by United States Geological Survey 
(USGS). If no price data is available, prices are estimated based on the average value of 
United States import and exports of the metal.255  
 Production cost 
Production cost are estimated based on values reported by producing companies if available. 
Data constraints affect all economic analysis of metal markets. With respect to refractory 
metals, limitations are particularly obvious for consumption and production cost data and may 
be one reason for the reserved attention these markets have so far received in literature. In 
order to properly identify a supply side structural change behind elevated metal prices, data on 
production cost data of existing and new capacity as well as a perspective on the development 
of apparent consumption is indispensable. A view on apparent consumption and underlying 
drivers is furthermore necessary to conduct a proper intensity of use analysis of refractory 
metals and compare the demand development to non-ferrous metals. With the above 
mentioned caveats in mind, in the next chapter criteria are defined to refine the focus of metal 
markets to be analyzed in this work. 
                                                 
253 Compare chapter 3.2.1 
254 Compare chapter 4.1.1 
255 Compare Appendix, 9.2 for details 
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4.3 Coverage of metal markets 
Having assessed possible data source as well as necessary assumptions and simplifications for 
data preparation and data constraints in the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to 
identify the particular refractory metal markets to be analyzed further in this work. Given the 
large number of refractory metals256 confining the assessment of this heterogeneous group of 
metals is essential to refine the scope of this work.  
The criteria to refine the group of refractory metals should reflect the approach to the topic 
laid out so far in this work. Accordingly, the following criteria are used: 
 Growth in market value 
The particular focus on refractory metal markets distinguished from non-ferrous base 
metal markets is justified based on the observation that the economic relevance of certain 
refractory metals has grown remarkably during the commodity boom257. An important 
selection criterion is therefore the economic relevance of a metal, measured by market 
value. 
 Uniform demand structure 
After assessing several scientific concepts to analyze metal demand, the intensity of use 
technique was chosen due to its compelling top down approach and the quantitative 
results it yields up to the level of product composition of income (PCI) and material 
composition of product (MCP).258 However, due to lack of sufficient granularity of 
consumption data, estimating these variables is only possible if the major application of 
the metal is in one particular product, whose production output is publicly reported by 
country. 
 Data availability  
As discussed in the previous chapter, data on apparent consumption of refractory metals 
globally and by country are most often proprietary and have to be estimated based on 
trade data. The availability of trade data at a granular enough level is therefore a 
prerequisite for a reliable estimate of apparent consumption.  
 Plausibility of estimates 
As a next step, reconciling such estimates is often difficult as no officially accepted or 
                                                 
256 Compare chapter 2.1, Exhibit 1 
257 Compare chapter 2.3 
258 Compare chapter 3.2.1, Exhibit 11 
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available source exists. However, the plausibility of estimates can sometimes be 
challenged through figures published by industry sources, e.g., annual reports, by 
matching aggregated figures such as global supply and demand as well as through 
industry knowledge. Nevertheless, the degree of reconciliation may vary and uncertainties 
remain. A metal whose estimated apparent consumption figures by country appear 
implausible as they grossly diverge from other sources is excluded from further analysis. 
Exhibit 13 provides an evaluation of refractory metals along the above presented criteria: 
Uniform demand 
structure
Growth in 
market value
Data availability
Refractory metals
Chro-
mium
+++
++
+++
Manga-
nese
+++
++
+++
Molyb-
denum
+++
+++
+++
Nio-
bium
+++
++
++
Vana-
dium
+++
+++
+
Tung-
sten
−
++
−
Co-
balt
−
++
−
Tita-
nium*
−
++
n/a
Metals chosen for further
quantitative analysis
* Titanium metal
Plausibility of 
estimates
+ + ++ ++ − − − n/a
+++ : Fully satisfactory ++ : Satisfactory + : Somewhat satisfactory
- : Not satisfactory
 
Exhibit 13 – Assessment of refractory metals by selection criteria 
Source: Own illustration 
Based on these selection criteria, chromium, manganese, molybdenum and niobium are 
chosen for further demand side analysis. In the following subchapters, the assessment along 
the criteria is explained. 
4.3.1 Growth in market value 
It has been shown in chapter 2.3  that the group of refractory metals featured the strongest 
growth in real market value between 2001 and 2008. During this period, the market value of 
refractory metals as a group grew by 33 percent annually, whereas other minor metals grew 
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only by 13 percent.259 This extraordinary growth since 2001 underlines the rising economic 
importance of these metals and makes a comprehension of the underlying factors driving this 
development imperative. Growth in market value is therefore chosen as a selection criteria to 
take into account the rising economic importance of a refractory metal. 
Exhibit 14 shows the average market value from 2001 to 2008 as well as the annualized three 
year moving average growth rates for the periods 1980 to 2001 and 2001 to 2008 for 
refractory metals. 
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Exhibit 14 – Average market value and growth refractory metals 
Source: Own illustration 
The exhibit illustrates significant differences in market size. Molybdenum and manganese 
were by far the largest markets with 12 and 9 billion US dollars on average between 2001 and 
2008. All other markets were between 1 and 2 billion US dollars during the same time period, 
the market for tungsten was an estimated 600 million USD. Preceding the strong growth rates 
between 2001 and 2008 was a two decade long period of falling or stagnating market value 
for all refractory metals. By far the strongest growth rates during the boom period are found in 
the markets for molybdenum and vanadium followed by growth rates above 20 percent for all 
other markets. 
                                                 
259 Compare 2.3, Exhibit 6 
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4.3.2 Uniform demand structure 
As the majority of refractory metals is predominantly used as an alloying element in steel, 
steel production is the uniform application of choice. Steel production is well reported and 
data are published by official source.260 The following exhibits list the demand structure of 
the 8 refractory metals. 
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Exhibit 15 – Demand structure of refractory metals predominantly used as alloys in 
steel 
Source: Own illustration261 
The refractory metals in Exhibit 15 are predominantly used as an alloying element in steel, 
usually high strength low alloy (HSLA) grades or in stainless steel. Other minor applications 
are super alloys, which usually exhibit excellent mechanical strength especially at high 
temperatures. They are usually iron, nickel, copper or cobalt based and have a much higher 
content of alloying elements than HSLA steel grades. They are used for critical applications 
                                                 
260 Steel production by type is published by worldsteel.org 
261 Chromium: International Chromium Development Association (ICDA) (2010); Molybdenum: International Molybdenum 
Association (IMoA) (2010); Manganese: International Manganese Institute (IMnI) (2010); Vanadium: USGS (2008zm); 
Niobium: Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM) (2010a). The exact base year for the demand 
structure is not always clear from the source. 
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such as jet engines and turbines. Furthermore, refractory metal derivates are used as 
chemicals.262 
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Exhibit 16 – Demand structure of other refractory metals 
Source: Own illustration263  
The demand structure of tungsten, cobalt and titanium is depicted in Exhibit 16. As 
illustrated, the steel related use comprises only a minor share of total demand for all 3 metals. 
Tungsten's major use is in the form of cemented carbides, which in combination with a 
binding material, usually cobalt, is pressed to form hard metals. Hard metals have a much 
higher wear resistance than high speed steel, which is made by adding certain alloying 
elements to steel. 
Cobalt is used in a variety of industries. The dominant use is in cobalt-based batteries, 
followed super alloys and hard metals, colorings, chemicals and electronics. Only a small 
amount is steel related, in the form of high speed steel. Titanium's major use is in paint as 
titanium oxides, providing white coloring. Further applications are paper, rubber and other 
chemical related usage. Only a small amount is converted to titanium sponge metal, which is 
used predominantly in aerospace applications and other alloys. 
While all refractory metals have a variety of end use applications chromium, molybdenum, 
manganese, niobium and vanadium fulfill their functionalities in the end product through their 
alloying properties in steel and stainless steel. The concentration development of these metals 
in steel, measured as material composition of income therefore yields quantitative information 
                                                 
262 A more detailed overview of the specific use by metal is given in chapters 6.3 to 6.6 
263 Tungsten: International Tungsten Industry Association (ITIA) (2010); Cobalt: Cobalt Development Institute (2010)  
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as to how the demand for these functionalities develops over time. Such a quantitative 
assessment is not possible for tungsten, cobalt and titanium as the granularity of data on 
consumption development by end use is not available or proprietary data. 
The uniform character of the five refractory metals depicted in Exhibit 15 thus provides an 
adequate opportunity for an in-depth quantitative analysis. 
4.3.3 Data availability  
Whereas data on production and price are usually available for most metal types, whether or 
not apparent consumption may be calculated depends also on reported metal trade. Trade of 
goods is classified in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). The 
latest revision is HS 2007.264 The HS has a nomenclature of up to 10 digits, but UN Comtrade 
publishes trade statistics only up to six digits. This means that some trade flows are 
aggregated up to a level where a proper dissemination is not possible. E.g., in HS 2007, the 
numerical code 811292 summarizes trade of germanium, vanadium, gallium, hafnium, 
indium, niobium (columbium), rhenium, and articles of these metals, incl. waste and scrap, 
powder and unwrought. If a relevant share of either of these metals is in the form of waste and 
scrap, powder or unwrought metal, a calculation of apparent consumption is not possible as 
these forms of trade are not reported separately at the most granular reporting level. 
Refractory metals are usually traded in several refined forms. Table 17 provides and overview 
on the availability of data for all refractory metals by category265. 
                                                 
264 World Customs Organizaton (2010) 
265 Compare Appendix, Table 19 for details 
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Table 17 – Reported depth of trade by metal, HS code and description 
Source: Own illustration 
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As can be seen from the column on the very right in Table 17, data on the trade of several 
goods containing refractory metals are not available. Whether or not this impedes a reliable 
calculation of apparent consumption depends on the share of metal contained in the trade of 
such goods. This in turn depends on the demand structure of the metal and the trade mix of 
the individual reporting country.  
Chromium's major use is in stainless steel and consequently chromium is traded 
predominantly in the form of ferro-chromium. Only a negligible share of chromium is traded 
in the form of chromium contained in slag.266 Thus, estimating chromium demand without the 
trade data on listed in the very right column in Table 17 is unlikely to produce a large margin 
of error. Data on molybdenum and manganese in their intermediate forms are to a large extent 
complete.  
Mined niobium is reported to be predominantly converted into ferro-niobium267. According to 
the US Geological Survey (USGS), Brazil, the major producer of niobium worldwide, ceased 
to export niobium in its mineral form pyrochlore in 1981268 to nuture a downstream industry 
of niobium containing value added products. Ferro-niobium trade data therefore appear to 
capture most of niobium content traded in its non-alloyed form. 
Vanadium is traded in the form of ferro-alloys to be used in the production of steel, stainless 
steel and super alloys with only a small amount of global consumption going into applications 
for which other intermediate products such as vanadates and vanadium sulfates are 
processed269. Trade of vanadium contained in ashes and residues, which is reported 
sporadically until 2001, comprises only a marginal share of the value of total vanadium trade: 
                                                 
266 According to the International Chromium Development Association (ICDA), 95% of world production of chromite was 
smelted into ferro-chromium in 2008. ICDA (2010). In the same year, the split of chromium reported exports value was 
71.3 percent ferro-chromium, 18.4 percent ores and concentrates, 7% chromium metal and 3.4 percent chromium oxides. 
The value of chromium contained in slag, reported together with other metals was less than 1%. 
267 Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center (TIC) (2010) 
268 Jones/Cunningham (1981), p.271 
269 Compare 4.3.2, Exhibit 15 
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Exhibit 17 – Global vanadium imports contained in ashes and residues, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration, based on UN Comtrade270 
However, a different picture emerges for country specific trade. USGS reports values of US 
specific metal trade. The following exhibits contains estimated share of vanadium contained 
in ashes and residues of total US vanadium imports: 
 
                                                 
270 Compare Appendix, Table 43 
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Exhibit 18 – US imports of vanadium contained in ashes and residues, 1999 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration, based on USGS271 
USGS estimates that between 1998 and 2004 around 50 percent of US imported vanadium 
volume was contained in ashes and residues. After 2004 imports dropped but remained over 
15 percent till 2008. Based on value, the imports' share of vanadium contained in ashes and 
residues were much lower but remained over 5 percent in 2008.  
Unfortunately, such granular data do not exist for other countries. However, Exhibit 18 
illustrates that omitting trade of vanadium contained in ashes and residues from 2001 onwards 
in the calculation of apparent consumption may result in a potentially large margin of error for 
selected countries. 
Tungsten's major use is in hard metals, also called cemented carbides. According to the 
International Tungsten Industry Association, between 48 percent of local consumption in 
China and 72 percent of local consumption in Europe were used in the production of 
cemented carbides in 2008.272 Therefore, a significant share of tungsten trade is presumably 
in carbides. As trade in tungsten carbides is reported together with trade in boron carbides, 
aluminum, chromium, molybdenum, vanadium, tantalum, titanium and other carbides273, 
accounting for tungsten in carbides is not possible and a potentially large share of tungsten 
                                                 
271 Years 1998 to 2002: USGS (2002c), p.81; 2003 to 2007: USGS (2007b), p.80; 2008: USGS (2008k), p. 80 
272 International Tungsten Industry Association (ITIA) (2010) 
273 HS 2007 code 284990 
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consumption is exempt from the calculation of apparent consumption based on UN comtrade 
data.  
Regarding cobalt, cobalt chlorides, sulfates, carbonates, and acetates, the intermediate forms 
not reported by UN Comtrade comprised 6 and 14 percent of US imports in 2007 and 2008 
respectively by weight of cobalt content and about 6 percent by value, according to USGS.274  
Titanium is largely reported in its intermediate forms. 
4.3.4 Plausibility of estimates 
Assessing whether calculated data are plausible is often based on informed assumptions and 
triangulation of selected data points for which data exist as well as conversations with 
industry experts. Due to lack of a uniform demand structure for tungsten, titanium, and cobalt 
and because of a potentially large margin of error for tungsten apparent consumption for 
omitting trade in tungsten carbides, the metals are exempted from further demand side 
assessment. Nonetheless, an attempt was made to calculate demand data for cobalt, which can 
be found in the appendix. However, aggregated global apparent consumption could not be 
reconciled with reported global production.275 
In the case of vanadium, estimates for apparent consumption could not be reconciled with 
values reported in conference papers and those published by Vanitec. E.g., based on the 
calculation of apparent consumption as described in chapter 4.2, vanadium concentration per 
ton of produced steel was estimated to have fallen in China from 1994 to 2008, an observation 
that could not be confirmed by an industry source. Based on the same source, global 
production figures as well as production in China and South Africa could not be reconciled 
with figures published by USGS.276 
No evidence was found for significant implausibilities of estimates for chromium, manganese, 
molybdenum, and niobium. However, it should be reemphasized that while the granularity of 
trade data on these four metals in their intermediate forms is sufficient as outlined in Table 17, 
metal is also contained in traces in alloyed steel or in final products, which may be imported 
or exported. Yet, capturing the metal content in this indirect form of trade is difficult due to 
lack of data. Therefore, results and conclusions based on calculated apparent consumption 
have to be interpreted with care.  
                                                 
274 USGS (2008zo), Appendix 
275 Compare Appendix, 9.3.5 for details. The Cobalt Development Institute states that quantification of collected figures 
including trade and supply to calculate demand is "most difficult as figures based on official reports are lower than actual 
figures." CDI (2010), p.56 
276 Bunting (2009) . Compare Appendix, 9.2 
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4.3.5 Summary 
Having dicussed the growing importance of refractory metals, their lack of coverage in 
scientific literature as well as a scientific approach to analyze these metal markets going 
forward in previous chapters, the purpose of this chapter was to assess the lack of reliable 
market data for these metals as well as a practical approach to levy solid information 
nonetheless.  
Whereas data on production and price are available at large, apparent consumption has to be 
estimated based on published trade data. As these data do not provide information on the 
actual metal content of import and exports, the amount of metal contained by produced form 
has to be estimated. Furthermore, data on production cost are to a large extent proprietary and 
only rarely published by producers. 
Based on mainly on the data impediments on the demand side and reflecting the choice of the 
intensity of use technique to analyze patterns in apparent consumption, a set of criteria was 
defined to assess which metal markets can be sufficiently analyzed going forward. Based on 
these criteria, chromium, manganese, molybdenum and niobium were found to meet all 
requirements for a sufficient analysis.  
Given that data impediments exist mainly on the demand side, structural supply side 
differences will nonetheless be compared for all refractory metals in the following chapter. 
However, a comprehensive assessment comprising relevant influencing factors not only on 
the supply but also on the demand side is developed for chromium, manganese, molybdenum 
and niobium only. 
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5. Structural differences between non-ferrous base and 
refractory metal markets 
As deduced in chapter 3.4, economic analyses of metal markets and conclusions drawn with 
respect to underlying market forces influencing demand, supply and price are predominantly 
based on non-ferrous base metal markets. It is implicitly assumed that refractory metal 
markets follow similar development patterns as non-ferrous metals. In light of their rising 
economic importance and in the absence of a proper comparison of the underlying market 
structure of the two metal groups, in the following chapter the supply and demand structure of 
refractory metals and non-ferrous metals are compared. 
5.1 Structural supply side differences 
In the following chapter, the supply structure of refractory metals and non-ferrous metals are 
compared along the factors production concentration, trade concentration and supply source 
as outlined in vertical columns in Exhibit 12. Changes in the production costs of the marginal 
supplier will be elaborated for selected markets in chapter 8.  
5.1.1 Regional mine production concentration  
On average, the production of refractory metals is subject to a higher regional concentration 
than the production of non-ferrous base metals. A common index to measure the 
concentration of production is the so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)277. It is a 
widely used measure to determine if a market is critically concentrated. E.g., in the US 
antitrust law, a market with a HHI value above 1,800 is considered to be concentrated.278 The 
HHI is measured as the sum of the squared market shares multiplied by 10,000. The same 
methodology may be used to determine the global production concentration in metal markets. 
Exhibit 19 shows the HHI for non-ferrous base and refractory metals for 1990 and 2007279: 
                                                 
277 Herfindahl (1974) 
278 US Department of Justice (2010) 
279 Production figures for 2008 in a sufficiently disaggregated form were not available by the time of writing. 
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* Titanium sponge metal production, capacity data for 1990
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Exhibit 19 – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for metals, based on global production 
data 
Source: Own illustration 
As shown in Exhibit 19, the average HHI for non-ferrous metals is 1,748, slightly below 
1,800, marking the threshold value beyond which a market concentration is considered 
critical. The HHI for nickel, aluminium, zinc and copper are below 1,800, and lead and tin are 
clearly above the threshold. The average HHI for refractory metals is 3,444, twice as high as 
for non-ferrous base metals. Only the index of manganese is below the threshold value, all 
other refractory metals are above 1,800. Comparing the concentration of global production in 
2007 with earlier periods illustrates a gradual change in production concentration for non-
ferrous metals. In 1990, the average HHI for non-ferrous metals was 1,189, below its 2007 
value. Since 1990, the production concentration of all six metals except nickel has risen. For 
refractory metals, the average HHI value in 1990 is similar to the 2007 level. The rising 
concentration of niobium and tungsten was offset by falling concentration in manganese, 
molybdenum, vanadium, cobalt, and titanium metal. For chromium, the concentration did not 
change. 
These findings illustrate that the supply structure of refractory metals differs from non-ferrous 
metals insofar as regional production of refractory metals is more highly concentrated on 
average and for most refractory metals. This influences supply security considerations as 
consuming regions are dependent on few supplying countries with fewer option to diversify 
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their supply. The fact that the HHI for five refractory metals has fallen since 1990 may be 
interpreted as a reaction to concerns of supply security as production has become more 
diversified on a regional level.  
However, the index has several shortcomings. It does not account for the reliability and 
openness to trade of a nation, which impedes developing a realistic perspective on the 
criticality of the concentration. E.g., Brazil is the dominant exporter of niobium. Niobium 
supply concentration with an HHI of almost 9,000 may be interpreted as highly critical, yet 
supply security is unchallenged as long as Brazil is a reliable trading partner.  
Also, assessing the production volume is misleading as a country may not export all of it or in 
different forms. Furthermore, countries such as China install capacities to refine certain 
metals that exceed the capacity needed for domestically mined ore in order to process 
imported ores and concentrates from countries that do not refine it themselves. Through 
national policies such countries may then control a large share of the refined metal globally 
even so the country is not a large producer of primary ore. Such constellation greatly 
influences global availability of certain metals but it is not captured by a production based 
HHI.  
5.1.2 Trade concentration, export restrictiveness, and market 
organization 
While other considerations such as mine concentration, reliability of logistics and general 
stability of country also play a role when assessing metal supply security, concerns over 
resource security during the boom were especially sparked by Chinese export restrictions 
imposed on metals in various forms during the commodity boom as illustrated by the 
countermeasures launched by importing regions280. The reason for this is that the introduction 
of national trade policies in China in 2006 and 2007, a major supplier and dominant consumer 
of metal commodities, which may have been intended to protect domestic assets but favors 
domestic metal manufacturers challenged the hitherto prevalent perception that free trade and 
globalization had gradually eliminated domestic access to raw materials as a competitive 
edge281. In the following the impact of Chinese trade restrictions282 are therefore assessed.   
                                                 
280 Compare chapter 2.2 
281 Porter/Baldwin (1986), p.4 
282 The focus is on Chinese export restrictions may be justified as they are the most influential in terms of trade volume 
affected and the most far reaching in terms of metals covered.  
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Measuring the supply side concentration based on trade differs from basing it on production. 
Whereas the country producing, i.e. mining, the ore is the origin of the metal, an ore or 
concentrate may be exported, refined, and exported again. By taking the value of gross 
exports of metals across all intermediate forms as the basis for calculating trade concentration, 
volume exported several times in different forms may be double counted. Exports may then 
appear more diversified than production and consequently, the HHI may actually be lower 
than if based on production. To avoid this, trade can be viewed separately for different parts 
of the value chain. As already illustrated in chapter 4.3.3, Table 17 metals in their 
intermediate forms are usually categorized between ores and concentrates, chemicals, ferro-
alloys and other articles such as the pure, unwrought metal, plates, sheets etc. One then 
receives one HHI for each intermediate product, which may be summarized as the trade value 
weighted average. However, metals in different intermediates forms may still be converted 
into semi-products within a category, so double counting cannot be avoided. E.g., the HS 
code 76 comprises among other forms of aluminum trade aluminum sheets, plates, and strips 
in various forms (HS 760611 to HS 760692), of which aluminum pipes, tubes, and other 
structures and products (HS 7608 to HS 7616) are manufactured.  
Ø 924
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* Trade value weighted average of the categories ores& concentrates, articles, chemicals, and ferro-
alloys
 
Exhibit 20 – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for metals, based on global trade data 
Source: Own illustration 
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The above exhibit depicts the trade value weighted average HHI for six non-ferrous base and 
six refractory metals for the years 1998 and 2008283. Concentration shows a slight increase 
for both metal groups. However, the average value for refractory metals is three times higher 
than for non-ferrous base metals. Without niobium, the average HHI of the refractory metals 
depicted above is still close to 2,000, twice as high as refractory metals, which confirms and 
emphasizes the generally higher concentrations of both metal groups.  
As with production concentration, a high export value based HHI itself says little about 
whether supply security is at risk as it does not contain information about the reliability of the 
trading partner. The latter may be captured quantitatively by assessing policy measures 
towards restricting trade. The most commonly used index to account for trade restrictiveness, 
the IMF's trade restrictiveness index, is a very broad measure, spanning the entire trade of a 
nation not just trade in metals and predominantly accounts for import bound tariffs. Yet risk 
to supply security inherently stems from the restriction of exports of certain raw materials in 
various forms. 
In order to capture how much the export of a metal is restricted relative to global trade, export 
tariffs therefore appear to be the appropriate measure. Given that China is the major supplying 
economy levying export tariffs, the focus is on tariffs from China. The caveat of this approach 
is that export tariffs are subject to national policy and may change according to the political 
and economical environment. Also, they are designed to influence exports, which are then 
also exposed to more volatility than production levels. Therefore, it can be argued that a one 
year analysis of both export concentration and export restrictiveness based on export tariff 
may be of little informative value going forward. However, the fact that China did not alter 
most of its metal export tariffs in 2009, the year, in which metal markets were hit particularly 
hard by a global recession, suggests that rather than being temporary tools adaptable to global 
demand, these tariffs are there to stay. Furthermore, in order to account for any short-term 
reactions these surcharges may have triggered on the side of importers, such as switching to 
suppliers from other nations as far as possible, 2008 instead of 2006 or 2007, the years in 
which most export tariffs were introduced, is chosen to not overstate the influence of Chinese 
export restrictions. 
                                                 
283 1998 instead of 1990 as for production was chosen to receive a more complete set of trade data. 
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Exhibit 21 – Trade concentration and export restrictiveness, 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
In Exhibit 21, the HHI for twelve metals based on the average weighted export concentration 
is plotted against the average export restrictiveness associated with each metal. The latter is 
calculated by multiplying the Chinese export tariffs by HS code with the corresponding value 
of Chinese exports and dividing the result by the total global value of the metal's exports.284 
The result may be interpreted as the average extra charge, a non Chinese importer has to pay 
when he purchases a basket of intermediate forms of a certain metal on the global market.285  
As indicated by the grey shaded ellipses, four of the six refractory metals are to the upper 
right of the non-ferrous base metals. Their position in the chart illustrates that not only are 
these refractory metals more concentrated, they are also more exposed to Chinese export 
restrictions. Whereas the average export tariff levied on non-ferrous metals is 0.1 percent, the 
average extra charge to which molybdenum, manganese, chromium, and vanadium are 
exposed is 1.6 percent. Niobium, albeit highly concentrated, is only marginally exposed to 
export restrictions as Brazil, the major supplier, does not levy such taxes. In fact, the average 
export charge on niobium, 0.02 percent, stems from restricted re-exports of ferro-niobium 
                                                 
284 Compare Appendix, Table 45 for Chinese export tariffs by HS code 
285 Assuming that each exporter contributes to the basket according to his share of total exports of the metal and that each 
intermediate product is contained according to its share of total exports of the metal 
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from China. The exhibit illustrates that assessing the concentration of supply on a national 
level through export concentration instead of through production concentration and taking 
into consideration export restrictiveness yields a new perspective, which better reflects supply 
security issues to importers. E.g., measured by production, less than 0.9 percent of global 
chromite ore stemmed from China in 2008. Yet measured by export value, it exported 6.4 
percent of all exports of ferro-chromium, the major intermediate form, in which chromium is 
traded, as well as over 12 percent of chromium articles, including chromium metal. As an 
export tariff of 20 percent was levied on ferro-chromium in 2008 among other chromium 
products, this resulted in an average global export charge of 1 percent. 
Plotting the average export charge across all intermediate metal forms as an aggregated value 
allows to compare selected metals. However, it disguises that for certain intermediate 
products, surcharges were much higher. E.g., China exported over 25 percent of total global 
exports of ferro-silico-manganese and levied a 20 percent export tariff on the product. This 
resulted in an average surcharge of 5.1 percent to be borne by non-Chinese importers. 
In the case of aluminum, tin, and molybdenum, export tariffs were complemented by export 
quotas, which were gradually tightened or newly introduced in the case of molybdenum 
(Exhibit 22): 
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Exhibit 22 – Chinese export quota evolution 
Source: Own illustration286 
This form of export restriction is not captured in Exhibit 21, which implies that the cost effect 
of all Chinese export restrictions on importers in 2008 and beyond may have been higher than 
the average export surcharges calculated. 
In line with differences in the structure of trade concentration and restrictiveness, the market 
organization at the interface of suppliers and consumers differs as well for non-ferrous base 
metals and refractory metals. Distinguishing elements are the absence of a central market 
place for most refractory metals and the lack of financial instruments to mitigate the risk of 
price volatility as well as the nature of participants trading actively. 
The spot market trade of non-ferrous metals is conducted at centralized stock exchanges such 
as the London Metal Exchange (LME), whereas refractory metals have until 2010 been traded 
in a decentralized form only, with prices being set through direct negotiations between 
producers and consumers or by producers, e.g., in the case of niobium. For non-ferrous base 
metals, prices are published daily. Prices for refractory metals are published by trade journals 
based on interviews with trading partners based on a weekly, monthly or longer-term period.  
Exchange trading introduces the possibility of forward trading. Two implications of exchange 
trade emerge. First, this form of trading allows market participants to hedge their exposure to 
                                                 
286 China Customs 2009 
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the fluctuation of the commodity's price. Second, the existence of financial instruments in 
metal trading introduces a new type of investor on a large scale with speculative motives as 
opposed to industrial market participants. With respect to the first implication, until 2010 
industrial market participants only had the opportunity to hedge their exposure to non-ferrous 
metal prices. As the importance of refractory metals has grown, this has changed. As 
industrial consumers are beginning to realize the growing importance some of these metals 
and the cost and revenue risk associated with them, the LME introduced forward trading for 
molybdenum and cobalt in early 2010.287 
Scholars are divided on the implications of these different price setting mechanisms and 
opinions range from the perception that the introduction of exchange trading and thus future 
trading increases or does not affect volatility. However, several authors concede that 
exchange trading leads to an increase in market information.288 
5.1.3 Split of production 
Metal supply may stem from three general sources289: 
 Individual primary supply 
Individual primary supply is usually the most common form of metal supply and relates to 
metal mined from non-renewable sources as the main product. 
 Co- and by-product supply 
This form of supply stems also from non-renewable deposits but the metal is mined as a 
co-product or a by-product. A co-product status indicates that in order to make the mine 
profitable the metal must be mined together with the main product and both metals 
influence output. A by-product status indicates that while the metal is mined together with 
the main product, its total value is insignificant compared to that of the main product and 
consequently the by-product's price has no influence on the output290. 
 Secondary supply 
Secondary supply is metal recycled from scrap. Scrap may orginate from home scrap, 
                                                 
287 LME (2010) 
288 Compare chapter 3.1.3 
289 Tilton (1992), p. 52ff. 
290 The exact differentiation between by- and co product is blurred and not properly defined. Depending on revenue and 
profit shares, such labeling may also change with changing prices. 
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generated in the refining phase, new scrap generated during manufacturing or old scrap, 
resulting from products disposed by consumers. 
The supply of a particular metal may stem from all three sources and the nature of factors 
influencing supply may differ depending on the metal and the source of supply.  
The supply of non-ferrous metals stems predominantly from individual primary supply. While 
most of the time other metals are also extracted when non-ferrous base metals are mined, the 
latter usually constitute the dominant product. In contrast, three refractory metals are mined 
predominantly as co- or by-products as illustrated in Exhibit 23: 
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Exhibit 23 – Production split molybdenum, cobalt, vanadium, various years 
Source: Own illustration291 
Over 60 percent of molybdenum was mined as a co-product of copper production in 2006, 
mainly in Latin America. In 2008 cobalt production stemmed to over 80 percent from co- and 
by-production of nickel and copper. Vanadium is mostly recovered as a by-product from slags 
and residues. A minor share is also recycled from catalysts, where the recovery is associated 
with the recovery of other metals such as cobalt, nickel, and molybdenum292.  
This has important implications. Co- or by-products are mined only when the primary product 
                                                 
291 Molybdenum: Based on data from Raw Materials Group (2007); Cobalt: CDI (2010), p.53; Vanadium: Bunting (2009) 
292 Mitchell (1996), p.3 
 132
is mined also. Thus, supply of molybdenum, cobalt, and vanadium may not respond to the 
demand needs of the individual metal but to the supply situation of the main product.293 
Situations of over- or undersupply may therefore appear more pronounced than is the case for 
metals, which are mined mainly from primary deposits. E.g., in 2001, the molybdenum supply 
from copper mining remained low despite rising molybdenum prices and an undersupplied 
molybdenum market as copper producers delayed production "driven by efforts to deal with 
long-term flat copper prices lasting till 2003"294. On the other hand, the price of the refractory 
metals molybdenum, cobalt, and vanadium is often irrelevant to the viability of a mining 
project, in which these metals are mined as by- or co-products. This may lead to an 
oversupply or to a price erosion and to the squeeze-out of primary miners.295 
From most of their end uses refractory and non-ferrous base metals may be theoretically be 
recycled as in most applications metals is not dissipated, i.e. irretrievably lost296. However, 
whether or not scrap recycling is a relevant source of supply depends on numerous factors, 
foremost economic considerations297. Most factors influencing the success of secondary 
supply are metal specific. Due to the large volumes available, old scrap flows of non-ferrous 
base metals are generally well recycled. Global recycling rates298 for non-ferrous base metals 
are illustrated in Exhibit 24: 
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Exhibit 24 – Global recycling rates of non-ferrous base metals, 2006 
                                                 
293 Compare Maxwell (1999), p.5, for an example of nickel and cobalt 
294 Langhammer/Zeumer (2010), p.17 
295 Compare chapter 7.2 for an example in the molybdenum market 
296 This is not the case for other minor metals used in electronic components. Compare also Reller (2009), p.134 
297 Henstock (1996), p.6 
298 Recycling rate is calculated dividing global scrap recovery by global consumption. 
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Source: Own illustration299 
Global recycling rates of refractory metals are not published and scrap recovery of these 
metals is thought to be insignificant300 compared to non-ferrous base metals as these metals 
are usually contained only in traces in the end product and are thus much more costly to sort 
and extract.  
A comparison of the share of global export value associated with metal scrap relative to total 
export value of the individual metal reflects the minor role of refractory metal scrap. Exports 
associated with either non-ferrous base metal comprise close to 5 percent of total exports on 
average: 
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Exhibit 25 – Share of waste and scrap of global metal exports, non-ferrous base metals 
Source: Own illustration301 
For refractory metals, trade of waste and scrap is rarely reported separately on the level of 
trade data granularity provided by UN Comtrade. Not accounting for stainless steel scrap 
                                                 
299 Aluminum: Internation Aluminium Institute (2010); Nickel: Reck et al. (2008); Tin: International Research Institute 
(ITRI) (2010); Copper, zinc, lead: Based on World Bureau of metal statistics (2009) 
300 Henstock (1996), p.222 
301 Compare Appendix, Table 19 for HS codes used 
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exports, the average export value of chromium, cobalt and molybdenum is 1.4 percent. 
However, refractory metals are contained in trade of stainless steel and alloyed steel scrap. 
The value of stainless steel scrap is dominated foremost by the chromium content. Accounting 
for this form of scrap in the value of chromium trade yields a scrap trade percentage of 55 
percent. 
The difference illustrates that while metal scrap trade is not reported sufficiently granular, 
trade flows of alloyed scrap material may contain significant amounts of refractory metals. 
However, which of these are in the end recovered is unclear. 
5.2 Demand side structural differences 
In the following chapter, differences between refractory metals and non-ferrous base metals 
are elaborated with respect to the general structure of demand and demand development. 
Laying a particular focus on refractory metals, both topics are furthermore analyzed in detail 
in chapter 6. 
Refractory metals have a different demand structure insofar as they are usually used only in 
very small quantities in the end product. Thus, their share of costs relative to the total cost of 
the end product is small. Substitution considerations therefore impact refractory metals often 
only indirectly or only when such considerations are not purely cost based. Despite their small 
volume, refractory metals provide indispensable functions to steel grades as the dominant 
intermediate product of refractory metals analyzed in this work as well as to the end product. 
This contrast, the small volume and cost position and yet the essential functions these metals 
effectuate in steel302, makes their role in many applications fundamentally different from non-
ferrous metals. While the latter's importance to the end product is beyond doubt, non-ferrous 
base metals often comprise a more dominant share of material volume in the end product and 
thus a sizable share of total cost. As such, their influence and their role are much more visible. 
The analysis of metal demand development has been subject to numerous studies and 
concepts. The most widely used methodology by scholars as well as practitioners is the 
intensity of use (IU) technique.303 The concept postulates that demand ikD  of metal i  in an 
economy k  in 0t  growing at an annualized rate of ikr  till Tt   may be expressed as the 
                                                 
302 Compare also chapter 6.1 
303 Tilton (1990); compare also chapter 3.2.1 
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product of economic growth measured as gross domestic product kGDP  and the economy's 
intensity of use ikIU . 
The following formula expresses the relationship: 
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In order to identify similarities or differences in demand development, demand growth and 
the IU development for non-ferrous metals and the four refractory metals chromium, 
manganese, molybdenum, and niobium are assessed for the following thirty-four economies 
listed in Table 18304: 
Advanced economies Emerging and developing economies 
Western Europe Austria  Major emerging markets China305 
 Belgium306   Brazil 
 Finland   India 
 France   Russia 
 Germany  Developing Asia Indonesia 
 Italy   Malaysia 
 Netherlands   Thailand 
 Norway  Eastern Europe Czech Republic 
 Portugal   Hungary 
 Spain   Poland 
                                                 
304 The thirty –four countries consumed about 90 percent of total non-ferrous metal demand on average. Compare Appendix 
for details 
305 China comprises China mainland, Hongkong and Macao. Internal trade flows were eliminated. 
306 Belgium comprises Belgium and Luxembourg. Internal trade flows were eliminated. 
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 Sweden  Other emerging economies Argentina 
 United 
Kingdom  
 Chile 
Other advanced economies USA   Mexico 
 South Korea   Turkey 
 Australia   Ukraine 
 Canada   Venezuela 
 Japan   South Africa 
Table 18 – Economies in the focus of metal demand analysis 
Source: Own illustration307 
Exhibit 26 shows the average demand growth for the six non-ferrous base metals for 
advanced and emerging and developing economies. Growth rates are calculated based on 
three-year moving averages from the average between 1994 to 1996 to the average from 2006 
to 2008. For simplification purposes and to illustrate the time span covered, the time period is 
referred to as 1994 to 2008 in the following. 
                                                 
307 Classification according to World Bank 
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Annualized demand growth non-ferrous base metals, 1994-2008*
* Demand was annualized based on three-year moving averages from 1994 to 1996 and 2006 to 2008
** Real GDP growth, adjusted for purchasing power parity (ppp)
0.5
0.5
1.1
-0.2
-0.1
1.3
Ø 0.5
Zinc
Tin
Nickel
Lead
Copper
Aluminum
Average 
GDP growth**: 2.6%
Average demand growth, percent
Advanced economies Emerging economies
8.5
6.8
8.6
10.5
9.5
11.2
Ø 9.2Average 
GDP growth**: 5.7%
 
Exhibit 26 – Demand growth of non-ferrous base metals between 1994 and 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Overall, demand for non-ferrous metals in advanced economies grew at a modest annualized 
growth rate of 0.5 percent between 1994 and 2008. For the younger materials aluminum and 
nickel, demand grew slightly above 1 percent, whereas demand shrank despite the commodity 
boom for copper and lead, and stagnated around 0.5 percent for tin and zinc. Average real 
GDP growth adjusted for purchasing power parity in these advanced economies was 2.6 
percent on average, above all average metal demand growth rates. 
Unsurprisingly, a different picture emerges for metal demand development in emerging and 
developing countries. Here demand grew at an average of 9.2 percent and ranged from 6.8 
percent for tin up to 11.2 percent for aluminum during the same time period. Average annual 
GDP growth was 5.7 percent for the selected countries, below the demand growth rates of all 
non-ferrous metals. Complementing this growth analysis with the development of the 
intensity of use for non-ferrous base metals by regions yields a familiar picture: 
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Intensity of use development by region, 1994-2008
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Exhibit 27 – Intensity of use development by region between 1994 and 2008 for non-
ferrous metals 
Source: Own illustration 
The analysis reflects findings from Exhibit 26 that GDP growth in advanced economies 
outgrew metal demand on average. As a result of this discrepancy, metal intensity of use was 
generally falling in advanced economies. A notable exception was the development of tin in 
Japan. IU for nickel in South Korea and aluminum in Western Europe stagnated during the 
observed time period. In emerging and developing economies, GDP growth was below metal 
demand growth on average- Dominant trends such as industrialization and urbanization are 
generally assumed to drive metal demand and result in a rising metal intensity, although 
region specific differences exist. In China and Russia, intensity of use rose across all metals. 
In Brazil, IU fell for lead and tin and stagnated for zinc. In India IU stagnated for aluminum 
and zinc and fell for nickel. In Developing Asian countries, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, IU fell for the mature metals lead, tin and zinc and rose for the younger metals 
aluminum and nickel as well as copper. In major Eastern European economies, development 
was similar. IU fell for the mature metals copper, tin and zinc and also rose for the younger 
metals aluminum and nickel as well as lead.  
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These region specific distinctions may lie in cultural differences on a microeconomic level 
also suggested in earlier studies308. Nonetheless, it emerges that intensity of use of non-
ferrous metals is on average falling in advanced economies while rising in emerging 
economies and this perception continues to dominate economic analysis of metal demand 
among practitioners as well as scholars. 
However, a different picture emerges when analyzing the demand development of refractory 
metals. Exhibit 28 illustrates the average growth rates for four refractory metals. 
Annualized demand growth refractory metals, 1994-2008*
* Demand was annualized based on three-year moving averages from 1994 to 1996 and 2006 to 2008
** Without Belgium
***Real GDP growth, adjusted for purchasing power parity (ppp) 
6.3
1.4
1.4
2.3
Average 
GDP growth***: 2.6%
Niobium
Molybdenum**
Manganese
Chromium
Ø 2.9
Average demand growth, market share weighted
Advanced economies Emerging economies
16.4
10.8
8.0
7.3
Average 
GDP growth***: 5.7%
Ø 10.6
 
Exhibit 28 – Demand growth of refractory metals between 1994 and 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Contrary to non-ferrous base metals, the average refractory metal demand growth rate was 
slightly above GDP growth in both advanced and emerging economies during the same time 
period. Even when niobium is excluded, the average demand growth rate in advanced 
economies was 1.7 percent, more than three times that of non-ferrous base metals between 
1994 and 2008. With an annualized demand growth of 6.3 percent of niobium, the metal 
clearly excelled demand growth of all other metals. In emerging economies, growth rates 
were 1.5 percentage points higher on average than for non-ferrous metals. Niobium and 
                                                 
308 Compare Tilton (1990), p.73 for possible explanations for differences in intensity of use in aluminum and lead between 
the US and the United Kingdom 
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molybdenum grew strongest, followed by chromium and manganese. Exhibit 29 complements 
the growth analysis by depicting the intensity of use development: 
Intensity of use development by region, 1994-2008
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Exhibit 29 - Growth in intensity of use of refractory metals in eight major consuming 
regions and countries 
Source: Own illustration 
It emerges that the IU of niobium rose in all markets regardless of stage of economic 
development. For the other metals, no clear horizontal development picture is identifiable. 
Molybdenum's IU in advanced economies fell in the US and in Western Europe, yet rose in 
South Korea and Japan. In emerging economies, molybdenum's record is equally mixed. 
Rising in Russia and China as well as in Eastern Europe, the metal's consumption per GDP 
unit fell in India and developing Asia and stagnated in Brazil. Manganese's IU fell in most 
advanced economies except Japan but also fell in India, Developing Asia and Eastern Europe. 
Chromium's concentration per unit of GDP fell in the US and stagnated in Japan, yet 
increased in Western Europe and South Korea and rose in all emerging regions except Eastern 
Europe. 
The IU development suggests that for the refractory metals analyzed above, patterns of 
development in intensity of use do not appear to flow solely along stages of economic 
development, at least not during the fourteen year time period analyzed in this work.  
The distinction to the development in non-ferrous base metals is striking. Specific 
consumption of refractory metals appears not to decline in general at a certain stage of 
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economic development. Rather, factors reaching across economic performance levels have a 
dominant influence on the consumption of refractory metals. The unanimously positive 
development of niobium and the mixed record of other refractory metals suggests that 
structural differences embedded in the demand profile of these metals together with factors of 
microeconomic or other nature have a strong influence on the individual metal growth 
development. 
5.3 Summary 
In the preceding chapter the supply and demand structure of non-ferrous base and refractory 
metals were compared. Having demonstrated that refractory metals are underrepresented in 
literature on the economic development of metal markets despite their growing economic 
importance, the purpose of the comparison was to find evidence for differences in the 
structure of both metal groups that justify a separate analysis of refractory metals. 
On the supply side, differences exist with respect to the concentration of production, trade and 
export restrictiveness as well as market organization and source of supply. Production of 
refractory metals analyzed in this work is generally more concentrated in fewer countries and 
consequently, export of these metals in its various forms is also more aggregated. It was 
furthermore shown that China's role as a major supplier in these markets is more pronounced 
than in non-ferrous base metal markets with the consequence that importers of refractory 
metals are generally more exposed to Chinese export restrictions and thus face higher average 
surcharges than Chinese consumers. In this context, it was shown that China's influence is not 
confined to refractory metals that it produces domestically but generally affects metals, in 
which the economy has a dominant share in some parts of the value chain. 
With respect to market organization, refractory metals before 2010 were exclusively traded 
decentralized as opposed to non-ferrous base metals, which are all traded at central 
exchanges. This affects both opportunities of market participants to hedge themselves against 
price volatility as well the exposure of markets to financial investors. 
Finally, sources of supply are different between non-ferrous base metals and selected 
refractory metals. Whereas supply from the former stems predominantly from primary mines, 
i.e. from mines, which are mined mainly for non-ferrous base metals as well as from 
secondary production, i.e. recycling, refractory metals' share of recycling is thought to be 
insignificant. Furthermore, molybdenum, cobalt, and vanadium are to over 60 percent up to 
85 percent produced as co- or by-products. As such, their supply depends on the production 
and demand of the main product, usually nickel, copper or steel and not on the demand 
situation of the actual refractory metal. 
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On the demand side, it was demonstrated that the development of refractory metal demand 
relative to GDP is fundamentally different from patterns found for non-ferrous base metals. 
While the latter show generally falling patterns in advanced economies and rising patterns in 
emerging economies, demand for refractory metals relative to GDP does not appear to 
develop solely according to stages of economic development. Rather, metal specific factors 
embedded in the demand profile of the individual metal appear to have a pronounced 
influence. 
These structural differences both on the supply and demand side underline the importance to 
treat refractory metal markets separately from non-ferrous metal markets.  
Distinctions on the supply side have to be considered when accounting for structural forces 
influencing the long-term level and volatility of metal prices. An analysis of refractory metal 
demand has to identify factors, which shape the demand profile of the individual metal and 
take them into account. Clearly, a projection of refractory metal demand based solely on 
economic performance will not render realistic results.  
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6. Demand structure of refractory metals 
In the preceding chapter 5.2, a comparison of the demand stucture of non-ferrous base metals 
and four refractory metals showed that the intensity of use (IU) of the two groups of metals 
follows different trends. IU of non-ferrous base metals followed largely patterns of economic 
development. IU in economically advanced countries fell as predicted by economic theory, as 
GDP growth stems mostly from non-metal intensive sectors such as services. IU in emerging 
economies was mostly rising, albeit with region specific differences. This is said to be the 
result of industrialization and of a significant share of GDP growth stemming from metal 
intensive industries such as manufacturing.309 
A different picture emerges for refractory metals. Here rise and fall in IU are seemingly 
disconnected from patterns of economic development, reaching across economically 
advanced and emerging economies within the same metal market. This suggests that factors 
other than macroeconomic development play an important role in the development of 
demand. Furthermore, demand growth of refractory metals in advanced economies measured 
from the average of 1994 to 1996 to the average of 2006 to 2008 exceeds that of non-ferrous 
base metals on average. 
In the following chapter, an attempt is made to shed light on underlying forces influencing the 
demand for refractory metals. In chapter 6.1, functions refractory metals effectuate in steel are 
analyzed and linked to corresponding industry and consumer trends. This qualitative approach 
is then substantiated by a quantitative analysis of growth in apparent consumption on the basis 
of the IU technique. In chapter 6.2, the concept of product composition of income (PCI) and 
material composition of product (MCP), which allow a more granular decomposition of 
growth of apparent consumption are elaborated. Furthermore, an approach to cluster 
economies in the focus of this work is suggested to account for the specific demand structure 
of refractory metals . Subsequently, apparent consumption growth is decomposed for the 
refractory metals chromium, manganese, molybdenum, and niobium in the chapters 6.3 to 6.6 
for the clustered economies. In chapter 6.7, the influence of alloyed steel trade on MCP levels 
is examined by cluster. Chapter 6.8 complements the preceding analyses with a perspective on 
refractory metal specific micro trends such as substitution. Chapter 6.9 provides a summary 
and conclusions. 
                                                 
309 Compare chapter 3.2.1 
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6.1 Functions of refractory metals and corresponding long-term trends 
Refractory metals are added to steel because they improve the properties of steel either 
indirectly by influencing processing parameters, e.g., the cooling temperature or by having a 
direct effect on the properties of the final steel grade, e.g. strength. Such property 
improvements translate into functions in steel relevant to the manufacturing of steel, e.g. 
improved machinability, and essential for the end product, e.g. improved corrosion resistance.  
E.g., adding niobium improves the refinement of the microstructure of steel. This property 
improves the function of the end product as it allows the development of light-weight steel 
grades, which despite their lower weight have a higher strength than ordinary steel grades. 
Such steel grades allow the end application, e.g. an automobile, to function with less material 
at more demanding operating parameters. 
As growth in apparent consumption of refractory metals is essentially influenced by demand 
for certain end applications, it is the induced improvement of end use functions that drives the 
demand for refractory metals310. The following exhibit lists the major end use functionalities 
by alloy311. Vanadium as an important steel alloy is included. 
                                                 
310 Improved handling, such as weldability and machinability also play a role in the choice of alloys. 
311 Following Stahlfibel (1990), p.10f. Listed are those properties, in which any of the five metals are classified as "stark 
verstärkend"  - strongly increasing 
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Exhibit 30 – Functional profile of refractory metals in steel 
Source: Own illustration 
The dominant functions that either refractory metal effectuates in steel are corrosion 
resistance, strength, and high temperature strength as well as wear resistance and oxide and 
sulfur fixing in the case of manganese. Differences in the functional profile suggest distinct 
functional demand, i.e. demand growth characteristics. 
Different long-term trends affect the demand for refractory metals through the functions they 
bring to bear in steel and stainless steel. The three major application categories for high 
strength low alloy steel (HSLA) are pipe line, automotive and structural312 and industrial 
applications, transportation and building and construction for stainless steel313. A relentless 
performance increase within these categories leads to an ever increasing advancement of the 
operating parameters temperature, pressure and velocity. At the same time, a trend is visible 
towards ever lighter materials, which nonetheless can withstand more challenging operating 
parameters to address carbon emissions and other environmental concerns.314  
                                                 
312 Heisterkamp/ Carneiro (2001), p.1 
313 Nickel Institute (2007) 
314 Drewes/ Walker (2001), p.1ff. 
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While these trends are not new, a rising awareness for the issue of climate change, an 
increased necessity for sustainable industry solutions and for a sustainable expansion of the 
use of steel as demand in emerging economies surges315, all accelerate the development of 
more advanced steel grades and mediate a shift towards high performance steel grades.  
In addition, urbanization and industrial production are taking place in regions, which are 
located in more corrosive environments and face increasingly corrosive media, like sour gas 
and higher sulfur content in oil316. Water purification and desalination to answer rising 
demand for clean potable water in light of increasing pressure on available water supplies are 
further trends, which increase the demand for steel grades able to handle such corrosive 
environments.  
Parallel to these industry trends, the establishment of a state of the art industrial infrastructure 
and ongoing urbanization accompanies economic growth in emerging economies led by 
China.317 Furthermore, rising consumer spending318 in emerging markets and access to 
products of western quality standards breed an increasingly sophisticated and powerful 
consumer class demanding similar standards and quality improvements from domestic brands. 
Exhibit 31 summarizes how these developments accelerate industry and consumer trends: 
                                                 
315 Korchynsky (2005), p.1f 
316 Heisterkamp/ Carneiro (2001), p.7; Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010), p.16 
317 Boyer/ François (2009), p.21 
318 Consumer spending in emerging markets is reported to have surpassed US consumer spending since 2007 and comprised 
over 30 percent of total global consumer spending in 2008. The Economist (2010), p.9 
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Exhibit 31 – Long-term trends and regional developments 
Source: Own illustration 
An example for operations in more corrosive environments are constructions in places like the 
Gulf region, which through its proximity to the coast and the desert are particularly 
challenging for steel materials. Also, due to environmental pollution in certain strong growth 
locations in emerging economies, requirements for the corrosion resistance of structural 
elements are particularly high319. 
The trend quality improvement refers to enhancing the property of an existing application, 
usually durability, without changing operating parameters, e.g., the replacement of galvanized 
steel for chromium containing stainless steel in automotive exhaust pipes. Performance 
increases refer to industrial operations and consumer products, the latter occurring with a 
relevant impact for refractory metals mainly in the automotive industry.  
Exhibit 32 illustrates how industry and consumer trends affect the demand for refractory 
metals through the functions they bring to bear in steel: 
                                                 
319 SCI (2010), p.1 
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Exhibit 32 – Long-term industry trends affecting the demand of  
refractory metals through their functional profile 
Source: Own illustration 
Chromium and to a lesser extent molybdenum in combination with chromium in stainless 
steel are the main benefactors of a trend towards an exposure of steel grades to increasingly 
corrosive environments and higher corrosion due to advancing operating parameters such as 
higher pressures and temperatures. In this context, increasing efficiency by burning fuel at 
higher temperature also requires steel grades able to provide elevated temperatures strength, a 
further functionality provided by both metals. Furthermore, relentless quality improvements 
of existing applications further benefits both alloys.320. The aspiration for ever lighter yet 
higher-strength steel grades is benefiting the demand for niobium, vanadium and 
molybdenum in HSLA steel grades.  
Functional demand for refractory metals originates in the above deduced industry and 
consumer trends and greatly influences the individual demand for refractory metals. 
Consequently, the nature and characteristics of demand growth of the individual metal should 
reflect this. In the following chapter, growth in apparent consumption is therefore 
                                                 
320 Niobium is also reported to have been studied as an effective alloying element in ferritic and martensitic stainless steel to 
improve both corrosion resistance and high temperature strength. Given that only a minor share of niobium is used in 
stainless steel, the metal is not considered a major benefactor of trends towards more corrosive environments. Compare 
Hiramatsu (2001), p.2 
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decomposed into respective drivers to further substantiate the function related growth of 
refractory metals. 
6.2 Methodology of demand growth decomposition 
In chapter 5.2, demand ikD  for a metal i  in an economy k  was expressed as the product of 
kGDP  and the intensity of use ikIU . According to the intensity of use technique321, ikIU  may 
be expressed as the product of 
 the production composition of income kPCI , i.e. the economy's output of the product, in 
which the refractory metal is used relative to the economy's GDP 
 the material composition of product ikMCP , measuring the demand of the metal relative to 
the output of product in which it is contained 
The following formula illustrates the relationship: 
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While all variables are time dependent, kGDP  and kPCI  are only dependent on the 
economy k , whereas ikMCP is also dependent on metal i . 
The growth rate ikr  of metal demand may therefore be expressed as the product of the growth 
rates of GDP, PCI and MCP and can be decomposed accordingly: 
1)1()1()1(  ikkkik xwsr  
As illustrated in chapter 4.3, Exhibit 15, the four refractory metals in focus are used as 
alloying elements in steel. The variables kPCI  and ikMCP  are therefore calculated based on 
                                                 
321 Compare chapter 3.2.1 
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the steel production of the individual economies. In this context it is important to differentiate 
between steel production and steel consumption. The apparent consumption of refractory 
metals was calculated based on imports, exports and domestic production of the metals in 
their intermediate forms. In these forms, they are used in the domestic production of alloyed 
steel. Therefore, production is used as the divisor.322 
MCP is the only metal dependent variable, measuring a refractory's metal concentration in 
steel. The variable should reflect the functional demand for refractory metals inferred in the 
preceding chapter 6.1 and is therefore in the focus of the subsequent analysis. GDP and PCI 
are metal independent variables and are influenced by a wealth of factors depending on the 
individual economy. Further analysis of GDP and PCI beyond the variables' share of apparent 
consumption growth is therefore out of the scope of this work.323  
As a further step to better comprehend underlying drivers of refractory metal demand, 
developing a hypothesis how to cluster countries of similar IU development and level is 
essential. A key finding of chapter 5.2 was that economic performance alone is unable to 
explain differences in demand development between economies. Clustering economies by 
their GDP per capita level to explain the development of IU as suggested in numerous studies 
on non-ferrous metals is therefore insufficient to describe the demand development of 
refractory metals. Clustering by geography seems equally inadequate. Given that the main 
usage of refractory metals is in steel production, it is highly probable that the level of 
domestic steel production has a pronounced influence on apparent consumption of refractory 
metals and the development. Therefore, the traditional GDP per capita cluster is expanded by 
the level of steel production in a particular country and MCP, i.e. the apparent consumption of 
a metal per steel production rather than IU, the apparent consumption by GDP is tracked. 
Exhibit 33 illustrates the country clusters resulting from this approach324: 
                                                 
322 See chapter 6.7 for a consideration of alloyed steel trade 
323 Compare chapter 8.2.2 for further discussion 
324 Absolute figures for steel production are used as plotting steel production relative to GDP would not have influenced 
significantly the attribution of economies to clusters and would not have altered China's dominance in cluster 1. 
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Exhibit 33 – Country cluster 
Source: Own illustration 
Assigning the economies in the focus of this work according to the suggested clustering 
method yields seven groups of countries. Exhibit 34 depicts the total steel production and the 
average GDP per capita by cluster: 
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Exhibit 34 – Steel production and average GDP per capita by cluster, 2000 and 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Economies in cluster 1 combined both the highest cumulated steel production and the lowest 
average GDP per capita. With over 500 million metric tons in 2008, China produced the 
major share. All advanced economies except Portugal are in clusters 5 to 7. The grey dotted 
lines depict steel production and GDP per capita in 2000. The line for GDP has shifted almost 
parallel. In all clusters GDP per capita increased by between 2,000 and 4,000 US dollars per 
capita from 2000 to 2008. Given that emerging economies started from a low level of GDP in 
2000, this translates into higher GDP growth rates than in advanced economies. Cumulated 
steel production experienced a tremendous increase in cluster 1 by a factor of 3 but remained 
relatively stable for all other clusters. 
Overall, the development of steel production and GDP per capita between 2000 and 2008 
should be reflected in apparent consumption growth. Especially the strong increase in steel 
production in cluster 1 is expected to be a major lever for growing consumption of refractory 
metals. At the same time, a growing concentration of refractory metals in steel production in 
cluster 1 despite such strong steel growth would be a strong indicator that the increasingly 
relevant functions refractory metals effectuate in steel are not limited to advanced economies. 
Specifically, the gap in GDP per capita between clusters 1, 2, and 3 and clusters 5, 6, and 7 
should be reflected in MCP levels of refractory metals, whose use is indeed dependent on an 
economy's stage of economic development. 
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In the following chapters 6.3 to 6.6, apparent consumption is used to approximate metal 
demand and decomposed into respective shares attributable to GDP, PCI, and MCP on a 
regional basis, following the clustering hypothesis displayed in Exhibit 33. The time periods 
before and during the crisis are depicted separately. As apparent consumption is calculated 
without stock changes due to lack of data, figures are presumably more volatile as the 
dampening element of stock in and outflows is missing. To account for this higher volatility, 
growth is calculated based on three year rolling averages. Specifically, the growth of apparent 
consumption for the period before the boom is calculated from the average of 1994 to 1996 to 
the average of 2000 to 2002 and during the boom from the average of 2000 to 2002 to the 
average of 2006 to 2008. For simplification, the first period is expressed going forward as 
1994 to 2001, the second period as 2001 to 2008 to illustrate the maximum span of years 
covered. 
6.3 Chromium 
Chromium is crucial for the production of stainless steel, its major application, as it is the 
ingredient that makes steel stainless. A minimum of 10.5 percent of chromium is added to 
steel to receive a highly improved corrosion resistance compared to ordinary carbon steel. 
This resistance is due to an invisible chromium-rich film, which accumulates at the surface of 
stainless steel. It is inert, adherent to the metal and resistant to a wide range of corrosive 
media. Another main advantage is that it is self-repairing through the reaction with oxygen, 
thus damage by abrasion and other mechanical actions is instantaneously repaired.325 
Corrosion resistance and other properties may be improved through the addition of other 
alloying elements but through its unique role in stainless steel, chromium is irreplaceable and 
is considered to have no substitute.326 Chromium's other use is as a alloying element in 
specialty alloys as well as a chemical. Given this unique role and the critical importance of 
stainless steel in modern society and in military applications, chromium is therefore 
considered one of the most important strategic and critical materials. 
In the following chapter, the underlying drivers of intensity of use (IU) growth, the material 
composition of product (MCP), i.e. chromium intensity in domestic steel production and the 
product composition of income (PCI), i.e. the growth of steel production relative to GDP will 
be analyzed on a regional basis. Chapter 6.3.2 summarizes the findings of the chapter. 
                                                 
325 Stainless Steel Advisory Service (SSAS) (2001), p.1f. 
326 USGS (2010a), p.3 
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6.3.1 MCP and PCI analysis of chromium demand growth 
Chromium apparent consumption has enjoyed strong growth on the back of an increasing 
demand for stainless steel during the time period observed. Apparent consumption by cluster 
is displayed in Exhibit 35: 
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Exhibit 35 – Chromium apparent consumption growth by cluster,  
1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Chromium apparent consumption enjoyed strong annualized growth in emerging economies 
throughout the observed time period whereas growth rates in advanced economies were 
fluctuating. 
In cluster 1 including China, India and Russia, where over 37 percent of global apparent 
consumption were consumed in 2008, annual growth rated during the boom almost doubled 
compared to the pre-boom period. In the other major consuming clusters 6 and 7, growth was 
less steady. In cluster 7, combining Japan, the US and South Korea, apparent consumption fell 
prior to the boom on average and just recovered till 2008. In cluster 6 comprising major 
European steel producing economies, growth leveled off during the boom. Only in cluster 5 
growth remained steadily above 3 percent from 1994 throughout 2008. Overall emerging 
economies consumed over 50 percent of global demand, although figures for South Africa 
indicated in the lower left cluster 3 are subject to qualification. South Africa is a major 
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producer of chromite ore and chromium products yet does not have a large domestic market. 
It is therefore assumed that a calculated apparent consumption of 820 thousand metric tons on 
average between 2006 and 2008 is widely overestimated. Presumably, chromium is exported 
in a form not captured in the calculation of apparent consumption.  
The following exhibit illustrates the decomposition of growth into the respective drivers: 
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Exhibit 36 – Decomposition of chromium growth by cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
For advanced economies, growth before and during the boom was split between an increasing 
intensity in steel as well as growth in line with GDP. In all clusters in the right column 
comprising advanced economies, PCI, i.e. steel production per unit of GDP fell throughout 
the observed time period. Since chromium growth rates were still positive with the exception 
of cluster 7 prior to the boom, an increasing intensity overcompensated for falling steel 
production, indicating an ongoing specialization towards stainless steel. In cluster 1, strong 
steel growth relative to GDP during the boom accounted for a third of demand growth. 
Nonetheless, despite strong steel growth, increasing concentration of chromium in steel 
attributed another 30 percent to total growth, suggesting that stainless steel production is 
outgrowing carbon steel production. The residual was growth in line with GDP. 
Overall, an increasing concentration of chromium in steel production accounted for 40 to 50 
percent of apparent consumption growth in all major clusters except cluster 3.  
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As the MCP variable is the only metal dependent variable and therefore best suited to reflect 
the influence of functional demand affecting chromium, MCP rates by cluster and period are 
depicted in Exhibit 37: 
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Exhibit 37 – MCP rates chromium by country cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
The exhibit reflects an overall increase in the intensity of chromium per ton of produced steel 
in emerging economies. In cluster 1, MCP grew at constant rate of 6 percent annually between 
1994 and 2008. In cluster 2, annual growth was lower but equally steady at just over 2 
percent. In advanced economies, the increase of chromium concentration in steel production 
grew slower or stagnated. In cluster 5 and 6, growth in MCP slowed during the boom, 
presumably because the fall in steel production per GDP slowed. In cluster 7 comprising the 
US, Japan and South Korea, MCP rates remained at 4 metric tons per thousand tons of 
produced steel on average during the observed time period with minor fluctuations. 
It stands out that the average MCP rate in the major consuming cluster 1, including China, 
India and Russia has already reached levels of the cluster 7 economies US, Japan and South 
Korea, despite a large gap in economic development approximated by per capita income 
levels. Also, while growth in chromium intensity per unit of steel production has stagnated in 
the latter, undeterred growth in cluster 1 suggests that it will soon surpass levels of this 
cluster. Emerging economies in cluster 2 remained below cluster 1 by a factor of two. MCP 
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levels in cluster 3 were even lower when adjusted for an inflated value in South Africa. 
Overall, chromium intensity in emerging economies appears to fall with falling steel 
production, which suggests that some of these economies are net importer of stainless steel. 
Major European producing economies, cumulated in cluster 6, led by Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, and Spain maintained a higher average concentration of 6.8 tons chromium per one 
thousand metric tons of steel produced. Finally, the highest average MCP levels are found in 
cluster 5. Here, Finland is the main consumer of chromium with an average MCP rate 
between 2006 and 2008 of 27 tons of chromium per one thousand metric tons of produced 
steel. Other major consumers are Sweden and the Netherlands with MCP levels of 12 and 
15.0 respectively, followed by Austria and Australia with 4.6 and 2.7. Norway does not 
consume significant amounts of chromium. The high MCP rates of the Scandinavian 
countries may be explained by the presence of highly specialized stainless steel and other 
alloy producers such as Outokumpo and Sandvik, whose main production centers are in 
Finland and Sweden, respectively. 
It is noteworthy that large differences between economies in the major consuming clusters 1 
and 7 exist as illustrated in the following exhibit: 
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Exhibit 38 – Chromium MCP level of economies in cluster 1 and 7, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
MCP levels of China and Russia have surpassed the US level during the observed time period 
from the average of 1994 to 1996 to the average of 2006 to 2008 but both remain below that 
of South Korea and Japan by a factor of around 2. Chromium concentration only grew in 
South Korea and fell slightly in the US and Japan during the observed time period. India's 
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high rate may in part be explained by the country's position as a major global supplier of 
chromium and by the popularity of a stainless steel grade family named the 200 series, which 
is widely used for cook ware and uses manganese, available from domestic sources instead of 
nickel, which has to be imported327.  
However, so far MCP levels have been compared without adjusting for chromium contained 
in stainless steel trade. This may lead to an over- or underestimation of chromium actual 
domestic consumption. As stainless steel trade is reportedly separately from carbon steel trade 
and contains a minimum of 10.5 percent of chromium328, an estimation of chromium content 
contained in exports and imports is possible. Thus, a more accurate calculation of apparent 
consumption of chromium is possible. In order to remain consistent, the divisor, domestic 
steel production, also needs to be adjusted for exports and imports to calculate apparent 
consumption of steel and to receive the intensity of chromium in steel used for domestic 
consumption DomesticikMCP : 
ipipk
kkikDomestic
ik EIP
EcIcDMCP 
 )()(  
)( kIc  denotes the chromium content in imports of stainless steel, )( kEc  the chromium 
content in exports of stainless steel, ipI  and ipE  the imports and exports of steel. 
Exhibit 39 displays the adjusted MCP rates by cluster:  
                                                 
327 Australian Stainless Steel Development Association (2006), p.2. Compare also chapter 6.8.2 for further details 
328 SSAS (2001), p.1ff. The standard grade of the still dominant 300 series grade family contains 18 percent chromium. The 
second largest grade family, the 400 series, contains between 13 percent and 17 percent chromium. An average of 15% 
chromium is assumed to be contained in traded stainless steel. Compare also chapter 6.8.2 
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Exhibit 39– MCP development of domestically consumed chromium by country cluster, 
1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
The MCP levels in the above exhibit depict a more accurate picture of the level of chromium 
intensity of steel used domestically. An important finding is that the country cluster 1 
including China, India and Russia, which has been the main driver for chromium demand 
growth in the analyzed period surpassed MCP levels of advanced economies with comparable 
steel output already before the crisis. Bolstered by net stainless steel imports, the MCP level 
of cluster 1 already reached an average MCP level of 3.7 metric tons chromium per thousand 
tons of domestically consumed steel for the time period between 2000 and 2002 compared to 
an average of 3.1 in the US, South Korea and Japan. In 2008, concentration of domestically 
consumed stainless steel in cluster 1 was already more than 30 percent above the average in 
cluster 7. Adjusted for stainless steel trade, MCP growth rates in cluster 1 slowed 
considerably during the boom. Having grown at 6 percent annually from 1994 to 2008 as 
depicted in Exhibit 37, growth of chromium intensity of domestically consumed steel was 
only 2 percent during the boom. This suggests that chromium intensity of domestically 
consumed steel may not advance significantly beyond the 2006 to 2008 average rate of 4.3 
but rather that imports may be replaced by domestic production. 
Concentration of chromium in steel in cluster 2 is considerably higher when adjusted for 
stainless steel trade, which confirms the hypothesis that the countries cumulated in this cluster 
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are net importers of stainless steel on average. With an average of 3 metric tons of chromium 
for one thousand metric tons of steel produced between 2006 and 2008 the MCP level is 
similar to that found in cluster 3 adjusted for South Africa but still below cluster 1. 
MCP levels in advanced economies adjusted for stainless steel trade are all lower than the 
unadjusted level, which suggests that on average these economies are net exporters of 
stainless steel. Nonetheless, the differences between the clusters 5, 6, and 7 persist. 
Concentration for cluster 6 and cluster 5 remain above cluster 7 by a factor of 2 and 3, 
respectively on average between 2006 and 2008. This indicates that reasons beyond economic 
development, e.g., cultural reasons may also play a role in explaining the use of stainless 
steel. E.g., an unpublished document by the Nickel Institute suggests that in the USA the 
popular aluminum is an accepted alternative to stainless steel329, which may in part explain 
the low chromium concentration in this country. 
Overall, the concentration of chromium consumed domestically appears to have stabilized on 
average in cluster 5, 6, and 7 and growth slowed considerably in cluster 1. This suggests that 
concentration may approximate a level of saturation in advanced economies and advances at a 
slower pace in emerging economies. 
6.3.2 Summary 
The purpose of the preceding chapter was to develop a more granular yet quantitative 
understanding of forces influencing the intensity of use (IU) development of chromium as a 
major driver of chromium demand growth next to growth in line with GDP. In this context, 
the share and development of GDP, the material composition of product (MCP) and product 
composition of income (PCI) were analyzed. Findings are summarized as follows: 
 Driver of growth in chromium apparent consumption 
The major driver of growing chromium IU appears to be a rising MCP level, i.e. a rising 
intensity of chromium in steel. This holds true regardless of the stage of economic 
development and can be witnessed in emerging economies as well as for developed 
economies' steel production and consumption. In advanced economies this rising 
concentration compensates for a falling growth of steel production relative to GDP. Only 
in cluster 1 has steel production still grown above GDP. Here, PCI attributes roughly 30 
percent to total growth in apparent consumption. 
                                                 
329 Nickel Institute (2007), p.20 
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 Level of MCP rates  
MCP levels of major emerging and advanced economies appear to be close together. In 
fact, when adjusting for stainless steel trade, cluster 1 including China, Russia, and India 
surpassed the chromium concentration level of domestically consumed steel of cluster 7, 
including the US, Japan, and South Korea on average already in 2001. Concentration in 
the other emerging cluster 2 and 3 are at the average level of cluster 7. 
Other advanced economies clustered in cluster 5 and 6 maintain a concentration of 
chromium higher than cluster 7 by a factor of two and three respectively. This gap 
remains when stainless steel trade is adjusted for, which suggests that other reasons, e.g., 
cultural influence the use of stainless steel.  
The minor differences in MCP level between emerging and advanced economies are a 
reflection of chromium's universal function as a corrosion inhibitor. The importance of 
this function both for industrial and end user applications underlines its unique status but 
is also the reason why it is not a specialty alloy found only in high tech products in 
advanced economies. Rather, in the form of stainless steel, it enjoys a wide spread 
distribution in all major steel producing and consuming economies worldwide, to a large 
extent regardless of the stage of economic development330. 
 Growth of MCP rates 
MCP rates in the China, Russia, India cluster continue to grow strongly measured both in 
steel production as well as in domestically consumed steel, closing the gap to major 
Western European countries. Particularly China's strong MCP growth rates suggests that 
chromium demand will continue to grow above GDP. This is turn is an indication that 
China's steel production is becoming increasingly sophisticated as level of chromium 
intensity in steel production and domestic consumption reach those of Western European 
countries.  
In advanced economies, growth rates of chromium intensity in steel production in 
advanced economies are stagnating between 1994 and 2008 for cluster 1 bundling the 
major steel producers USA, Japan and South Korea. Growth of chromium intensity in 
steel in highly specialized Scandinavian steel producers appears to be driven mainly by 
exports. On the other hand, the increase in chromium intensity in major Western European 
steel producing countries such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain appears to be driven 
by internal demand for stainless steel. 
                                                 
330 Differences between countries of different stages of economic development can be found in the use of the type of 
stainless steel. Compare also chapter 6.8.2 
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The above analysis identified the relevant driver of growing IU following the top down logic 
of the intensity of use technique as depicted in Exhibit 11 in chapter 3.2.1 and helps to 
substantiate the influence of major industry and consumer trends deduced in chapter 6.1 on 
chromium apparent consumption patterns through the functions chromium effectuates in steel. 
6.4 Manganese 
Manganese's main use is in steel making, comprising over 90 percent of manganese used 
today. Manganese provides two distinct properties. During the steel making process, it is 
added to combine with sulfur and for its deoxidation properties, helping to remove both 
undesirable sulphur and oxygen. It is estimated that about 30 percent of manganese is still 
used for this purpose.331 Its other property, comprising the major share of manganese used in 
steel is as an alloying element in steel. Manganese plays an important role in improving 
strength and toughness of steel. By mitigating the response of steel to quenching it helps 
refine steel's characteristic micro-structure known as pearlite. This virtue is the reason that 
traces of manganese between 0.15 percent and 0.8 percent are contained in virtually all low 
carbon steel grades. Higher percentage rates are found in high strength low alloy steels 
(HSLA) and in speciality steel grades. Furthermore, manganese is used for its ability to form 
an austenitic structure, as does nickel. Stainless steel containing between 4 to 16 percent of 
manganese, also called 200 series stainless steel, has been introduced as a low cost alternative 
to nickel containing austenitic stainless steel. In non-steel applications, manganese is used as 
an alloy in aluminum to enhance corrosion resistance as well as in copper to improve 
castability and mechanical strength. Its most important non-metallurgical application is as a 
depolarizer in dry-cell batteries, followed by the use as a chemical to purify water and treat 
waste water. 
In the following chapter, growth in apparent consumption is decomposed into GDP, the 
material composition of product (MCP), i.e. manganese intensity in domestic steel production 
and the product composition of income (PCI), i.e. the growth of steel production relative to 
GDP will be analyzed on a regional basis. Chapter 6.4.2  summarizes the findings of the 
chapter. 
                                                 
331 International Manganese Institute (2010)  
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6.4.1 MCP and PCI analysis of manganese demand growth 
Judging from manganese's demand profile, apparent consumption of the metal should follow 
the production of steel. Exhibit 40 displays apparent consumption development by cluster for 
the two periods from the average of 1994 to 1996 to the average of 2000 to 2002 and to the 
average of 2006 to 2008: 
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Exhibit 40 - Manganese apparent consumption growth by cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
In all but one country cluster, apparent consumption stagnated or fell between 1994 and 2001 
but rebounced strongly during the commodity boom period from 2001 to 2008. Cluster 1 
comprising China, India and Russia experienced an 18 percent annual growth rate from 2001 
to 2008 and was the major consuming cluster of manganese in 2008, comprising 44 percent of 
global apparent consumption. As the only cluster experiencing growing apparent consumption 
in the period prior to the boom cluster 2, including Brazil and Ukraine as the main manganese 
consuming economies, saw an 8 percent growth between 1994 and 2001 and continued to 
encounter growing consumption during the boom, albeit at a lower rate of 4.6 percent. In 
2008 this cluster consumed 16 percent of global apparent consumption in 2008. Combined, 
emerging economies' share of global apparent consumption of manganese was over 60 
percent.  
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Among advanced economies, a mixed picture emerges. In the cluster 5, growth fell from 1994 
to 2001 mainly driven by falling apparent consumption in Australia, the Netherlands and 
Austria before returning with double digit growth rates in the latter two during the commodity 
boom from 2001 to 2008. Growth among Western Europe's main steel consumers in cluster 6 
stagnated between 1994 and 2008. Finally, demand in the major steel producing economies 
USA, Japan and South Korea remained constant during the period prior to the boom and 
experienced strong growth at an annualized rate of 11 percent during the boom. 
Over 60 percent of manganese apparent consumption is consumed in emerging economies. 
Major steel producing economies bundled in cluster 7 consume barely 20 percent of global 
demand. 
To nurture a better understanding of manganese's demand development, the drivers of growth 
are depicted in Exhibit 41: 
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Exhibit 41 –Decomposition of demand by cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
A reduction of manganese content in steel production was the major cause of declining 
demand during the period from 1994 to 2001 in most emerging economies, followed by fall in 
steel production relative to GDP. In cluster 1, 96 percent of declining demand was caused by 
declining manganese content in steel. Rising GDP compensated for this decline in MCP, 
otherwise demand would have declined much stronger. Despite strong growth in during the 
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commodity boom, rising MCP played only a minor role, comprising 19 percent of demand 
growth, behind 34 percent due to rising steel production relative to GDP and 47 percent 
general GDP growth. This confirms the hypothesis that growth in manganese apparent 
consumption closely follows steel production. 
In cluster 2, where demand growth remained strong throughout the analyzed periods, growth 
in MCP was a strong driver for growth during the first period but contributed only a minor 
share between 2001 and 2008, compensating for a falling steel production relative to GDP. In 
cluster 3, including developing Asian countries Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia as well as 
Latin America's Venezuela and Chile, falling manganese content in steel production was the 
main driver for declining manganese demand in both periods.  
In cluster 5 falling steel production relative to GDP caused 43 percent of declining manganese 
demand, the residual being caused by a reduction in manganese concentration in domestic 
steel production. In major Western European steel producers bundled in cluster 6, fall in 
demand during the first period can be assigned to a falling MCP rate, followed by reduced 
steel output. Finally, a decline in manganese content and steel production relative to GDP 
occurred as well in cluster 7 but was compensated by GDP growth, causing demand to 
stagnate. In the boom period, 39 percent of growth in this cluster can be assigned to rising 
manganese content in domestic steel production followed by 61 percent driven by general 
GDP growth. 
Falling MCP rates as the main driver of falling demand prior to the boom in major manganese 
consuming regions are also visible in Exhibit 42: 
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Exhibit 42 – MCP rates manganese by country cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
It emerges that average MCP levels among major steel producers appear to be similar 
regardless of the stage of economic development. Manganese concentration for unit output of 
domestic steel production in 2008 was between 8.2 and 8.8 metric tons of manganese per one 
thousand metric tons of steel in cluster 1, cluster 7 and cluster 6, comprising economies, 
which consume over 75 percent of manganese.  
In cluster 2, manganese concentration was rising. This effect was mainly caused by the 
Ukraine. Adjusting for this, MCP levels would have remained constant at 10 metric tons per 
one thousand tons of steel between 1994 and 2008. In cluster 3, MCP level fell steadily 
indicating an increasingly efficient production of steel.332 Rising manganese concentration in 
cluster 5 consisting mainly of advanced economies home to highly specialized steel producers 
could originate from a higher functional demand for manganese's advanced alloying functions 
such as increased wear resistance. 
In two notable cases, MCP levels vary significantly within a cluster. India's MCP level of 
manganese is constantly higher at around 19 metric tons of manganese per one thousand 
metric tons of domestically produced steel compared to 7 in China and Russia. In cluster 2, 
                                                 
332 Compare also chapter 6.8.1 
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the Ukraine's MCP level rose to an average of 20 metric tons per one thousand tons of steel 
produced. Reasons for such high rates in both countries are elaborated in more detail in 
chapter 6.8.1. 
6.4.2 Summary 
The purpose of the preceding chapter was to develop a more granular yet quantitative 
understanding of forces influencing the demand growth of manganese. In this context, the 
share and development of GDP, the material composition of product (MCP) and the product 
composition of income (PCI) were analyzed. Findings are summarized as follows: 
 Driver of growth in manganese demand 
The major driver of declining manganese demand during the period from 1994 to 2001 
were falling intensity of manganese in domestic steel production, coupled with falling 
steel production relative to GDP. In the years during the boom, increasing demand in the 
main consuming country cluster consisting of China, India and Russia was mainly caused 
by GDP growth, coupled with PCI, i.e. steel production outgrowing GDP followed by a 
slight rise in MCP rates. In major consuming advanced economies bundled in clusters 6 
and 7, demand during this period grew mainly in line with GDP, bolstered by a slight 
increase in MCP.  
 Level of MCP rates  
Among major steel producers, MCP rates appear to be in the area of above 8 tons of 
manganese per throusand tons of domestic steel production, regardless of stage of 
economic development. In selected economies, with manganese mining and refining 
facilities, rates appear to be higher, such as in Norway and the Netherlands as well Brazil 
and the Ukraine.  
Similar MCP levels in manganese between advanced and emerging economies are a 
reflection of the metal's unique functions as a sulfur and oxide fixing agent and as a 
strength improving alloy of standard grade carbon steel333. Both functions make it an 
essential ingredient to steel making and thus facilitate a wide spread distribution globally. 
Manganese's role in the improvement of wear resistance is important but the volume of 
manganese going into high alloyed steel grades is estimated to be small compared to 
                                                 
333 Compare also chapter 6.1 
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manganese's more dominant uses334. A production focused on such steel grades may in 
part explain the higher MCP rates in selected countries. 
 Growth of MCP rates 
In the analyzed time period, MCP rates fell or stagnated prior to the commodity boom 
from 1994 to 2001 in most major steel producing economies and grew only slightly during 
commodity boom from 2001 to 2008. An exception were advanced economies bundled in 
cluster 5. Here intensity of manganese in domestic steel production grew at a rate of over 
8 percent during the boom. 
The above analysis aided to identify the relevant driver of falling or stagnating IU for 
manganese following the top down logic of the intensity of use technique as depicted in 
Exhibit 11 in chapter 3.2.1. The quantitative approach complements the qualitative function 
based approach in chapter 6.1. The results are a reflection of manganese's universal role. 
Manganese's use is wide spread and its concentration in steel is saturated in most major 
consuming economies. In fact, a more efficient use of manganese can result in a falling 
concentration in steel production as is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.8.1. Both explain 
the similar MCP levels between emerging and advanced economies as well as the low growth 
rates of manganese consumption on a global scale335. 
6.5 Molybdenum 
Becoming known as a replacement for tungsten in tool steel after the 2nd world war, roughly 
75 percent of molybdenum is today used as an alloying element in steel or stainless steel as 
well as in tool steel and cast iron, where it is valued for its ability to enhance strength, 
hardenability, weldability, toughness, elevated temperature strength, and corrosion resistance. 
In this context Molybdenum is often called the energy metal due to its dominant use in steel 
grades for pipes and tubular goods, boilers, tanks, drilling equipment and other energy related 
applications. Molybdenum is used only in small amounts and rarely exceeds 2 percent of 
content. Molybdenum based alloys with a higher content of molybdenum enjoy growing 
demand linked to molybdenum's elevated temperature strength.336 Its other major use is in 
catalysts (~14 percent) for the desulfurization of sour oil as well as of petrochemicals and 
coal-derived liquids. 
                                                 
334 Compare also chapter 4.3.2, Exhibit 15 
335 Compare chapter 5.2, Exhibit 28 
336 Imgrund/ Kinsman (2007), p.23  
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In the following chapter, the underlying drivers of intensity of use (IU) growth, the material 
composition of product (MCP), i.e. molybdenum intensity in domestic steel production and 
the product composition of income (PCI), i.e. the growth of steel production relative to GDP 
will be analyzed on a regional basis. In shapter 6.5.2  the findings of the chapter are 
summarized. 
6.5.1 MCP and PCI analysis of molybdenum demand growth 
Molybdenum apparent consumption by country cluster is displayed in the following exhibit: 
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Exhibit 43 – Molybdenum apparent consumption growth by cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
From the above exhibit it becomes apparent that molybdenum demand stagnated or fell in its 
major markets prior to the boom. Between 1994 and 2001, molybdenum's main consuming 
regions were traditional markets in major steel producing western economies. Here growth 
was sluggish. In cluster 7, comprising the US, Japan and South Korea, growth was slightly 
negative, in cluster 6 consisting of main steel producing Western European countries barely 
positive. A similar picture emerges for the lower left cluster comprising as main consuming 
countries Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Austria with Australia and Norway 
consuming only a minor share. Apparent consumption in major emerging economies played 
only a minor role in the molybdenum markets prior to the boom. Combined demand from 
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China, India and Russia in the cluster 1 shrank between 1994 and 2001 and comprised only 
7.3 thousand metric tons in 2001, barely 7 percent of global demand. Only cluster 2 including 
Brazil, Ukraine, Poland, Turkey, and Mexico and cluster 3, bundling developing Asia, Chile 
and Venezuela experienced strong growth prior to the boom. In cluster 3, Chile as a main by-
producer of molybdenum from copper production accounted for a major share of apparent 
consumption indicated by the dotted columns. 
Molybdenum's situation changed dramatically during the period from 2001 to 2008. Apparent 
consumption in the upper left cluster grew by an annualized rate of 32 percent, mainly driven 
by China with India and Russia playing only a minor role. Within 7 years, China became a 
major consumer of molybdenum. Growth in advanced economies was positive during the 
commodity boom as well, albeit at lower levels. In cluster 7, demand grew by an average of 4 
percent between 2001 and 2008, followed by moderate growth among Western European steel 
producers in cluster 6 and a growth rate of 2.5 percent in cluster 5. Growth in the cluster 2 fell 
slightly during the boom mainly because of consumption breaking off in Mexico after 2006. 
In contrast to chromium and manganese, cumulated consumption of advanced economies still 
accounts for over 60 percent of total global apparent consumption. Cluster 1 consumes only 
about a quarter of global consumption although exhibits the strongest growth rates, which 
suggests that its share is going to increase going forward. 
In the following Exhibit 44 growth is decomposed by cluster into the drivers GDP, PCI and 
MCP: 
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Exhibit 44 – Decomposition of molybdenum growth by cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
In the major consuming markets prior to the commodity boom, located in economies with 
GDP per capita above 25,000 USD clustered in the right column, molybdenum consumption 
stagnated or fell mainly due to declining steel production and falling intensity of molybdenum 
in steel production. In cluster 7 combining the US, Japan and South Korea, negative growth 
rates between 1994 to 2001 were equally driven by falling PCI and MCP rates. In cluster 5, in 
which consumption is mainly driven by Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Austria, falling 
steel production relative to GDP was the main cause of stagnating demand, compensated only 
by positive GDP growth. Between 2001 and 2008, molybdenum demand in major steel 
producing economies in cluster 7 grew driven primarily by an increase in MCP rates, 
followed by growth in line with GDP. In cluster 5, growth was mainly in line with GDP 
growth and only a quarter of demand growth can be assigned to a rise in intensity of 
molybdenum in domestic steel production. 
In cluster 1, falling molybdenum intensity in steel production in China and India between 
1994 and 2001 and was responsible for 98 percent of declining consumption during that 
period. The extraordinary growth during the commodity boom from 2001 to 2008 was mainly 
driven by an increase in molybdenum intensity in steel contributing more than 50 percent of 
growth, followed by general GDP growth and increasing steel production relative to GDP. 
 172
Exhibit 45 complements the analysis of molybdenum growth and its underlying drivers with a 
perspective on the level and development of molybdenum intensity in steel production per 
cluster: 
GDP, USD per capita, real, ppp-based
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Exhibit 45 – Molybdenum MCP rates by country cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
The MCP level in cluster 1 grew by 15 percent annually during the boom period despite the 
strong increase in steel production illustrated in chapter 6.2. In advanced economies, 
concentration of molybdenum per metric ton of produced steel remained relatively constant 
from 1994 to 2008 albeit fluctuated slightly in cluster 7 and cluster 5. 
In contrast to chromium and manganese, emerging economies appear to have an overall lower 
molybdenum intensity per unit of domestically produced steel than advanced economies. In 
cluster 1, the average MCP rate is 81 grams molybdenum per metric ton of steel, roughly a 
third of the molybdenum intensity in advanced economies of comparable steel output in 
cluster 7 or cluster 6. Differences within the cluster amount, however. China's MCP rate 
tripled from an average 30 grams molybdenum per metric ton of steel produced between 2000 
and 2002 to 93 on average between 2006 and 2008. During the same time period, India's rate 
fell slightly from 56 to 41, whereas Russia's MCP rate stabilized around 30 grams 
molybdenum per ton of steel. In cluster 7, MCP rates grew slightly, mainly driven by the US, 
which also had a higher MCP rate than Japan and South Korea. In the US, the MCP rate for 
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molybdenum grew from an average of 332 grams molybdenum per metric ton of steel 
between 2000 and 2002 to 453 between 2006 and 2008. During that period, Japan's MCP rate 
grew slightly from an average of 145 to 161 and remained slightly above 80 in South Korea. 
In Western Europe, molybdenum intensity in steel production differs by a factor of two 
between cluster 6 and cluster 5. In economies belonging to the former, including Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Austria, UK and Canada, the MCP level remained constantly just over 200 grams 
of molybdenum per ton of domestically produced steel on average between 1994 and 2008. 
Rates differed within the cluster and ranged from an average 350 for Canada to 250 for 
Germany and around 200 for the remaining economies. In cluster 5, the MCP level fluctuated 
slightly but remained above 400. Sweden's rate was the highest with a molybdenum 
concentration of almost 1000 grams per metric ton of produced steel, followed by Finland and 
the Netherlands with rates around 550. These levels were the highest on a global scale and 
indicate a highly specialized steel industry in the three countries. Austria's and Norway's share 
of consumption in this cluster was small. MCP rates for the former fluctuated at 250, for the 
latter around 50. Standing out with an extraordinary high MCP level among emerging 
economies is Chile. The dotted column in cluster 3 illustrates Chile's effect on the cluster's 
average concentration of molybdenum in steel production. Chile produces molybdenum as a 
by-product from its copper production. Given that Chile produces very little steel and that its 
domestic market is unable to absorb a large amount of molybdenum, the estimated apparent 
consumption is probably overstated. Presumably, molybdenum is exported in forms other 
than the ones captured in the calculation of apparent consumption.337 
Trade of steel and stainless steel containing molybdenum as an alloying element are not 
reported separately from other alloyed steel trade. An estimation how much of molybdenum 
apparent consumption is driven by imports and exports of alloyed steel is therefore difficult. 
However, trade of alloyed steel, containing also molybdenum among other alloys is reported 
separately from non-alloyed steel.  
China's growing MCP level during the boom correlates strongly with its net alloyed steel 
trade development.338 In Exhibit 46, China's MCP level development is plotted against net 
trade of alloyed steel in percent of total steel production. The shaded area indicates the 0.95 
confidence interval of the Student's t-distribution: 
                                                 
337 Compare chapter 4.3.3 
338 Linear regression is calculated based on ordinary least square method and confidence intervals tested for the .95 
percentile of the Student's t-distribution. The Student's t-distribution was chosen for its known robustness and 
applicability to distributions with small n. Compare also Lange et al. (1989) 
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Exhibit 46 – Molybdenum MCP development of China over  net alloyed steel trade 
relative to total steel production, 2000 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
The exhibit indicates that growth of molybdenum apparent consumption during the 
commodity boom from 2001 to 2008 in China strongly correlates with an increase in net 
exports of alloyed steel relative to total steel production339. Within the .95 confidence interval 
the regression line has an incline between 1,287 and 2,368, i.e. China's MPC rate increases by 
between 13 and 24 grams of molybdenum per ton of steel per 1 percent of increase in net 
exports. Within the same confidence interval, the regression line intersects the ordinate 
between 63 and 85 grams molybdenum per ton of produced steel, i.e. when trade of alloyed 
steel is just balanced. An MCP level above this threshold is the result of an increase in the 
exports of molybdenum containing alloyed steel. China's 2008 MCP value is 133, which 
suggests that China's alloyed steel exports contain more molybdenum than the steel consumed 
domestically. Assuming that the upper intersect value of 85 grams molybdenum per metric 
ton of domestic steel production reflects domestic consumption of China in 2008 and 
multiplying it with Chinese steel production of 500 million tons in 2008 yields a domestic 
apparent consumption of 42.5 thousand metric tons molybdenum, about 24 thousand metric 
tons or 12 percent of global consumption less than the calculated apparent consumption of 
66.5 thousand metric tons in 2008. 
                                                 
339 The Durbin Watson value d= 1.47 is close to 2 and suggests only a mild suspicion of 1st degree autocorrelation. 
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The adjustment has to be interpreted with care. Alloyed steel combines a variety of steel 
grades, not all of which contain molybdenum. Also, the number of data points stretches only 
over eight years. Particularly, data for the period from 2008 onwards once available should be 
considered as well to test the robustness of the regression. Finally, the intersection in the 
above estimation of domestically consumed molybdenum is implicitly assumed to be static. 
Yet one would expect the threshold to shift vertically upwards over time as the nature of 
domestic steel demand approaches alloying levels of advanced economies, therefore the 
values marking the .95 confidence interval should not be used unconditionally to forecast 
domestic demand going forward.  
It should be noted though that China's vast domestic molybdenum resources and the fact that 
export tariffs and quotas since 2006 put a cap on exports of molybdenum in its intermediate 
forms lend support to the conjecture that molybdenum exports continue channeled further 
down the value chain in the form of alloyed steel340. 
6.5.2 Summary 
The purpose of the preceding chapter was to quantify the drivers of molybdenum demand 
growth beyond intensity of use. In this context, the share and development of GDP, the 
material composition of product (MCP) and the product composition of income (PCI) were 
calculated. Findings are summarized as follows: 
 Driver of growth in molybdenum demand 
Molybdenum's growth since 2001 took place predominantly in China, followed by 
growing demand in the US. In both cases, a rise in intensity of molybdenum per ton of 
domestically produced steel comprised over 50 percent of growth. Growth stagnated in 
Western Europe's major steel producing economies and grew only slightly in highly 
specialized economies such as Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands. 
 Level of MCP rates  
The level of MCP rates is higher on average in major steel producing advanced economies 
compared to major emerging economies by a factor of three. Among advanced economies, 
economies with specialized steel producers reach levels of MCP, which are higher by a 
factor of six compared to emerging economies.  
The higher concentration of molybdenum in steel production of advanced economies 
suggests that demand for steel grades fulfilling the functions molybdenum brings to bear 
                                                 
340 Compare chapter 7.2 for further details 
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in steel, namely corrosion resistance and high temperature strength in combination with 
chromium as well as an increase of strength, is much higher relative to total steel demand 
than in emerging economies.  
 Growth of MCP rates 
In major consuming economies MCP rates were mostly declining or stagnating prior to 
the commodity boom between 1994 and 2001. During the commodity boom from 2001 to 
2008, rates were growing strongest in emerging countries, mostly driven by China. 
However, regression analysis indicates that this in part was driven by an increase in net 
exports of alloyed steel. Thus, levels of molybdenum concentration in domestically 
consumed steel are presumably lower. 
During the same period, MCP levels appeared to stagnate on a higher level in advanced 
economies, except in the US, where MCP levels grew at over 5 percent between 2001 and 
2008.  
 
In the above analysis the major drivers of growth of molybdenum's apparent consumption 
following the top down logic of the intensity of use technique as depicted in Exhibit 11 in 
chapter 3.2.1 were identified.  
6.6 Niobium 
Niobium's major use is as an alloying agent in high strength low alloy steel (HSLA) and 
stainless steel. The end use of steel and stainless grades using niobium is in oil and gas pipe 
lines, in automotive components as well as in structural components, e.g. in high rise 
buildings. Niobium in steel forms niobium carbide and niobium nitride, compounds which 
improve the grain refinement via retardation of austenite recrystallisation and the precipitation 
hardening of steel.341 Small amounts of niobium, usually below 0.1 percent thus substantially 
increase the strength of steel, allowing the development of light weight steel grades. 
Furthermore, niobium leads to improved toughness, formability, and weldability of 
microalloyed steel.342 In its second major use in super alloys, niobium is used as a 
precipitation strengthener and adds high temperature strength as well as corrosion resistance. 
A further use in this field is as an alloying element in superconductors. 
                                                 
341 Heisterkamp/ Carneiro (2001), p.3 
342 Patel/ Khul'ka (2001), p.477 
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In the following chapter, growth of apparent consumption is decomposed into GDP, the 
material composition of product (MCP), i.e. niobium intensity in domestic steel production 
and the product composition of income (PCI), i.e. the growth of steel production relative to 
GDP on a regional basis. Chapter 6.6.2 summarizes the findings of the chapter. 
6.6.1 MCP and PCI analysis of niobium demand growth 
Niobium's apparent consumption development by country cluster is illustrated in Exhibit 47: 
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Exhibit 47 – Niobium apparent consumption growth by cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Niobium apparent consumption grew throughout the analyzed period from 1994 to 2008 in all 
major consuming clusters. In emerging economies, the major consuming hubs of niobium 
were in cluster 1 and 2, mainly driven by China and Brazil. Growth before and during the 
commodity boom was strong, albeit much stronger in the upper left cluster, where demand 
started before the boom from a much lower basis in 1994. Other emerging economies were 
only minor consumers of niobium.  
Among advanced economies, niobium apparent consumption growth was positive prior to the 
commodity boom between 1994 and 2001 and growth picked up further during the 
commodity boom. Growth rates were strongest in cluster 7, comprising the three largest steel 
producers among advanced economies, the US, Japan, and South Korea, which was also the 
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cluster consuming the major share of niobium within advanced economies. In cluster 5 
including the Scandinavian countries Sweden, Norway and Finland as well as the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Australia niobium apparent consumption was equally strong during 
the commodity boom but the cluster's share of global consumption was much smaller at 3 
percent on average between 2006 and 2008. Finally, growth in the major Western European 
steel producing economies and Canada, bundled in cluster 6 was lowest among advanced 
economies but still strong at 5 percent per annum during the commodity boom, comprising 17 
percent of global consumption on average between 2006 and 2008. 
In the following exhibit, growth is decomposed into the main growth drivers according to the 
intensity of use technique: 
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Exhibit 48 – Decomposition of niobium growth by cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
It emerges that niobium apparent consumption growth in all major consuming clusters is 
driven mainly by an increase in MCP rates. In cluster 1, an increase in the concentration of 
niobium per ton of domestically produced steel comprised 82 percent of growth between 1994 
and 2001 and still 62 percent during the commodity boom between 2001 and 2008. GDP and 
an increase in steel production relative to GDP made up the residual. A similar picture 
emerges for the other major consuming cluster among emerging economies on the middle left, 
including Brazil as the major consumer, followed by Mexico, Poland and Turkey. 
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Increasing intensity of niobium per ton of domestically produced steel comprised over 70 
percent of growth of niobium apparent consumption in all advanced economies between 2001 
and 2008, followed by general GDP growth and overcompensating for an overall decline in 
steel production. In cluster 7, an increasing MCP rate made up 68 percent of growth in the 
period prior to the commodity boom and even 72 percent in cluster 5 during the same period. 
In Western Europe's major steel producing economies in the middle right cluster, the MCP 
rate was slightly falling from 1994 to 2001 and was overcompensated by general GDP 
growth. 
The following Exhibit 49 illustrates the development of niobium MCP rates per country 
cluster between 1994 and 2008: 
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Exhibit 49 – Niobium MCP rates by country cluster, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Several trends emerge from the above exhibit. MCP levels of emerging economies appear to 
converge to around 20 grams of niobium per ton of domestically produced steel on average 
between 2006 and 2008. Strong growth rates in MCP rates particularly in the upper left 
cluster, mainly driven by China suggest that this level is soon to be exceeded. 
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It can be shown that this strong growth is in part driven by an increase in the exports of 
alloyed steel343. Exhibit 50 illustrates that the development of China's MCP levels for 
niobium correlates strongly with China's shift towards becoming a net exporter of alloyed 
steel344: 
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Exhibit 50 – Niobium MCP development of China over net alloyed steel trade in relative 
to total steel production 
Source: Own illustration 
The shaded area indicates the 0.95 confidence interval of the Student's t-distribution. Within 
this interval, China's niobium MCP level increases between 2.6 grams niobium and 5.8 grams 
niobium per ton of steel for each 1% increase of net exports of alloyed steel relative to total 
steel production. The regression line intersects the ordinate between 14.5 and 21 grams 
niobium. Taking the upper value as a saturation level for China's domestic demand, a 
concentration of niobium above 21 grams indicates that China is exporting alloyed steel with 
a higher niobium concentration on average than needed domestically. China's calculated MCP 
level for niobium based on imports and exports of ferro-niobium was 30.6 grams in 2008. 
Multiplying the difference to 21 grams with China's steel production in 2008 yields an amount 
                                                 
343 Compare also chapter 6.7 
344 Linear regression is calculated based on ordinary least square method and confidence intervals tested for the .95 
percentile of the Student's t-distribution. The Durban Watson value d=1.95 is close to 2 and verifies the absence of a 1st 
degree autocorrelation. 
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of niobium exported in the form of alloyed steel of 4.8 thousand metric tons or 7.6 percent of 
global consumption in 2008. 
The same considerations with regards to the validity of such an adjustment remarked for 
molybdenum in the previous chapter apply to niobium. In contrast to molybdenum, China 
does not produce significant amounts of niobium domestically. However, since 2007 the 
Chinese government has levied tariffs on the export of ferro-niobium, which lends credence to 
the hypothesis that the flow of niobium exports is redirected towards higher value-added 
products such as HSLA steel grades that can be exported unrestrictedly. 
Standing out with an extraordinary high niobium intensity in domestic steel production of 313 
grams on average between 2006 and 2008 is Brazil, which supplies around 90 percent of 
global niobium. The high rate may results from Brazilian steel producers specializing in 
niobium intensive steel grades and super alloys but may also be an indication that niobium is 
exported in intermediate forms other than ferro-niobium such as ores, concentrates and 
niobium oxides, which are not reported on a granular enough level to be captured in the above 
calculation of niobium apparent consumption.345 Thus, Brazil's apparent consumption may be 
overstated. 
In major steel producers within advanced economies bundled in cluster 6 and 7, MCP levels 
are around 60 grams of niobium per ton of domestically produced steel, a factor of three 
larger than in emerging economies, coming from a base level of 35 grams on average between 
1994 and 1996. This base level appears to have been higher by a factor of 1.5 in cluster 6, 
comprising major Western European steel producing economies, which may explain the 
slower growth in apparent consumption in this cluster compared to the upper and lower right 
cluster. Also, MCP rates grew during the commodity boom between 4.3 and 7.6 percent 
annually, suggesting that Niobium intensity in steel continues to rise. In cluster 5, the level of 
60 grams was already exceeded on average between 2006 and 2008, lending further credence 
to the hypothesis that economies clustered here are home to steel producers focusing 
predominantly on specialty steel grades. 
6.6.2 Summary 
The purpose of the preceding chapter was to quantify the drivers of niobium demand growth 
beyond intensity of use. In this context, the share and development of GDP, the material 
                                                 
345 Compare also chapter 4.3, Table 17 for details 
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composition of product (MCP) and the product composition of income (PCI) were calculated. 
Findings are summarized as follows: 
 Driver of growth in niobium demand 
As in most metal commodities, growth in emerging economies was mainly driven by the 
upper left cluster, mainly driven by China, with India and Russia playing only a minor 
role. Global share of global apparent consumption in this cluster rose from 0.4 percent in 
1994 to 27 percent in the year 2008. Growth however was also strong in advanced 
economies, notably in the upper right cluster comprising the US, South Korea and Japan, 
where niobium apparent consumption grew by 7 percent annually on average since 1994. 
Overall the main driver of growth, accounting for over 50 percent of growth in all major 
consuming regions, was a rise in niobium concentration per ton of domestically produced 
steel. 
 Level of MCP rates  
Emerging economies converged consistently to a level of 20 grams niobium per ton of 
domestically produced steel on average between 2006 and 2008. Advanced economies 
converged at a level of 60 grams, a factor of 3 higher than in emerging economies. In 
cluster 5 countries, MCP levels already reached 70 grams per ton of steel on average 
between 2006 and 2008. 
An exception is Brazil, whose extraordinary high rate suggests a particular focus on 
niobium intensive steel grades and super alloys as well as a possible overstatement of 
apparent consumption through lack of accounting for exports of niobium products other 
than ferro-niobium. 
Similary to molybdenum, niobium's higher MCP level in advanced economies suggests 
that the demand for the function niobium effectuates in steel, which is mainly a significant 
increase in strength, is much higher in advanced economies relative to total steel demand 
than in emerging economies. 
 Growth of MCP rates 
MCP rates have grown strong in all major consuming regions since 1994. Growth picked 
up further during the commodity boom. In the cluster comprising China, India and Russia, 
growth of MCP rates was strongest at over 20 percent annually between 1994 and 2008, 
followed by 7 percent annually during the commodity boom from 2001 to 2008 in major 
advanced economies in the upper right and lower right cluster. In light of this growth, 
MCP levels should be expected to increase further with levels in emerging economies 
slowly converging with advanced economies. 
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Following the top down logic of the intensity of use technique depicted in Exhibit 11 in 
chapter 3.2.1, the major drivers of niobium's growing apparent consumption were identified, 
complementing the linking of niobium's demand growth to the functions the metal brings to 
bear as an alloy in steel346. 
6.7 Consideration of alloyed steel trade and micro trends in refractory metal 
markets 
The purpose of the preceding chapters 6.2 to 6.6 was to decompose growth in apparent 
consumption for four selected refractory metals into quantifiable drivers according to the 
intensity of use technique. A particular focus was laid on the variable MCP. The development 
of the concentration of a refractory metal in steel production over time and by cluster reveals 
to some extent the effect of functional demand refractory metals experience as a result of the 
functions they effectuate in steel. 
The clustering methodology developed in chapter 6.2 is based on the simplified hypothesis 
that the major influences of refractory metal demand are economic development and steel 
production. While these factors have an important effect as could be illustrated in the 
preceding chapters, numerous other factors may influence metal demand347. Especially, metal 
specific micro trends such as substitution may have an effect on the demand of an individual 
metal. While the impact of such trends is difficult to quantify, an examination is nonetheless 
essential for a holistic understanding of refractory metal demand. Furthermore, the use of 
apparent consumption is an approximation of real metal demand and is estimated based on 
domestic production, import, and export of refractory metals in their intermediate form. Yet 
refractory metals may be imported and exported in the form of alloyed steel. With the 
exception of chromium in stainless steel, this form of trade is not available in a granular 
enough form to be captured in the calculation of apparent consumption. Nonetheless, whether 
a country imports or exports a major share of its steel production in the form of alloyed steel 
may greatly over- or understate the calculated MCP level. It was illustrated in chapter 6.5 on 
molybdenum and in chapter 6.6 on niobium that China's rise as a net exporter of alloyed steel 
from 2000 to 2008 was closely correlated with a rising MCP level for these metals. Similarly, 
a rise in the concentration of chromium is closely correlated to net trade of stainless steel. 
This suggests that the rise in Chinese demand for refractory metals is not entirely driven by 
domestic demand but owes to some extent to an increasing export activity.  
                                                 
346 Compare chapter 6.2 
347 Compare chapter 3.2.4 
 184
While such close correlation only exists for China, the ratio of net export of alloyed steel 
relative to steel production nonetheless allows a qualitative assessment of whether an 
economy imports or exports a large share of its refractory metals in the form of alloyed steel 
or whether the MCP level reflects the domestic demand for alloyed steel of that economy. 
Alloyed steel trade is to some extent reported separately from non-alloyed steel and iron. It 
may be clustered into three categories348: 
 Steel and steel products classified as alloyed steel 
 Steel and steel products classified as stainless steel 
 Steel and steel products classified as used for oil and gas applications 
The following exhibits depict average MCP levels and percentage of alloyed steel trade from 
2000 to 2002 and from 2006 to 2008 by cluster: 
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Exhibit 51 – MCP levels and alloyed steel trade, 2000 to 2002 
Source: Own illustration 
                                                 
348 Compare Appendix, table xyz for details 
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MCP level and net alloyed steel trade, average 2006 to 2008
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Exhibit 52 – MCP levels and alloyed steel trade, 2006 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
The exhibits illustrate that the major steel producers aggregated in cluster 1, 6 and 7 export 
only a minor share of their total production in the form of alloyed trade. This suggests that a 
dominant share is consumed domestically, although China's rising MCP levels for niobium 
and molybdenum from the average of 2000 to 2002 to the average of 2006 to 2008 can in part 
be attributed to increased exports349. Alloyed steel trade remained furthermore balanced 
during the observed time period for clusters 2 and 4, which indicates that MCP levels reflect 
domestic demand for alloyed steel.  
Material trade imbalances exist for cluster 3 and 5. Cluster 3 aggregates economies from 
developing Asia, namely Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, which are all relying heavily on 
imports of alloyed steel to satisfy domestic demand. This reliance has intensified during the 
boom period as the average net imports of alloyed steel relative to total steel production rose 
from 9 percent to 19 percent. This explains in part why this cluster's MCP level are among the 
lowest for all metals examined. The high share of imports indicates that MCP levels of 
refractory metals may be understated. 
                                                 
349 Compare chapters 6.5 for molybdenum and chapter 6.6 for niobium 
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Economies aggregated in cluster 5 are major exporters of alloyed steel on average. The 
average share of net exports relative to steel production rose from 6.5 percent to 11.5 percent 
during the observed time period, mainly due to strong exporting activities in Sweden, Finland 
and Austria. The heavy reliance on exports serves as an explanation for the elevated MCP 
levels for all refractory metals analyzed and lends support to the hypothesis that steel 
producers in these countries are expanding their role as global specialists of advanced high 
alloyed steel grades. 
Expressing net exports of alloyed steel relative to total domestic steel production reveals if an 
economy exports or imports a relevant share of alloyed material and therefore serves as an 
indication whether the calculated concentration of refractory metals per ton of steel is over- or 
understated. It does, however, mask the share of an economy's alloyed steel trade on a global 
basis. The shift of economies in cluster 1 from net importers to net exporters on average 
appears marginal when expressed relative to total domestic production as illustrated in Exhibit 
51 and Exhibit 52 but hides the magnitude of this development for global alloyed steel trade: 
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Exhibit 53 – Net alloyed steel trade relative to total alloyed trade, 1994-2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Exhibit 53 depicts the development of net alloyed steel trade by cluster relative to total 
alloyed steel trade. The solid line expresses the weight based, the dotted line the value based 
relationship. Throughout the observed time periods 1994 to 1996, 2000 to 2002 and 2006 to 
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2008, the shift of cluster 1 from a net importer to a net exporter translated into a significant 
change of the landscape of global alloyed steel trade. From the average of 1994 to 1996 to the 
average of 2006 to 2008 economies in cluster 1 rose from net importers whose net imports of 
alloyed steel comprised 5.7 percent of global imports on average to net exporters, whose net 
exports comprised 6.6 percent of global alloyed steel imports measured by weight. By value, 
economies in cluster 1 were marginal exporters with net exports being 0.4 percent of total 
imports of alloyed steel. China is the dominant driver behind this development. The fact that 
the value based development of net exports relative to total imports lags the weight based 
development suggests that a large share of alloyed steel exports is bulk material. 
Whereas cluster 1 has experienced a major shift from net imports to net exports, the 
economies aggregated in clusters 2, 3, 4, and 5 maintained a relatively stable position. 
Economies in cluster 2 and 4 fluctuated mildly around a balanced trade of alloyed share. The 
share of net imports of economies in cluster 3 of global imports fell slightly from around 5 
percent to 1.5 percent measured by value and remained relatively stable when measured by 
weight. Economies in cluster 5 including Sweden, Finland and Austria continued to supply a 
stable share of global imports of alloyed steel of around 4 percent measured both by value and 
weight, emphasizing their undisputed role as a global specialty steel supplier. 
China's rise as a net exporter of alloyed steel during the observed time period happened at the 
expense of economies in cluster 6 and 7. The share of net exports relative to global imports of 
alloyed steel fell for economies aggregated in chapter 6 fell from an average of 9.7 percent 
between 1994 and 1996 to an average of 6.3 percent between 2006 and 2008 measured by 
value. Measured by weight, the fall was even more pronounced from 8 percent to 3 percent. 
The widening gap between the share of global imports measured by value and by weight is a 
mirror-inverted reflection of the trade development of cluster 1. During the observed time 
period economies in cluster 6 concentrated on exports on higher valued alloyed steel to 
counterbalance China's rising dominance in lower valued alloyed steel. 
A different reaction to this rising dominance can be observed in advanced economies 
aggregated in cluster 7. Whereas the share of net exports of total global imports of alloyed 
steel fell both measured by value and by weight, the fall in relative value was much more 
pronounced during the economic boom period, from an average of 6.9 percent between 2000 
and 2002 to 1.9 percent on average between 2006 to 2008. This development was mainly 
driven by Japan: 
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Exhibit 54 – Development of net alloyed export development relative to total alloyed 
trade, cluster 7 economies USA, South Korea and Japan 
Source: Own illustration 
Whereas the share of US net imports of alloyed steel relative to total global imports fell 
during the observed time period and South Korea's alloyed steel trade was roughly balanced, 
Japan's share of alloyed trade dropped significantly from over 11 percent to below 6 percent 
of total import value and to 8 percent of total import weight. Evidently, Japan failed to 
maintain its position in the alloyed steel market relative to global alloyed steel exports partly 
because it did not manage to concentrate on higher valued alloyed steel.  
6.8 Analysis of metal specific developments 
To complement the analysis of refractory metals in the preceding chapter 6.1 to 6.7, metal 
specific micro trends are examined in the following chapters as a further source of influence 
impacting apparent consumption. 
6.8.1 Manganese 
Through its universal role as both a sulfur and oxide fixing agent and as an economical 
alloying element to improve basic properties of steel through the refinement of steel's pearlitic 
structure, manganese is contained in some traces in virtually all alloyed steel grades. Thus, its 
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role is distinct from other alloying elements that are found only in certain grades to 
significantly alters the properties of steel. Manganese does not visibly benefit from an 
increasing demand for specialty alloys caused by the general industry trends described in the 
previous chapter.  
Its special functional role as an alloying element in steel, that is adding wear resistance to 
steel, is limited to a few applications, which are insignificant from a volume standpoint. On 
the contrary, through a more efficient steel production the amount of manganese needed per 
ton of steel can be reduced. The replacement of the open hearth process by the oxygen blown 
process and the electric furnace process reduced the intake of manganese necessary to fix 
sulfur and oxygen. The effect can be seen when comparing MCP levels of countries, which 
still use the open hearth process. In the Ukraine, 15 thousand metric tons or 41 percent of total 
domestic steel production were still produced using the traditional process in 2008. This share 
is unmatched by any other major steel producer. Ukraine's average MCP level was 
accordingly high. Between 2006 and 2008, the average concentration of manganese in 
domestic steel production was 20 metric tons per thousand tons of steel produced. To put this 
into perspective, Exhibit 55 shows the distribution of share of global manganese apparent 
consumption over manganese intensity in steel for 34 countries for the periods between 1994 
to 2001 and 2002 to 2008.  
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Exhibit 55 – Distribution of manganese MCP by share of apparent consumption 
Source: Own illustration 
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For the first period, 50 percent of global manganese consumption was below a manganese 
intensity of around 9.5 kilogram per ton of produced steel, indicated by the dotted vertical line 
in the above exhibit. During the second period, the 50 percent threshold sank to 8.9 kilogram, 
indicating an incremental efficiency increase in the use of manganese. 
Manganese's role in stainless steel has increased through its use as a substitute for nickel. 
Manganese containing stainless steel, called the 200 series has been introduced as a low cost 
alternative to nickel containing 300 series stainless steel.350 Given the overall miniscule 
volume of stainless steel compared to carbon steel, the impact of this development on global 
manganese demand is estimated to be insignificant. It does however explain higher 
manganese apparent consumption in certain countries, the most visible being India. Whereas 
China's and Russia's MCP level appears to converge around 7 to 8 kg manganese per ton of 
produced steel, India's level is much higher and albeit having declined from its 1994 level still 
remains more than double the level observed in China and Russia. 
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Exhibit 56 – Differences in manganese concentration in steel, cluster 1 economies China, 
India, Russia 
Source: Own illustration 
The reason for this may be explained in part by the popularity of the 200 series stainless steel. 
The non-magnetic property of austenitic stainless steel serves as a major quality indicator of 
stainless steel for Indian end consumers. As both the nickel containing 300 series and cheaper 
                                                 
350 ASSDA (2006), p.1. Compare also chapter 6.8.2, Exhibit 58 
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manganese containing 200 series are austenitic and therefore non-magnetic, the 200 series has 
grown popular as a low-cost alternative to nickel containing stainless steel in kitchen ware 
and other end use applications, in which stainless steel plays a role visible to the consumer.351 
Overall, growth of manganese demand is expected to follow the growth of steel. Even though 
evidence exists for manganese containing stainless steel having gained popularity, volumes 
are estimated to be too small to have a significant effect on overall manganese growth. 
6.8.2 Chromium – Molybdenum 
An important trend shaping the development of apparent consumption of molybdenum 
appears to take place in stainless steel and is therefore to some extent interlinked with 
chromium. Therefore metal specific trends concerning the two metals are elaborated together 
in this chapter. 
Whereas growth in chromium apparent consumption was strong albeit volatile since 1994 
apparent consumption for molybdenum stagnated till early 2000 before experiencing strong 
growth mainly driven by increasing demand from China: 
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Exhibit 57 – Index apparent consumption molybdenum and chromium, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
                                                 
351 ASSDA (2006), p.2 and based on conversations with market experts 
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Part of this growth is due to significant changes in the stainless steel landscape during the past 
10 years as already indicated in the above chapter on manganese. This is based on the 
intention of consumers to reduce rising stainless steel material costs and the aspiration of the 
stainless steel industry to meet this demand. Exhibit 58 illustrates the gradual shift between 
overall grad families: 
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Exhibit 58 – Changes in stainless steel landscape, 1999 to 2007 
Source: Own illustration352 
Due to a continuous price rise since 1999 and an extraordinary price hike in 2007 as well as 
high volatility in nickel prices, which are traditionally passed on to industrial consumers of 
stainless steel, nickel has been identified as a major cost driver of stainless steel353. Efforts to 
replace nickel have led to a rise in 200 series stainless steel and 400 series ferritic stainless 
steel at the expense of a decline of the total share of nickel containing 300 series stainless 
steel.354 Whereas the 200 series appears to retain an image of a low-cost and sometimes low-
quality stainless steel grade family355, ferritic stainless steel, which contains mainly 
                                                 
352 Based on ASSDA (2006); Nickel Institute (2007) 
353 International Stainless Steel Forum (ISSF) (2007), p.5 
354 300 series: contains mainly chromium and nickel. 200 series stainless steel: contains mostly chromium and substitutes 
nickel for manganese. 400 series stainless steel: contains mostly chromium, less or no nickel and other alloying elements 
if needed such as molybdenum 
355 ASSDA (2006), p.1ff. 
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chromium as well as other non-nickel alloying elements is promoted as complementary and 
sometimes as a replacement to 300 series stainless steel356.  
While this shift away from 300 series stainless steel leaves the demand for chromium widely 
untouched, alloying elements in 400 series ferritic stainless steel, replacing the properties 
nickel provides in austentic stainless steel, benefit from this development. In this context 
particularly molybdenum experiences a rising use, foremost to provide corrosion resistance in 
grades such as 434, 444, 436 equal to nickel containing stainless steel.357 This is reflected in a 
strong increase in the production of molybdenum containing ferritic stainless steel.358  
On the back of this substitution, molybdenum together with chromium profit from a stainless 
steel production having continuously outgrown carbon steel since 1994, although this trend 
was interrupted by a fall in production during the economic crisis since 2008: 
                                                 
356 ISSF (2007), p.5 
357 ISSF (2007), p.14 
358 The IMoA reported a rise in the production of molybdenum containing grades from 47 thousand metric tons in 2002 to 
360 thousand metric tons in 2005. IMoA (2007), p.22. It should be noted that molybdenum is also contained in austenitic 
stainless steel, foremost in a grade called 316. The substitution of ferritic stainless steel for austenitic stainless steel may 
therefore impede molybdenum's use for this application. As the replacement of austenitic stainless steel appears to affect 
mostly the dominant grade 304, which does not contain molybdenum, the negative effect on molybdenum is assumed to 
be marginal. 
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Exhibit 59 – Index steel and stainless steel production, 1994 to 2009 
Source: Own illustration359 
Part of the growth of stainless steel beyond the growth of carbon steel results from a gradual 
substitution of stainless steel for carbon steel in structural components360 driven by the 
necessity for more corrosion resistant materials. One traditional field of carbon steel where 
stainless steel is newly considered is in reinforced concrete for structural components in 
bridges, tunnels and highways. Due to high maintenance costs for corroding constructions 
using carbon steel, resulting from aggressive media such as de-icing salt, stainless steel is 
promoted as an alternative to reduce overall life cycle costs.361 
Finally, molybdenum is also experiencing increasing demand from its application as a 
catalyst. Future sources of oil are prognosed to contain increasing amounts of sulfur as 
sources containing sweet low sulfur crudes are depleting.362 Molybdenum's catalytic 
properties are needed to desulphurize sour oil. 
In summary one can assess that albeit more volatile than steel production, stainless steel 
production nonetheless continuously outgrew steel production since 1994, mainly driven by 
industry trends demanding better corrosion resisting material. Demand for molybdenum 
                                                 
359 Stainless steel production data: ISSF (2001 – 2008); Nickel Institute (2007) (1994-2000) 
360 ISSF (2007), p.47f. 
361 Gedge (2003), p.1ff. 
362 Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010), p.16 
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strongly increased since 2003 on the back of industry trends towards higher corrosion 
resistance, lighter steel grades and high temperature strength as well as metal specific trends 
benefiting the demand for molybdenum. 
6.8.3 Niobium and vanadium 
Demand for niobium and vanadium are closely linked due to similar properties. Both provide 
a significant increase in the strength of steel and are therefore key ingredients for the 
development of light-weight steel for oil and gas pipelines, automotive components and 
structural elements in construction.363 To some extent complements in major HSLA 
grades364, where niobium acts mainly as grain refiner and vanadium mainly as a precipitation 
hardener365, niobium and vanadium are also close substitutes in certain grades, although the 
substitution of vanadium for niobium is generally thought to result in performance 
penalties.366 
Quantitative analysis of vanadium apparent consumption was dismissed due to difficulties 
reconciling results. Instead, production figures are plotted in the following exhibit, which are 
assumed to sufficiently approximate global apparent consumption: 
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Exhibit 60 – Index production niobium and vanadium, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
                                                 
363 Mitchell (1996), p.5;  
364 Heisterkamp/ Carneiro (2001), p.6 
365 Patel/ Klinkenberg/ Hulka (2001), p.7 
366 USGS (2010e), p.2 
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As illustrated in the above exhibit, production of niobium continuously outgrew production of 
vanadium from 1994 to 2008. In 1994, total niobium production was about 50 percent of total 
vanadium production volume but in 2007, niobium reached vanadium's production level and 
surpassed it in 2008. Assuming that recovery of niobium and vanadium in steel scrap is 
generally marginal due to the miniscule content of both alloys in HSLA steel grades, the 
production trend is a good reflection of a trend in apparent consumption. Niobium therefore 
enjoyed a much higher demand on a global scale than vanadium. 
This development is confirmed on a regional level for the US. USGS reports US consumption 
figures for vanadium367. The concentration development of vanadium appears to resemble 
that of molybdenum in advanced economies. Both metals appear to have reached a level of 
saturation as MCP levels remained constant or grew only slightly during the observed time 
period: 
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Exhibit 61 – Development of MCP levels for niobium, vanadium, and  
molybdenum in the US, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Whereas the concentration of niobium in steel increased by 9.5 percent per year between 1994 
and 2008, molybdenum's and vanadium's MCP rate grew only by 2.8 and 1.2 percent, 
respectively. 
                                                 
367 Vanadium consumption: 1994-1997: USGS (1999e); 1998-2001: USGS (2003e); 2002-2005: USGS (2007d); 2006-
2008: USGS (2010u)  
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From preceding analysis it is also apparent that molybdenum's concentration per ton of steel is 
much higher than that of niobium. The reason for this can be found in the demand structure of 
the two metals as illustrated below: 
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Exhibit 62 – Demand structure and average concentration for molybdenum and 
niobium 
Source: Own illustration368 
Molybdenum's concentration is generally higher in steel as it is not only used in HSLA steel 
as a microalloy but also in steel grades demanding a higher molybdenum content such as heat-
treatable engineering steel, case hardened steel, high-temperature steels, and oil country 
tubular goods. Additionally, a higher share of total molybdenum consumption is used in 
stainless steel at an average content higher than the average content of niobium. 
Niobium's high growth rate and increasing concentration in steel is not confined to emerging 
economies but takes place in advanced economies as well. This development can be attributed 
to two main trends favoring the use of niobium: 
 Favorable properties of niobium in light-weight steel grades 
 Substitution of niobium for vanadium due to economical reasons 
Demand for light-weight steel grades to realize less weight and yet higher strength steel 
grades appears to be particularly strong in structural and automotive applications. Exhibit 63 
                                                 
368 Molybdenum: IMoA (2007), p.23f.; Niobium: Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM) (2010b) 
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provides an estimate for the development of niobium's demand share in these sectors between 
1980 and 2007: 
Demand structure development niobium, 1980 to 2007
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Exhibit 63 – Demand structure development niobium, 1980 to 2000 
Source: Own illustration369 
The above estimations from two different industry sources confirm that between 1980 and 
2007, niobium use in its traditional application as an alloy in steel for oil and gas pipelines 
declined at the expense of stronger demand for niobium containing steel grades in the 
segments of automotive and structural components. 
It is particularly the automotive sector, which has been the driver of the high profile 
development of niobium containing steel grades.370 In part as a response to light-weight 
initiatives by the aluminum industry371, the development of light-weight steel grades permits 
thinner wall thickness of car parts and consequently lower weight. In this context, a much 
welcomed development was the ultra light steel auto-body in the mid 1990s, which achieved a 
25 percent weight reduction of the car weight on a cost-neutral basis.372 Niobium is the alloy 
                                                 
369 1980 to 2000: Heisterkamp/ Carneiro (2001), p.4. For 2007 compare chapter 4.3.2, Exhibit 15 
370 Patel/ Klinkenberg/ Hulka (2001), p.2 
371 Drewes/ Walker (2001), p.2 
372 Drewes/ Walker (2001), p.12 
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of choice due to its strength increasing properties, which appear superior to other alloying 
elements as less volume is needed to achieve the same yield strength: 
Single alloying addition necessary to increase yield strength of mild 
steel by 150 MPa,
percent
0.10
0.08
0.03
Niobium Vanadium Titanium
 
Exhibit 64 – Alloying addition necessary to increase yield strength of mild steel 
Source: Own illustration373 
A trend in HSLA steel towards lower carbon and ultra-low carbon steel grades in automotive 
applications to achieve better formability and deep drawing abilities also benefits the use of 
niobium. Lower carbon content allows an increased solid solubility of niobium in steel, 
causing increased precipitation hardening by niobium particles and "allows steel to 
accommodate a higher niobium content"374. Consequently, this trend is making niobium a 
more effective strengthener of steel. 
"In modern pipeline steels, niobium is the primary strengthener and toughening agent"375. An 
increasing pipeline length to gain access to remote sources complemented by ever material 
challenging operating parameters such as higher pressure to raise the throughput as well as 
more corrosive media such as sour gas demand a relentless performance increase of pipeline 
steel. Niobium contributes higher strength and low temperature toughness. Lower carbon 
                                                 
373 Based on Patel/ Klinkenberg/ Hulka (2001), p.7 
374 Tither (2001), p.7 
375 Gray/Hulka (2001), p.1 
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content, which together with other alloying elements aims to resist corrosive media and ease 
weldability376 favors the use of niobium over other alloys. 
In construction, specifications favoring concrete constructions are gradually adapted to 
employ light-weight steel grades to reduce wall thickness, weight and handling costs.377 
In steel manufacturing, niobium is considered advantageous compared to other alloying 
alternatives as it is more forgiving to alterations in processing parameters such as the cooling 
temperature.378 Also, by virtue of pinning nitrogen niobium decreases the free nitrogen 
content, thus favoring the use of higher nitrogen containing yet more productive steel making 
processes as the electronic arc furnace.379  
Aside from its favorable properties in steel, niobium is thought to have benefited from a 
gradual replacement of vanadium. Being close substitutes in their main application as a 
microalloy, the choice for niobium or vanadium is often dependent on the relative price.  
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Exhibit 65 – Real price development ferro-niobium and ferro-vanadium, 1988-2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Exhibit 65 depicts the real price development of both metals in the form of ferro-alloys. 
Whereas niobium remained relatively flat since 1988 before rising in 2002 for the first time in 
two decades, vanadium's price has been more volatile. After peaking in 1989, prices dropped 
                                                 
376 Ibid. 
377 Donnay/ Grober (2001), p.2 
378 Patel/ Klinkenberg/ Hulka (2001), p.23 
379 Donnay/ Grober (2001), p.1 
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sharply before peaking again 10 years later and reached a record price level in 2005. The 
reason for the difference in price development lies in different price setting mechanisms. 
Niobium's price is set by its dominant producer, CBMM, who held it constant despite rising 
consumption of niobium. Vanadium's price is negotiated between major consumers and 
producers on a quarterly basis. 
The volatile price performance and the higher amount of vanadium needed compared to 
niobium to achieve similar properties are named the key reasons for a gradual substitution of 
vanadium for niobium and combinations of niobium and titanium. Exhibit 66 illustrates the 
development of niobium and vanadium content by end application: 
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6 Based on typical commercial HSLA strip steel grades between 380 and 690 MPa yield strength  
Exhibit 66 – Development of niobium and vanadium content by application segment 
Source: Own illustration 
For HSLA grades typically found in structural components, vanadium content dropped in 
modern grades as lower carbon content increases the efficiency of niobium as a 
strengthener380. While this constitutes a substitution, niobium does not visibly profit from it 
as the niobium content remained constant. In line pipe steel grades, the substitution is 
particularly visible. The X-70 grade, which was developed in 1974 and is still considered "the 
                                                 
380 Grober/ Donnay (2001), p.4 
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work horse grade"381 among pipeline steel grades, contains vanadium in its original 
specification. However, the alloy design was changed after vanadium's price peak in the late 
1980s382 and "the precipitation hardening effect due to vanadium-carbonitride was replaced 
by dislocation strengthening."383 In steel grades typically used in automotive application, 
niobium is the primary alloy used. While grades containing vanadium exist, the alloy has so 
far not benefited from the extensive growth of HSLA steel in the automotive segment, 
suggesting that alternative grades replacing vanadium with niobium or with a combination of 
niobium and titanium fare better. 
It should be noted that research on substitution suggests that whether a material is substituted 
for another does not depend solely on the relative price but also on the cost share of the 
material relative to total cost of the end product.384 Given the miniscule amount of alloys in 
HSLA steel grades, the material cost of alloys is assumed to be marginal. Therefore, the 
superior performance of niobium both in the manufacturing process as well as in the end 
product are likely to be important reasons for niobium's stronger growth. 
6.9 Summary 
The purpose of chapter 6 was to develop a thorough understanding of the underlying factors 
influencing the development of refractory metal demand. 
In a first step, demand was related to the functions refractory metals effectuate in steel. It was 
demonstrated that different refractory metal have differing functional profiles. Demand for 
these functions was identified to be effected by four major industry and consumer trends:  
 Performance increase through  
 Advancement of operating parameters  
 The development of light weight high strength steel grades  
 Quality improvements  
 Operation in more corrosive environments 
                                                 
381 Heisterkamp/ Carneiro (2001), p.6 
382 Gray/Hulka (2001), p.3 
383 Heisterkamp/ Carneiro (2001), p.6f. 
384 Tilton (1983), p.1ff. Compare also chapter 3.2.1.1 
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While these trends are not new, they are accelerated by a rising prosperity and the installation 
of a state of the art industrial infrastructure in emerging economies, the growing aspiration 
globally to respond to climate change issues by developing sustainable industry solutions and 
consumer end products and to respond to tighter environmental standards as well as by other 
regional differences. E.g., in China, constructions in more corrosive environments due to a 
proximity to sea water or pollution effects create a strong demand for steel grades able to 
withstand this environment. In advanced economies lowering the weight of a car body results 
in higher demand for light-weight steel grades. 
The quantitative effect of a refractory metal's functional profile on its apparent consumption 
development was demonstrated in a next step. Growth of apparent consumption was 
decomposed into growth shares attributable to GDP, product composition of income (PCI), 
i.e. growth of steel production relative to GDP and material composition of product (MCP), 
i.e. the refractory metal's concentration per unit output of steel production for two periods 
spanning the time before the commodity boom from 1994 to 2001 and during the boom from 
2001 to 2008. To address potential fluctuations in the development of apparent consumption 
due to lack of adjusting for stock changes, growth rates were annualized based on three year 
moving averages. Development of MCP level as the metal dependent variable was examined 
in details to find evidence for a quantitative reflection of a metal's functional profile. 
Specifically, 34 economies were clustered in a matrix of economic development and steel 
production, the latter being the dominant use of the refractory metals in focus. This 
aggregation yielded 7 clusters, of which cluster 1, 5, 6, and 7 comprise the major consuming 
economies:  
 Cluster 1 aggregates the major steel producers among emerging economies, namely 
China, India and Russia. Due to its sizable steel production that dwarfs the ones of Russia 
and India as well as its outstanding economic growth, China was the dominant driver in 
this cluster. 
The characteristics of this cluster were strong growth in apparent consumption driven 
mostly by a rising concentration of refractory metals in steel, which has led to a dominant 
share of global apparent consumption being consumed here. Average MCP levels between 
2006 and 2008 for molybdenum and niobium were below those of advanced economies 
by a factor of three, but at a similar level for chromium and manganese.  
Relative to domestic steel production, trade of alloyed steel appeared to be balanced 
between 2006 and 2008. However, measured relative to global exports of alloyed steel, 
China has switched from being a net importer to becoming a net exporter of alloyed steel. 
This rise is correlates very closely with a strong rise in MCP levels of molybdenum and 
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niobium, which indicates that part of the consumption of these metals is exported in the 
form of alloyed steel rather than used for domestic consumption. 
 Cluster 2 comprises emerging economies with steel production volume comparable to 
major Western European producers, namely Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Poland, and the 
Ukraine. Between 2006 and 2008, average adjusted concentration of chromium in this 
cluster was below that of cluster 1 but almost double for manganese, partly driven by 
inefficient steel processing found in the Ukraine. Molybdenum and niobium MCP levels 
were among the lowest globally. As average alloyed steel trade is balanced, the low 
concentration levels of chromium, molybdenum and niobium reflect the developing status 
of the clustered countries. 
 In cluster 3, developing Asia including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Chile and 
Venezuela as well as South Africa are bundled together. Concentration of manganese 
reached the levels of cluster 1 as well as of advanced economies on average between 2006 
and 2008, coming down from a much higher level before the boom.  
The economies in this cluster are importing a large share of alloyed steel relative to 
domestic steel production on average and this trade imbalance exacerbated during the 
boom. In combination with a relatively low developing status and with the exception of 
South Africa, this is reflected in concentration levels of chromium, niobium, and 
molybdenum that are among the lowest globally. Adjusted for stainless steel trade, 
chromium concentration is at par with clusters 2 and 4. South Africa's molybdenum levels 
are higher due to strong imports of the metal. 
Overall, economies in cluster 3 are minor consumers of refractory metals as alloyed steel 
is largely imported. 
 Cluster 4 consists of Portugal, Argentina, Hungary and Czech Republic with Portugal 
being the only advanced economy. Alloyed steel trade of the four economies is balanced 
on average, which suggests that MCP levels reflect concentration found in domestic steel 
consumption. The average level of manganese are at par with advanced economies as well 
as cluster 1. Chromium concentration is below levels of advanced economies and similar 
to clusters 2 and 3. Molybdenum levels are higher than in other clusters comprising 
emerging economies but about half the concentration found in advanced economies. 
Niobium levels are at a similar level with clusters 1, 2, and 3. Overall, economies in this 
cluster are minor consumers of refractory metals due to a small steel production volume. 
In Cluster 5, 6 and 7 the relevant consumers among advanced economies are aggregated. 
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 Cluster 5 includes the Scandinavian countries Finland, Sweden and Norway as well as 
Austria, the Netherlands and Australia. The cluster is characterized by the highest average 
concentration of chromium, molybdenum and niobium worldwide, which reflects a highly 
specialized steel production predominantly located in Sweden, Finland and Austria. The 
fact that economies in this cluster have successfully managed on average to defend their 
stable share of alloyed steel exports against rising competition from China is a further sign 
for the distinctiveness of the steel production located here. The MCP level of manganese 
is the highest among clusters of advanced economies. In light of the advanced steel 
production found in this cluster, this is thought to be driven by manganese's function of 
improving wear resistance rather than by an inefficient steel production. 
 Cluster 6 comprises economies with a medium sized steel production including Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy, and Belgium as well as Canada. For chromium, MCP levels were 
between cluster 5 and cluster 7. Given that average alloyed steel trade is balanced relative 
to total steel production, this is thought to reflect cultural differences regarding the use of 
stainless steel, especially compared to the US. Otherwise, MCP levels were similar to 
cluster 7. For chromium, molybdenum and manganese, MCP levels were mostly 
stagnating during the observed time period but rising for niobium. Concentration of 
molybdenum and niobium in steel were higher by a factor of 3 compared to the average in 
cluster 1. Global share of net exports relative to total global imports of alloyed steel fell 
during the observed time period. A widening gap between the alloyed trade measured by 
value and by weight suggests that main steel producers located in countries aggregated in 
cluster 6 are concentrating increasingly on higher valued steel grades and slowly abandon 
the market for lower valued bulk material. 
 The US, Japan and South Korea are aggregated in cluster 7. Levels of chromium remained 
below that of all other major consuming clusters including cluster 1, thought to also stem 
from a preferred use of aluminum over stainless steel compared to economies in cluster 6. 
Otherwise, levels were similar to cluster 6 and rose significantly only for niobium. During 
the boom, the share of net trade relative to total global trade of alloyed steel dropped 
significantly both measured by weight and value but more pronounced for the latter. This 
development originated in Japan and suggests that Japanese steel producers have not 
maintained their market position against China across the bandwidth of lower and higher 
valued steel grades. 
 
Furthermore, metal specific factors influencing the demand development of refractory metals 
beyond major industry and consumer trends as well as regional trade patterns were examined. 
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Specifically, substitution dynamics in the markets for chromium, molybdenum, and niobium 
were identified to favor the use of these three metals. Manganese's concentration was found to 
fall marginally due to further efficiency increases of steel production processes.  
Based on the consumption development, the refractory metals chromium, manganese, 
molybdenum, and niobium can be classified as follows: 
 Universal alloys 
Manganese and chromium may be considered universal alloys on a global scale. Similar 
MCP levels adjusted for stainless steel trade in chromium in all relevant consuming 
clusters regardless of the stage of economic development suggest that these alloys enjoy a 
wide spread use. While economies bundled in cluster 5 and 6 maintain a slightly higher 
concentration level in chromium, emerging economies have caught up with MCP levels of 
major steel producers in advanced economies, specifically the US. Increase in MCP level 
slowed down during the boom and comprised less than 50 percent of total consumption 
growth during the economic boom from 2001 to 2008 in all clusters. This indicates that if 
levels continue to increase, this will happen only slowly.  
However, important differences abound. Chromium is the key corrosion inhibitor in 
stainless steel. In this unique function, for which no substitute exists, the metal 
experiences increasing global demand driven by trends to operate at more advanced 
parameters and in increasingly corrosive environments. Furthermore, stainless steel is 
considered a substitute for steel in certain applications. Demand for chromium is therefore 
expected to grow above the rate of steel production. 
Manganese is used as a cost efficient alloy in most steel grades as well as a sulfur and 
oxide fixing agent. With regard to the latter use, efficiency increases in steel production 
continue to reduce the amount of manganese necessary to produce a ton of steel and the 
concentration of manganese per ton of steel in emerging economies aggregated in cluster 
1 is now similar to those of advanced economies. As its dominant use is tightly linked to 
the production of steel, manganese is expected to grow in line with steel. 
 High tech alloys 
Compared to the universally applied alloys chromium and manganese, molybdenum and 
niobium are considered high tech metals. While growth in apparent consumption was 
strongest in emerging economies, MCP levels are still higher by a factor of three in 
advanced economies, which suggests that the functional profile these metals effectuate in 
steel are sought after mainly in advanced economies relative to total demand for steel. 
Adjusting Chinese MCP levels for the consumed volume estimated to be exported in the 
form of alloyed steel, the concentration difference between major emerging and advanced 
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economies is even larger.385 
However, MCP levels for molybdenum in advanced economies stagnated between 1994 
and 2008, which implies that further growth in these economies will be in line with steel 
output. Growth beyond the production growth of steel will mainly take place in emerging 
economies.  
Niobium on the other hand has gained a role as the alloy of choice for the development of 
light weight steel grades. Through this function, the concentration of niobium in steel is 
rising not only in emerging economies but also in advanced economies. 
The fact that large differences in MCP levels still exist as well as the important role these 
metals enjoy in modern steel grades largely undeterred by threats of substitution indicates 
that the strong demand growth these metals experienced since early 2000 will continue as 
the gap between emerging and advanced economies narrows. Demand for niobium will be 
further accelerated by an increasing concentration in steel production in advanced 
economies. 
Growth of apparent consumption of chromium, manganese, molybdenum, and niobium was 
successfully linked to the individual functional profiles inherent in these refractory metals. 
Furthermore, regional differences were explained in the context of the developed clustering 
methodology accounting for stage of economic development and steel production volume as 
well as by considering alloyed steel trade as a third dimension. 
                                                 
385 Compare chapter 6.5 and chapter 6.6 for details. 
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7. Consolidation of structural forces in integrated framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to integrate conclusions of the preceding chapters 5, 6, and 7 
into a framework that maps all crucial structural forces on the supply and demand side, which 
have a profound impact on the long-term level and volatility of metal prices. Within these 
forces, differences between non-ferrous base metals and refractory metals are highlighted 
(chapter 7.1). To illustrate the framework's practicability and to provide an example for 
supply side structural changes with a profound impact on long-term metal price as a 
consequence of the crisis, the framework is applied to the molybdenum market (chapter 7.2). 
7.1 Consolidation of structural factors in an integrated price framework 
Economic theory states that demand and supply factors are mutually the key influences of the 
price finding process. However, it has already been shown that structural changes on the 
supply side are to be differentiated between forces influencing the supply security, availability 
and volatility as well as forces impacting the cost position of the marginal supplier386 that 
marks the break even point within the supplying industry. Additionally, the structure of the 
market organization at the interface of supply and demand is a further dimension influencing 
price volatility.387 
Furthermore, the comparison of structural factors of non-ferrous base metals and refractory 
metals in chapter 5 yielded important differences on the supply and demand side. The 
influence of a refractory metal's functional profile as well the role of alloyed steel trade on the 
individual demand development beyond stage of economic development was elaborated in 
chapter 6.  
Accordingly, an integrated framework covering the structural forces potentially impacting 
metal price level and volatility consists of four dimensions as illustrated in the following 
exhibit: 
                                                 
386 Compare chapter 4.1.2, Exhibit 12 
387 Compare chapter 3.1.3 
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Exhibit 67 – Integrated structural metal price framework 
Source: Own illustration 
In the following paragraphs, the structural forces industry, cost, demand and market structure 
and their impact on price level and volatility are discussed. The angular arrows illustrate 
interdependencies across the dimensions. Government intervention is explicitly considered 
not as a separate force but through its impact along the four forces in accordance with an 
approach suggested by PORTER: "For the purpose of strategic analysis it is usually more 
illuminating to consider how government affects competition through the five competition 
forces than to consider it as a force in and of itself"388. 
 Industry structure 
National concentration in metal production was long thought to be of dwindling 
importance for the issue of resource security and price level in times of globalization and 
open trade.389 
Yet the national concentration of refractory metals' production is generally higher than of 
non-ferrous base metals. Combining this observation with a perspective on the 
concentration of actual trade in refractory metals and assessing the trade openness of 
China as a major exporter of selected refractory metals illustrates that a major share of 
                                                 
388 Porter (2004), p.29 
389 Porter (1986), p.4 
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trade is subject to constraints with potentially severe implications for regions relying on 
imports of these metals in their intermediate forms. One concrete implication of Chinese 
metal export restrictions is a shift of exports further down the value chain. Specifically, 
the rising concentration of molybdenum and niobium in Chinese steel production strongly 
correlates with the development of Chinese alloyed steel trade and its transition from a net 
importer to a net exporter of alloyed steel. While China does not produce niobium and has 
to purchase the metal on the global market, it has vast resources of molybdenum and thus 
its trade policy towards this metal does impact the availability of molybdenum and the 
position of importers390. The regional concentration of supply is therefore an important 
factor in a price framework. 
 
The supply concentration on a corporate level, the level of integration of mining and 
refining companies in the metal's value chain as well as a company's competitive behavior 
in the market, i.e. whether it is a commercially passive miner or a strategic marketer with 
an agenda to actively shape the price  furthermore influence the medium and long-term 
market price level. Specifically, scholars are largely in agreement that oligopolistic 
structures on the supply side dampen price volatility.391 In this context, an extreme 
example is the major producer of niobium, the Brasilian miner Companhia Brasileira de 
Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM), who provides close to 90 percent of global niobium 
and pursued a price setting policy that kept the prices for niobium stable over a period of 
almost three decades.392 
However, reliable long-term data on corporate concentration let alone on value chain 
integration and on corporate conduct are mostly proprietary or not levied at all for 
refractory metal due to the low profile these metals enjoyed in the past. A perspective on 
repercussions of the metal price super cycle on the corporate supply level was therefore 
excluded from the analysis and the focus within this structural force was laid on the far-
reaching developments on the national level. 
 Cost structure 
The cost structure of the marginal producer determines the market price according to 
economic theory. While interviews with industry experts suggest that price levels often 
remain above the cost of the marginal producer not only during short periods of price fly 
ups but also for longer periods of time, the marginal cost position can nonetheless be 
                                                 
390 Compare chapter 5.1.2, Exhibit 21 
391 Compare also chapter 3.1.3 
392 Compare chapter 6.8.3, Exhibit 65 
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viewed as a floor price to a given demand. 
Factors influencing the cost structure may be numerous. A persistent stabilization of 
prices at a new price after a prolonged period of strong demand growth indicates that 
profound changes in the cost structure of the marginal producer took place. This may be a 
change in the type of the deposit. E.g., in the case of nickel, a switch from nickel sulphide 
deposits towards more complex nickel laterite deposits is thought to have increased the 
cost for a ton of nickel by a factor of two between comparable mines. 393  
Specific to selected refractory metals compared to non-ferrous base metals is the mix of 
supply, which may stem from primary deposits as well as co- and by-production394. A 
change in the significance of either source may cause a shift in the industry and influence 
the long-term price level. 
 Demand structure 
According to RADETZKI, unexpected, sustained demand growth is the initiating force of 
any super-cycle in prices395. Having shown that demand for refractory metals does not 
develop solely according to GDP growth and stage of economic development as suggested 
by numerous studies on demand for non-ferrous metals, gaining transparency on 
underlying drivers of demand for refractory metals was therefore a key focus in this work. 
Findings suggest that while economic development in emerging markets plays an 
important role, the functional profile of refractory metals has a distinctive influence on the 
growth prospects of the individual metal. Another influence specific to certain refractory 
metals emanates from the development of steel production, to which most refractory 
metals are to some extent tied. Also, it was demonstrated in chapter 6.8 that alloyed steel 
trade has a significant influence on the regional apparent consumption profile of refractory 
metals. While alloyed steel trade itself does not affect metal demand aggregated on a 
global level, it does impact the amount of metal available in a certain form. E.g., the fact 
that China constrains the direct export of ferro-molybdenum through export restrictions 
yet exports some of its molybdenum consumption in the form of alloyed steel is irrelevant 
to the global demand of molybdenum. However, it reduces the amount of ferro-
molybdenum available to steel producers outside China. As such, a molybdenum scarcity 
is induced, which albeit confined to a certain product, may severely impact the price level 
                                                 
393 Nickel Institute (2007) 
394 Evidence on secondary production, i.e. recycling of metals suggests that it is not cost competitive compared to primary 
production of non-ferrous base metals. Due to the usually small amounts of alloys used in steel, secondary production is 
thought to be even less relevant for refractory metals and therefore not listed as a factor influencing price level or 
volatility 
395 Radetzki (2006), p.63 
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and volatility. 
Finally, direct and indirect substitution effects not confined to either metal group may 
influence metal demand. 
 Market structure 
The organization of the market place defines the price setting mechanism of a commodity, 
influences the type and nature of market participants, i.e. whether they are industrial or 
financial and allows for forward trading of commodities through financial instruments 
such as futures. Non-ferrous metals are all exchange traded with stock exchanges such as 
the London Metal Exchange (LME) serving as a central clearing house.  
In contrast, price setting mechanisms of refractory metals in the past were based 
predominantly on producer administered prices or decentralized price negotiations 
between suppliers and consumers, although this is changing.  
The influence of a change in market organization on price volatility is debated in 
economic literature.396 In a recent work combining statistical price analysis with 
underlying industry data, SLADE/THILLE suggest that evidence for an indirect albeit 
tangible increase of volatility due to exchange trading exists caused by additional market 
information available to market participants.  
The above framework captures the forces shaping the long-term price level and volatility of 
metal prices that deem relevant from the perspective of the author based on reviewed 
literature and analyses conducted. Furthermore it depicts characteristics specific to refractory 
metals. It depends on the individual metal market as well as the observed time period along 
which forces the long-term price level and volatility is impacted.  
In the following chapter the framework laid out in Exhibit 67 is applied to the molybdenum 
market to illustrate both the practicability of the framework as well as to provide an example 
of a sustained structural supply side change in a metal market as a consequence of the 
commodity boom leading to a sustained elevated floor price level. 
7.2 Application of the framework to the molybdenum market 
Molybdenum's development during the commodity boom has been extraordinary compared to 
all other metals. Over a period of 7 years, from 2001 to 2008 using three-year rolling 
averages, the market value of the metal grew by over 53 percent annually397. After a short 
                                                 
396 Compare chapter 3.1.3 
397 Compare chapter 4.3.1 
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introduction, the changes in the market structure of molybdenum are discussed along the four 
dimensions defined in the previous chapter (chapters 7.2.1 to 7.2.3). 
Molybdenum has been identified as a high tech alloy, whose concentration in emerging 
countries is rising but remains below that of advanced economies by an average factor of 3. In 
advanced economies, the concentration stagnated on average between 1994 and 2008. 
Prior to the boom molybdenum's price were characterized as low and inelastic. After a short 
spike in 1980, prices remained at an average real price of 5 US dollars per pound expressed in 
2009 prices between 1983 and 2003. But during the 2004 - 2008 boom, prices experienced 
sustained record levels as high as 41.40 US dollars per pound in June 2005 expressed in 2009 
prices. In April 2009, prices plunged before returning to around 12.00 US dollars per pound in 
December 2009 – a figure almost three times higher than the traditional price level: 
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Exhibit 68 – Molybdenum real price development 1972-2009 
Source: Own illustration 
The molybdenum market experienced structural changes on several dimensions of the 
integrated framework since the beginning of the commodity boom with a profound impact on 
the price level of the metal. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, several factors 
suggest that these changes are there to last. 
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7.2.1 Industry structure 
Molybdenum's industry structure is consolidated on a regional level with the top 5 producing 
nations comprising over 90 percent of global production in 2008. From 1994 to 2008, the 
production share of the USA declined as China increased its production: 
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Exhibit 69 – Regional concentration of molybdenum production 
Source. Own illustration398 
China's growing dominance is thought to result from an abundance of molybdenum resources, 
low cost mining and government tax rebates of exports of refined molybdenum399. 
Prior to the commodity boom, a growing share of Chinese molybdenum exports relative to 
total global exports reflected China's rising production of molybdenum. Chinese share of 
global molybdenum exports doubled from 18 percent in 1994 to 36 percent in 2002 measured 
by estimated weight as importing regions came to rely on molybdenum from China: 
                                                 
398 Production data based on USGS (1996e) and USGS (2010d) 
399 Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010), p.17 
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Exhibit 70 – Development of Chinese exports versus molybdenum price development, 
1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
However, since 2002, China's share of export has fallen drastically to 15 percent in 2008 as 
depicted by the solid line in Exhibit 70, mainly due to falling exports of ferro-molybdenum as 
a result of government ordered closure of Chinese ferro-molybdenum producers and 
molybdenum mines400. The sharp drop of exports relative to total exports coincided with a 
record price rise as global consumers faced a politically induced scarcity. China's fall of 
exports is a reflection of increased domestic demand as well as a trade policy intended to 
nourish a downstream steel industry and to increase the share of value adding processing 
conducted domestically. Since 2005, export tariffs and export quotas have replaced tax 
rebates on molybdenum exports401, restricting the export of molybdenum in its intermediate 
forms. As illustrated in chapter 6.5, Exhibit 46, the rise of molybdenum's concentration in 
Chinese steel production strongly correlates with rising exports of alloyed steel. Based on this 
correlation the deduced concentration of molybdenum for domestically consumed steel was 
calculated to be a maximum of 85 grams of molybdenum per ton of steel. Compared to the 
calculated concentration of 133 grams in 2008 at a steel production of 500 million metric tons 
it was estimated that some 24 thousand metric tons of molybdenum may have been exported 
in the form of alloyed steel in 2008. 
                                                 
400 USGS (2005f), p.3  
401 Compare also Appendix, 9.4 
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Exhibit 71 – Chinese molybdenum exports, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
When this amount is taken into account together with estimated Chinese molybdenum exports 
in intermediate forms in 2008, annualized growth of Chinese molybdenum exports between 
2002 and 2008 was 7 percent, only slightly below annual growth of molybdenum exports 
between 1994 and 2002 as illustrated in Exhibit 71. In effect molybdenum exports from China 
continued undeterred, albeit ferro-molybdenum was replaced by molybdenum hidden in the 
higher value-added form of alloyed steel exports. 
The drop in exports of molybdenum in its intermediate forms nonetheless had a profound 
effect on the market as illustrated by the price development. Global industry consumers 
processing molybdenum such as steel producers faced severe shortages and molybdenum 
producers outside China rushed to supply the markets: 
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Exhibit 72 – Source of global molybdenum exports, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
Exhibit 72 illustrates that the drop in molybdenum exports from China after 2002 was mainly 
compensated by increased exports from the US, Chile, and Peru in 2008. Behind these 
increases lie new capacity additions, which are structurally different from existing capacity as 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
7.2.2 Cost structure 
Molybdenum stems from two main sources, as a by-product of copper mining and from 
primary molybdenum sources. For three decades prior to the boom, molybdenum from by-
production gradually became the dominant source of molybdenum. While in 1975 
molybdenum from copper by-production comprised only 35 percent of total molybdenum 
production, this share increased to 62 percent by 2006402. Two main reasons were responsible 
for the growing dominance of molybdenum from copper by-production. 
 Favorable cost position 
It is generally less costly to mine molybdenum as a by-product rather than as the primary 
product as the cost of mining the ore is borne by two metals, not just one. Yet comparing the 
cost position of by-producers and primary producers directly is difficult as different cost 
                                                 
402 Langhammer/Zeumer (2010), p.16 
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positions are reported. 403 Nonetheless, reported figures as well as opinions of industry 
experts indicate that copper by-producers mining molybdenum are in a better cost position 
compared to peers mining the metal from mines containing mainly molybdenum. 
 Improved molybdenum output per ton of copper 
Copper by-producers steadily improved their output of molybdenum per ton of copper ore 
mined: 
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Exhibit 73 – Molybdenum yield from copper by-production, 1985 to 2007 
Source: Own illustration404 
Between 1985 and 2007 the output of molybdenum stemming from copper by-production 
improved from around 15 kilogram of molybdenum per ton of copper to around 28 kilogram. 
                                                 
403 Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile (Codelco), a Chilean copper producer and one of the largest by-producers of 
molybdenum reported cost of sales of molybdenum to be 2.7 US dollars per pound of molybdenum in 2007. The largest 
primary mines in North America, the Henderson mine of Freeport-McMoran and the Thompson Creek mine of 
Thompson Creek Metals Company reported net cash costs of 5.4 US dollar per pound and 7.8 US dollars per pound 
respectively. The two cost positions are not directly comparable. Cash costs are defined as operating costs including 
transport, mining, refining, administration costs at the site level and royalties. So-called non-cash expenses such as 
depreciation and amortization as well as distribution costs and overhead costs are excluded. Cost of sales or cost of goods 
sold are defined as costs directly attributable to the product sold by a company. See also Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010), 
p.16; Coldelco (2008), p 162; Freeport-McMoran (2008), p.10; Thompson Creek (2008), p.31f. 
404 Based on data from Raw Material Group (2008) 
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The result of this development was the gradual closure of primary mines and price erosion 
between 1980 and 2001 as illustrated in Exhibit 68. However, when the market for 
molybdenum became undersupplied in 2002 due to a sudden growth in demand and reduced 
Chinese exports, prices began to rise and by-producers were not able to supply the market 
sufficiently to balance this scarcity.  
Primary producers who had mothballed mines, or had been confined to so-called swing 
suppliers at marginal cash costs producing opportunistically depending on the price, were 
unable to bring capacity on line fast enough to satisfy demand. 
As molybdenum from by-production does not suffice to meet demand, the majority of 
announced capacity additions announced to come online between 2007 and 2015 are primary 
mines: 
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Exhibit 74 – Molybdenum supply development forecast, 2007 to 2015 
Source: Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010) 
The supply of molybdenum is forecasted to increase to 289 thousand metric tons in 2015 from 
198 thousand metric tons in 2007. Of this, 65 percent are reported to be primary molybdenum 
projects. The additions of primary molybdenum capacity lift primary producers from 
irrelevance. Based on the supply forecast in Exhibit 74, the share of primary producers 
increases to 44 percent in 2015 from 38 percent in 2007. 
This development brings about a structural change to the molybdenum cost curve as it alters 
the cost position of the marginal producer noticeably. New primary capacity is added at full 
cost, i.e. carries cost of financing the capacity. Furthermore, operating costs of new primary 
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mines are significantly higher than of established primary mines and range between 11 to 14.5 
US dollars per pound according to one industry report405 compared to the aforementioned 5.4 
US dollars per pound for the Henderson mine and 7.8 US per pound for the Thompson Creek 
mine. 
Whether this new capacity is needed, which mine will ultimately be in the position of the 
marginal producer and therefore which cost position will determine the future floor price of 
molybdenum depends on how demand will develop going forward.  
7.2.3 Demand and market structure 
Molybdenum apparent consumption was relatively flat prior to the commodity boom between 
1994 and 2002 but experienced a boost between 2002 and 2008: 
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Exhibit 75 – Molybdenum apparent consumption, 1994 to 2008 
Source: Own illustration 
The underlying drivers for molybdenum demand originate in several long-term trends 
spurring demand for the functions molybdenum entails in steel, which were found to be 
enhanced corrosion resistance in combination with chromium in stainless steel, high strength 
and temperature resistant steel grades.406 Demand for molybdenum therefore depends on the 
sustainability of these trends: 
                                                 
405 Langhammer/Zeumer (2010), p.20 
406 Compare chapter 6.1, Exhibit 32 
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Exhibit 76 – Long-term trends and regional developments 
Source: Own illustration 
Most of these trends are originating in emerging economies. Foremost the establishment of a 
modern industrial infrastructure in emerging economies, notably China and India to be able to 
handle advanced operating parameter can expected to be a major driver of molybdenum 
demand. In operations in more corrosive environments, molybdenum furthermore profits from 
its catalytic properties, used to desulphurize sour oil. Molybdenum also benefits from the 
substitution of nickel containing austenitic stainless steel for ferritic stainless steel as it 
replaces nickel's properties such as enhanced corrosion resistance in ferritic stainless steel. 
This type of stainless steel is enjoying an increasing popularity in China and to a lesser extent 
in India.407  
Due to its role as an industrial metal, demand for molybdenum will to a lesser degree stem 
from consumer based trends, which comprise the formation of a sophisticated consumer class 
in emerging economies as well as sustainable end consumer solutions.  
While the molybdenum market as all other commodity markets is reported to have 
experienced a major contraction of demand during the economic crisis visible in the dramatic 
                                                 
407 Nickel Institute (2007) 
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price drop at the end of 2008, the above described trends are of long-term nature and are 
expected to weather the crisis largely undeterred408.  
A specific metal demand forecast is subject to a number of qualified assumptions beyond the 
scope of a scientific work. To build a demand model based on the growth decomposition 
approach applied in this work with demand global TtiD ,  for metal i  for a point in time T  for 
all n  countries equals 
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a number of country specific or global forecasts are necessary as input factors, such as the 
growth rates of GDP, of steel production and of material composition of product (MCP), i.e. a 
prognosis of the concentration development of molybdenum in steel. As illustrated in the 
analysis of metal market in chapters 6.8.1, 6.8.2, and 6.8.3, specific factors influencing the 
demand of individual metals may as well be applied to refine the forecast on a disaggregated 
level. Some of these input factors are proprietary or rely on specific industry knowhow. 
One scenario based forecast estimates global growth rates of molybdenum from 2007 to 2020 
between 2.6 percent in the worst case scenario and 4 percent in the best case scenario.409 
Combining these growth rates with the structural supply side change towards a larger share of 
molybdenum from primary molybdenum sources in 2015 yields a new floor price level of 10 
to 14 US dollars per pound of molybdenum410, significantly above the long-term average of 5 
US dollars per pound. As an indication that this is indeed happening, molybdenum prices 
appear to stabilize at the upper value of this range in 2010. 
In addition to a structural change on the supply side, a fundamental change in the 
organizational structure of the molybdenum market is happening as well. 
Until recently, suppliers, traders and consumers of molybdenum as well as of other refractory 
metals conducted metal trading decentralized with reference prices being published weekly, 
monthly or quarterly in respective trade journals. 
                                                 
408 Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010), p.18 
409 Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010), p.18f. 
410 Langhammer/ Zeumer (2010), p.20 
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Since February 2010, molybdenum is one of two refractory metals that are traded at the 
London Metal Exchange in recognition of an increasing need for a centralized trading place of 
refractory metals to allow participants to hedge price volatility. 
This step underlines the growing significance of molybdenum as decisive factor influencing 
the cost, risk, revenue, and profit position of market participants. It also brings about two 
main consequences to price volatility. Recent scientific evidence suggests that prices of 
metals traded at exchanges are subject to higher volatility due to an improved flow of 
information411, such as a better reflection of future scarcity. Furthermore, exchange trading 
opens the door to financial investors willing to invest directly into the commodity. One the 
one hand this should be welcomed as such investors offer offsetting positions to industry 
market participants longing to hedge their exposure to price volatility. On the other hand, if 
supply constraints in the molybdenum market as observed between 2002 and 2008 reoccur in 
the future, commodity speculators will find it easier to influence the market price in the short 
term as observed for non-ferrous metals during the commodity boom. 
                                                 
411 Slade/ Thille (2006), p.251 
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8. Discussions and conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the conclusions of this work. As a first step, 
conclusions are summarized along the research questions posed in chapter 3.4 (chapter 8.1). 
Secondly, implications for scientific research are deduced in chapter 8.2. In chapter 8.3 
implications for corporate practitioners are discussed. 
8.1 Summary relating to research questions 
At the beginning of this work on the basis of the reviewed literature, four research questions 
were posed. Along these questions, the results of this work are now summarized. 
Research question 1: What are distinguishing elements of non-ferrous base metal markets and 
refractory metal markets that justify a separate examination of the latter? 
It was found that refractory markets are distinctive from non-ferrous metal markets in several 
aspects.  
On the supply side, the global production of refractory metals is on average more 
concentrated than that of non-ferrous base metals. When global export concentration is 
compared, the higher concentration level of refractory metals is even more striking. 
Specifically, China's role as a heavy weight on the producing and exporting side as well as on 
the consuming side of many refractory metals in combination with export restricting trade 
policies is the cause of more pronounced market imbalances in the refractory metal markets. 
The impact of trade restrictions is therefore highly visible to the consumer. 
Furthermore, a relevant share of production stems from by- and co-production in selected 
metal markets and makes these markets more vulnerable to over- or undersupply as 
production volume is not directly linked to demand but to the production of the main product. 
On the demand side the analysis of apparent consumption of refractory metal demand relative 
to economic growth yielded striking differences to non-ferrous base metals. For the latter, the 
ratios of apparent consumption and economic growth developed along patterns of stage of 
economic development and fell almost unanimously in advanced economies, while rising in 
emerging economies during the observed time period as predicted by economic theory. For 
refractory metals, no such obvious pattern could be observed. The ratios of apparent 
consumption and economic growth developed along patterns specific to metal and economy. 
The orientation of the ratio alone did not allow an inference of the stage of economic 
development. 
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Finally, the market organization of refractory metal markets is different from non-ferrous base 
metals. Spot market trade in the latter markets is conducted on central stock exchanges, 
introducing market participants to forward trading. Such central spot market trade did not 
exist for refractory metals but was accomplished in a decentralized form until February 2010, 
when for the first time two refractory metals, molybdenum and cobalt were admitted to stock 
exchange trading. 
Research question 2: How does the distinct demand structure of refractory metals influence 
the demand development of such metals? 
The question was answered for five refractory metals used predominantly as alloys in steel. It 
was deduced that the functional profile of a refractory metal, i.e. the functions it effectuates in 
steel has a pronounced influence on the demand development of the individual metal. 
Refractory metals are used in often miniscule amounts as alloys in steel. As such, their cost 
share in the end application is small. Yet the functions refractory metals bring to bear in the 
steel grades used are indispensable for the end application. Three main functions relevant to 
the end application, namely corrosion resistance, strength and high temperature strength were 
identified. It is the demand for these specific functions, which was found to significantly 
influence the demand development for refractory metals. It was furthermore shown that four 
long-term industry and consumer trends are influencing this functional demand. Weight 
saving and advancement of operating parameters to increase performance are not new trends, 
but an increasing awareness for climate change and sustainability accelerates the development 
for lighter more enduring steel grades to function more efficiently. Relentless quality 
improvement as a further trend is demanded not only by affluent consumers in advanced 
economies but by a rising class of influential and sophisticated consumers in emerging 
economies. Finally, operations in more corrosive environments were identified as a fourth 
trend, e.g. constructions in demanding environments like the Gulf region or in more polluted 
areas in emerging economies. 
Research question 3: How can the impact of influences related to the demand structure of 
refractory metals be quantified and which other factors influence refractory metal demand? 
The question was answered for four refractory metals. To measure the impact of a refractory 
metal's functional demand profile, apparent consumption was estimated for 34 economies for 
the period prior to the commodity boom from 1994 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2008. The 
economies were clustered not only according to stage of economic development but also by 
steel production output, yielding altogether 7 clusters. 
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Growth in apparent consumption by cluster was then decomposed into growth in line with 
GDP growth, growth in line with product composition of income (PCI), i.e. growth of steel 
production relative to GDP, and growth of material composition of product (MCP), i.e. 
growth of the concentration of the refractory metal per metric ton of steel production. The 
variable MCP as the only metal dependent variable was used to measure how the demand 
development of a metal reflects the metal's individual functional profile as well as to assess 
regional consumption differences. 
Of the four examined metals, manganese and chromium could be classified as universal alloys 
enjoying a wide spread use globally visible in marginal differences between the MCP levels 
of advanced and emerging economies. Yet differences between the two metals exist, which 
can be traced back to the different functions chromium and manganese effectuate in steel.  
An increase in the concentration of chromium per ton of produced steel was responsible for a 
larger share of growth of apparent consumption than for manganese. Chromium has a unique 
role as the main corrosion inhibitor and is the key element in stainless steel. Through its 
corrosion inhibiting function it is directly profiting from corresponding trends demand more 
corrosion resistant material. Furthermore, while most clusters containing emerging economies 
reached or surpassed the concentration level of the US by 2008, a gap towards other advanced 
economies remained, which could in part be explained by cultural differences in the US 
regarding the preference of aluminum over stainless steel. Manganese is mainly used for 
oxide and sulfur fixing in steel as well as an alloy to refined the grain structure in steel, 
effectuating an increase in strength and toughness. As such, it is widely used in most alloyed 
steel grades but beyond that does not benefit visibly from any of the identified trends. Its 
consumption relative to steel was shown to have fallen on average due efficiency 
improvements in steel production. 
Molybdenum and niobium were classified as advanced alloys because their MCP level in 
advanced economies was estimated to be higher than in major emerging economies by a 
factor of three. This indicates that the share of demand for steel containing these alloys 
relative to total steel demand is much higher in advanced than in emerging economies. 
Differences in the development of both metals based on differences in their functions they 
effectuate in steel existed here too visible in the different growth rates.  
Growth in the MCP level of niobium contributed a large share to apparent consumption 
growth in advanced as well as in emerging economies whereas molybdenum's MCP rate was 
largely stagnant in advanced economies and grew only in emerging economies. This can be 
related to niobium's unique function of increasing the strength of steel and thus allowing the 
development of light-weight steel grades, catering directly to the trend for lighter yet high-
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strength materials in the automotive industry. Molybdenum, while also used as a steel 
strengthening alloy, benefits from this in combination with its corrosion inhibiting and high 
temperature resistant functions it effectuates in steel and stainless steel. As such, it is found 
mostly in industrial applications, compared to niobium, of which a major share is used in the 
improvement of end consumer products like automobiles. The growth rates of their different 
end use market are reflected in the growth of apparent consumption of molybdenum and 
niobium. 
Furthermore, factors influencing individual metals markets beyond the general trends 
identified in research question 2 were analyzed. It was found that chromium, molybdenum, 
and niobium benefit additionally from substitution dynamics. Chromium profits from 
substitution trends of carbon steel for stainless steel. Molybdenum benefits from a shift within 
the stainless steel industry away from nickel containing austenitic steel to ferritic stainless 
steel, in which molybdenum replaces nickel related properties. Niobium benefits from the 
substitution of vanadium, especially in pipeline steel and in steel grades used in the 
automotive industry. 
Beyond this classification, alloyed steel trade by country cluster was examined to assess the 
effect of alloys contained in such form of trade on the average MCP levels and therefore on 
the demand for refractory metals. 
It was demonstrated that alloyed steel trade has a significant impact on the MCP levels of 
certain clusters. The cluster with the highest MCP levels for most metals was also the largest 
net exporter of alloyed steel, measured relative to domestic steel production, whereas the 
cluster with the lowest MCP rates for most metals was also the largest net importer, measured 
relative to domestic steel production. 
Finally, a significant structural change in the global export market of alloyed steel initiated by 
China was visualized. The cluster including China switched from being a large net importer to 
a balanced trade of alloyed steel measured by value and to a significant net exporter measured 
by weight between 1994 and 2008. China's MCP growth for molybdenum and niobium 
strongly correlated with its rising net exports of alloyed steel between 2000 and 2008, 
suggesting that part of China's demand for these metals is re-exported in the form of alloyed 
steel.  
The increase in the Chinese's share of global alloyed steel exports had a significantly negative 
impact on the share of Japanese exports measured by value and to a lesser extent on the 
weight share of major European steel producers. Specialized European steel producers were 
able to maintain their share of global exports both measured by value and by weight.  
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Research question 4: What are the structural forces in a metal market that impact the long-
term level and volatility of a metal price and which characteristics within these forces are 
specific to refractory metal markets? 
Four structural forces were identified to capture the relevant influences on price level and 
volatility of metal markets: industry structure, cost structure, demand structure and market 
structure.  
Industry structure comprises regional concentration of production, trade and level of 
government intervention in trade as well as corporate concentration including also value chain 
integration and corporate behavior412. Specific to refractory metals are a higher average level 
of regional concentration and correspondingly a higher concentration in trade and a stronger 
exposure of regions relying on imports to export restricting measures. Cost structure describes 
the cost composition of existing and new capacity and corresponding changes resulting from 
deposit type changes, source type changes, government regulation or relevant long-term 
changes in specific cost levers. Specific to refractory metals is that production may stem from 
primary as well as by-or co-production sources. A structural shift within these sources may 
have a significant influence on the cost position of the marginal producer and may alter the 
long-term price level. This was quantified for the example of molybdenum. Demand structure 
captures influences on the demand side of the metal, which ultimately determines the 
marginal producer and therefore the floor price level. Also, demand fluctuation may influence 
price volatility. Demand structure comprises economic development of consuming regions, 
substitution as well as government regulation. Specific to refractory metal demand is the 
influence of the functions a metal effectuates in steel on the demand for this metal. A metal's 
individual functional profile entails a demand for these functions, which was demonstrated to 
originate in major industry and consumer trends. The small share of cost relative to the total 
cost of the end product is furthermore specific to refractory metals, causing substitution trends 
affecting refractory metals to originate from the substitution of a steel or stainless steel grade 
rather than from the desire to replace the metal itself. The substitution of austenitic stainless 
steel for ferritic stainless steel is a good example illustrating the indirect role of refractory 
metals and the direct role of nickel as a non-ferrous base metal. The substitution trend 
originated in the aspiration of producers to substitute for nickel for its significant influence on 
the level and volatility of stainless steel prices413, emphasizing the direct effect of the cost 
position of nickel. Molybdenum was used to replace nickel-related functions in ferritic 
                                                 
412 The corporate concentration level was not compared between non-ferrous base and refractory metal markets due to lack 
of reliable long-term data. 
413 ISSF (2007), p.1f. 
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stainless steel, so benefited from the substitution indirectly through the functions it effectuates 
in stainless steel. 
Market structure summarizes factors influencing price level and volatility resulting from the 
market organization. The latter defines the price setting mechanism and the type of market 
participants active in the market. Non-ferrous base metal markets have centralized spot 
markets and therefore a centralized price setting process with daily reference prices available 
to market participants at a stock exchange. The exchange based trading also allows forward 
trading and introduces financial investors to metal trading. Research indicates that the 
improved flow of information in exchange traded commodities increases price volatility414 
and that short-term volatility may result from price speculations415. The price setting 
mechanism in refractory metal markets was in the past based on decentralized trading 
between suppliers, traders and consumers and reference prices from interviews with market 
participants were published in trade journals. Financial investors had no direct access to the 
market other than to invest in listed stocks of companies active in the molybdenum industry 
or by purchasing physical volumes. Hedging against price volatility through forward trading 
was not possible. The introduction of the trading of molybdenum and cobalt futures at the 
London Metal Exchange in February 2010 fundamentally changed the market organization of 
two refractory metals with corresponding consequences on price volatility. 
8.2 Implications for further research 
In the following chapter, implications for research are discussed from a content and 
methodological perspective (chapter 8.2.1). In chapter 8.2.2, restrictions in this work are 
critically discussed and topics for further research are suggested. 
8.2.1 Content and methodology based implications 
The motivation for this work was based on two observations in the discussion about the 
economic development of metal markets. Firstly, it was noted that mineral economists are in 
disagreement how to evaluate the recent commodity boom with respect to its long-term 
impact on metal prices. Secondly, the absence of an adequate analysis of refractory metal 
markets matching the depth and level of quantification found in works on non-ferrous base 
                                                 
414 Slade/Thille (2006), p.251 
415 Brunetti/Gilbertz(1995), p.237 
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metals implied that any conclusions on economic dynamics of metal markets were of limited 
validity as refractory metals were excluded a priori. 
The work on hand contributes to the discussion on the long-term impact of the commodity 
boom on metal prices. Based on industry insights and on the review of existing literature on 
the topic a framework was deduced that illustrates through which forces structural changes in 
metal markets may occur and how this may impact level and volatility of metal prices. In a 
case study on the molybdenum market, the occurrence of structural changes and the 
measurable impact on prices were demonstrated. 
This approach enriches the discussion on structural changes in metal markets and long-term 
changes in metal price levels in three ways. The four forces framework laid out in Exhibit 67 
provides a holistic approach to structure future discussions along the dimensions that have a 
relevant impact on long-term metal prices and volatility. Furthermore, it expands the 
discussion beyond the future cost structure of the marginal producer and explicitly revives the 
dimension of national concentration, which was long dismissed as irrelevant in times of 
globalized trade. Also, the integration of insights from the analysis of refractory metal 
markets emphasizes the framework's applicability to this particular group of metals and at the 
same time yields important differentiating factors within the structural forces between non-
ferrous base and refractory metal markets. Developments in refractory metal markets provide 
important examples for the topicality of the debate, e.g., changes in the dimension market 
structure. Finally, the example of molybdenum illustrates the occurrences of structural 
changes in a metal market along several forces as a consequence of the boom and provides a 
quantitative estimation of the long-term price impact. 
The focus of this work on refractory metal markets expands the scope of mineral economics 
towards metal markets, which are to date underrepresented in literature, yet whose rising 
economic relevance is emphasized by extraordinary strong growth in market value and 
demand beyond that of non-ferrous metal markets and which will continue to gain weight in 
the future. 
The differentiation from non-ferrous base metals based on major differences on the supply 
and demand side underlines the particularities of refractory metal markets and emphasizes the 
necessity for a distinctive perspective and exclusive treatment of the markets. Structural 
differences on the demand side between non-ferrous base and refractory metals were 
addressed by an in depth analysis of refractory metal demand. It was demonstrated that 
refractory metal demand patterns are significantly influenced by the individual functional 
profile of each metal. This influence was traced back to underlying industry and consumer 
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trends and quantified by analyzing the concentration development of each refractory metal in 
steel by country cluster. 
It was shown that depending on their functional profile refractory metal concentration in steel 
is either measurably influenced by a country cluster's stage of economic development or 
enjoys a wide spread use regardless of macroeconomic differences. Furthermore, the 
functional profile of refractory metals has a visible influence on growth of apparent 
consumption. The concept of a refractory's metal functional profile and the link to 
overarching industry and consumer trends may therefore be understood a helpful toolkit to 
assess and comprehend the demand profile and demand development of a refractory and 
possibly also of other minor metals going forward. 
In addition, incremental regional and national differences in advanced economies regarding 
the degree of specialization in steel production towards high end steel grades were identified 
and the impact of net alloyed steel trade on the average concentration level of a country 
cluster illustrated. Finally, the advantage of domestic assets of refractory metals was 
illustrated in the case of molybdenum in China. The restrictions of molybdenum exports in its 
intermediate forms could be linked to China's development towards a leading net exporter of 
alloyed steel at the expense of net importers of molybdenum, which demonstrates that the 
topic of resource availability and security is of imminent relevance to metal markets and 
should not be dismissed by scholars. 
From a methodological viewpoint, price was chosen as the ultimate sensor to reflect relevant 
structural changes in metal markets. In differentiation towards existing research, metal prices 
were not examined based on the statistical analysis of price charts. Rather, structural changes 
in metal prices were attributed to either force within the four forces framework laid out in 
Exhibit 67, chapter 7.1. 
This approach complements existing metal price research of statistically identified super 
cycles with a long-demanded perspective on the metal industry based roots of super cycles  by 
unifying industry insights in an integrated framework to establish a holistic approach to price 
analysis in contrast to studies that observe and analyze structural changes in a metal industry 
but fall short of relating these back to a price impact. 
The approach chosen in this work owed to the author's practical industry background and 
intentionally leaned more towards the integration of solid industry knowledge than pure 
statistical rigor. The insights gained are nonetheless meant to contribute to prospective studies 
by scholars from various backgrounds and to the lively debate about the future development 
of metal prices.  
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8.2.2 Critical assessment of restrictions and suggestions for further 
research 
The conclusions based on this work are subject to several restrictions that may be classified as 
restrictions with respect to data, methodology and scope. 
From the viewpoint of data sources employed, the choice of refractory metals as the core 
markets for demand analysis entailed significant limitations. Officially reported consumption 
data are published only for non-ferrous base metals. Consequently, apparent consumption was 
approximated based on production and import and export data of refractory metals in their 
intermediate forms. The amount of refractory metals contained in annual import and exports 
flows was estimated based on fixed content assumptions as well as variable content calculated 
based on reported trade value and metal price.416 Despite plausibility checks and exemption 
of metals from the analysis that were found to yield implausible results, namely cobalt and 
vanadium, results were not unilaterally satisfying. Often, mirror reports had to be used for 
discrete periods as trade figures from the original reporter could not be reconciled. However, 
the choice, which figures to use as well as which methodology to choose to calculate metal 
content is subject to qualified assumptions and cannot be justified by hard facts. Furthermore, 
no adjustments were made for stock inflows and outflows due to lack of data. Finally, major 
producers of a certain metal, e.g., South Africa for chromium, Brazil for niobium, and Chile 
for molybdenum had estimated consumption rates significantly higher than could be 
explained by either domestic demand or the export of alloyed steel. This suggests that either 
significant discrete exports flows containing refractory metals were not captured or that metal 
content in accounted export flows was underestimated.  
Methodologically, the choice of the intensity of use technique to decompose growth of 
apparent consumption was substantiated based on the top down approach to decompose 
growth in apparent consumption417. However, only material composition of product was 
further examined as the variable directly dependent on metal apparent consumption. It is 
implicitly conjectured that GDP growth and steel growth are linked to refractory metal 
demand growth but a formal proof was omitted. A formal analysis linking GDP growth and 
growth of steel production relative to GDP to growth of refractory metal demand would 
further solidify the explanatory value of this approach. Furthermore, the clustering concept 
applied to aggregate the analyzed economies is subject to qualifications. The dimension 
capturing steel production is based on the absolute production volume. No correction was 
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made to adjust for scale effects between countries, nor can the author claim that concentration 
levels and apparent consumption of clustered countries develop in lock-step within each 
cluster. Whereas differences in concentration levels between clustered countries were 
highlighted and in some cases traced back to country specific singularities, immense scale 
effects particularly in cluster 1 are apparent. China's production volume dwarfs that of India 
and Russia yet the three countries are bundled together. While a simple adjustment, namely 
mapping steel production per unit of GDP instead of absolute steel production does not 
remove the gap between China and its peers, other ways to account for the influence of steel 
production are thinkable such as mapping steel production by population. Treating China as a 
separate entity is also justifiable based on the unique status of this economy.  
The focus of the work on refractory metals used predominantly as alloying elements in steel 
limits the scope of this work. Other refractory metals, namely cobalt, titanium and tungsten 
were exempted. Conclusions with regards to the significant influence of the functional 
demand profile and the link to major industry trends are therefore based on a subset of 
refractory metals and their validity in other markets is subject to verification. 
For future research the following recommendations may be deduced. With respect to the 
situation of apparent consumption data, trade figures are likely to remain the raw data source 
of choice due to lack of officially published figures, which would in any case be subject to 
similar constraints. However, estimates can be refined and the reliability improved by 
increasing the granularity of trade flow data beyond the six-digit limitation imposed on data 
published by UN Comtrade. More granular data are available directly from the reporting 
countries. This of course entails a much more tedious process of data collecting and data 
mining and most likely limits the analysis to a few reliable reporting countries. However, 
within the country clustering concept developed in this work, calculating refined apparent 
consumption for one representative economy by cluster would improve the validity of results. 
Furthermore, the analysis of chromium, manganese, molybdenum, and niobium and to a 
limited extent of vanadium can only be a first step of shedding light on the group of refractory 
metal markets. As the above mentioned are furthermore a special subset within refractory 
metals, an in-depth analysis of the growth drivers of cobalt, titanium and magnesium as well 
as the examination of sustained structural changes during the commodity boom along the 
four-forces framework can be expected to yield further insights into this group of metals. 
Also, the group of other minor metals contains highly innovative materials, whose markets 
are subject to volatile demand and a concentrated supply structure. Approaching these metals 
through the functional approach suggested in this work could facilitate a thorough 
understanding of the dynamics of these markets essential to market participants. 
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Finally, the period analyzed reaches till 2008 as data beyond this year were not yet published 
during the time of writing. Given the drastic fall in prices and demand across global 
commodity market starting mid 2008 and the subsequent contraction of global GDP growth 
due to the by some accounts still enduring economic crisis in 2010, the analyzed time period 
does not capture the full impact of the crisis. Applying the developed framework to metal 
markets during the crisis and beyond would help to refine factors identified within the 
structural forces and test the solidity of the framework. An extension of the time period 
beyond 2008 would also aide to verify the robustness of the identified trends affecting metal 
demand through a metal's individual functional profile. 
8.3 Implications for practitioners 
The extraordinary development of refractory metals during the commodity boom lifted 
selected smaller-scale metals from their limited significance up to eye level with non-ferrous 
base metals. Overall, refractory metals are becoming increasingly important to market 
participants with respect to cost, risk, revenue and profit.418 The introduction of cobalt and 
molybdenum future trading at the LME is a visible consequence of this development and a 
reaction to a growing urgency of market participants to hedge their exposure to these markets 
as well as to calls from financial markets for better access to lucrative investment 
opportunities. 
While the economic crisis has jeopardized numerous investments in capacity expansions as 
suppliers face liquidity shortages and are seeking ways to reduce capital expenditure and 
operating costs to generate cash, it was demonstrated that the demand for the examined 
refractory metal markets is tied to industry and consumer trends that are expected to remain 
valid and secure solid demand growth going forward. It is therefore assumed that refractory 
metals are losing none of their relevance gained during the commodity boom in the economic 
crisis. 
Suppliers should recognize the growing share of revenue and profit stemming from refractory 
metal markets and reevaluate the significance of these metals in their portfolio, in particular 
the classification of by- or co-product relative to a main product as well as their market 
approach. 
For consumers, selected refractory metals are becoming a cost and a risk factor of hitherto 
unknown relevance. Steel producers as the major consumers of the metals examined should 
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reconsider their supply strategy. A sole reliance on spot market supply may not suffice in the 
future and reports exists of top steel producers seeking long-term sourcing contracts to 
mitigate the risk of supply constraints in refractory metals.419 
The exchange trading of cobalt and molybdenum offers new opportunities but also carries 
risks for industrial market participants. The possibility for market participants to hedge their 
exposure to price volatility allows to mitigate the risk of fluctuating costs and revenue. On the 
other hand, in times of tight supply, commodity speculators now have easier access to these 
markets to magnify the short-term price impact of a perceived scarcity. 
China's role in selected refractory metal markets deserves special mention. Its unmatched 
need for raw materials to sustain its economic growth has made it the center of metal demand 
growth globally. However, its role on the supply side is of equal significance. As a resource 
rich economy, it has vast domestic assets in many refractory metals and has assumed the 
position of a dominant consumer as well as a major global supplier. That makes it 
fundamentally different from other resource rich emerging economies, which do not have a 
large domestic market and are relying on exports of raw materials to receive foreign 
exchange. China's determination to pursue domestic interests over unobstructed trade takes 
shape in the form of export rebates having become export restrictions. The effect on Chinese 
metal exports is considerable. It was illustrated that China's position in the alloyed steel 
market changed fundamentally from being a net importer to becoming a net exporter, a 
development that strongly correlates with a rising concentration of molybdenum and niobium 
in steel production. In parallel, these increased alloyed steel exports replace exports of metals 
in their intermediate forms as illustrated for the molybdenum market.420 In consequence, 
China subsidizes a domestic down stream industry relying on refractory metal supply and 
nourishes overcapacities. This constellation has severe implications for steel producers 
outside China. Their position is doubly inferior to their Chinese counterparts. Access to raw 
materials is restricted and the competitiveness of their products outside domestic markets, 
which are often protected by import tariffs, is jeopardized. At the same time, Chinese 
overcapacities in alloyed steel are pushed onto the global market. 
The analysis of the alloyed steel export market bears witness to signs how this development 
measurably affects steel producers outside China. Since 1994, the share of net alloyed steel 
exports of global alloyed steel exports of major Western European economies dropped from 
around 9 percent to below 4 percent measured by weight and to just above 5 percent measured 
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by value. For Japanese exports, the fall in market share is equally severe. Here, net exports 
relative to global exports fell from over 11 percent to 8 percent measured by weight and 
below 6 percent measured by value. While this is not to say that absolute exports of alloyed 
steel of either major Western European steel producers or Japan have fallen, neither region 
participates in the growing export market for alloyed steel. On the contrary, both large 
Western European and Japanese steel producers are marginalized on the global market.  
Yet the export share development of European economies with a smaller-scale steel 
production such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria also highlights a path to successfully 
maintain a competitive edge globally going forward. Home to innovative steel producers that 
specialize in high end steel grades visible in high concentration levels of refractory metals per 
unit output of domestic steel production, these countries have on average maintained an 
unperturbed share of global alloyed steel exports. 
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9. Appendix 
9.1 HS codes trade data 
Chromium (HS 1992) Manganese (HS 1992) Molybdenum (HS 1992) 
HS code Description HS code Description HS code Description 
2610 Chromium ores and concentrates 2602 Manganese ores, concentrates, iron ores >20% Manganese 261310 Molybdenum concentrates, roasted 
2819 Chromium oxides, hydroxides 2820 Manganese oxides 261390 Molybdenum ores and concentrates except roasted 
720241 Ferro-chromium, >4% carbon 720211 Ferro-manganese, >2% carbon 720270 Ferro-molybdenum 
720249 Ferro-chromium, <4% carbon 720219 Ferro-manganese, <2% carbon 8102 Molybdenum and articles thereof, waste or scrap 
720250 Ferro-silico-chromium 720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 282570 Molybdenum oxides and hydroxides 
811220 Chromium, articles thereof, waste or scrap/powders 722720 Bar/rod, of silico-manganese steel, irregular coils 284170 Metallic molybdates 
  722820 Bar/rod of silico-manganese steel not in coils   
  722920 Wire of silico-manganese steel   
  8111 Manganese, articles thereof, waste or scrap   
Niobium (HS 1992) Cobalt (HS 1992) Vanadium (HS 1992) 
HS code Description HS code Description HS code Description 
720293 Ferro-niobium 2605 Cobalt ores and concentrates 720292 Ferro-vanadium 
  2822 Cobalt oxides and hydroxides 282530 Vanadium oxides and hydroxides 
  282734 Cobalt chloride 262050 Ash or residues containing mainly vanadium 
  810510 Cobalt, unwrought, matte, waste or scrap, powders 811240 Vanadium, articles thereof, waste or scrap/powders 
  810590 Cobalt, articles thereof, not elsewhere specified   
* since HS 2002     
Table 19 – HS codes of refractory metal trade data 
Source: UN Comtrade 
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Aluminum Copper Lead 
HS code Description HS code Description HS code Description 
76 Aluminium and articles thereof 74 Copper and articles thereof 78 Lead and articles thereof 
2606 Aluminium ores and concentrates 2603 Copper ores and concentrates 2607 Lead ores and concentrates 
7602 Aluminium waste or scrap 7404 Copper, copper alloy, waste or scrap 2824 Lead oxides, red lead and orange lead 
262040 Ash or residues containing mainly aluminium 262030 Ash or residues containing mainly copper 7802 Lead waste or scrap 
282732 Aluminium chloride 282550 Copper oxides and hydroxides 262020 Ash or residues containing mainly lead 
  282741 
Chloride oxides and chloride hydroxides of 
copper   
Nickel Tin Zinc 
HS code Description HS code Description HS code Description 
75 Nickel and articles thereof 80 Tin and articles thereof 79 Zinc and articles thereof 
2604 Nickel ores and concentrates 2609 Tin ores and concentrates 2608 Zinc ores and concentrates 
7503 Nickel waste or scrap 8002 Tin waste or scrap 2817 Zinc oxide and peroxide 
282540 Nickel oxides and hydroxides 282737 Tin chlorides 7902 Zinc waste or scrap 
720260 Ferro-nickel   262011 Ash or residues containing hard zinc spelter 
    262019 Ash or residues containing hard zinc spelter 
    282736 Zinc chloride 
    283020 Zinc sulphide 
Table 20 – HS codes of non-ferrous base metals trade data 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
Stainless steel (HS 1992) Alloyed steel (HS 1992) Oil and gas pipe line steel (HS 1992) 
HS code Description HS code Description HS code Description 
730441 Stainless steel pipe or tubing, cold rolled 7224 
Other alloy steel in ingots or other primary 
forms; semi-finished products of other alloy 
steel. 730410 Pipes, line, iron or steel, for oil or gas pipelines 
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Stainless steel (HS 1992) Alloyed steel (HS 1992) Oil and gas pipe line steel (HS 1992) 
HS code Description HS code Description HS code Description 
730449 
Stainless steel pipe or tubing, except cold 
rolled 7225 
Flat-rolled products of other alloy steel, of a 
width of 600 mm or more. 730420 Casings, tubing and drill pipe, for oil drilling 
730640 Pipes and tubing, stainless steel, welded 7226 
Flat-rolled products of other alloy steel, of a 
width of less than 600 mm. 730610 
Pipe (oil/gas line) iron or steel nes, diameter 
<406m 
730721 Flanges, stainless steel 7227 
Bars and rods, hot-rolled, in irregularly wound 
coils, of other alloy steel. 730620 
Casings,circular, iron/steel, oil/gas drilling 
<406mm 
730722 
Threaded elbows, bends and sleeves of 
stainless steel 722810 Bar/rod of high speed steel not in coils   
730723 Pipe fittings, butt welding of stainless steel 722830 
Bar/rod, alloy steel nes,nfw hot 
rolled/drawn/extrude   
730729 
Pipe fittings of stainless steel except butt 
welding 722840 Bar/rod nes, alloy steel nes, nfw forged   
731411 Woven products of stainless steel 722850 
Bar/rod nes, alloy steel nes, nfw cold 
formed/finishe   
720421 Waste or scrap, of stainless steel 722860 Bar/rod, alloy steel nes   
7218 
Stainless steel in ingots or other primary 
forms; semi-finished products of stainless 
steel. 722870 Angles, shapes and sections, alloy steel, nes   
7219 
Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a 
width of 600 mm or more. 730451 Alloy steel pipe or tubing, cold rolled   
7220 
Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a 
width of less than 600 mm. 730459 Alloy steel pipe or tubing, except cold rolled   
7221 
Bars and rods, hot-rolled, in irregularly wound 
coils, of stainless steel. 730650 Pipes and tubing, alloy steel nes, welded   
7222 
Other bars and rods of stainless steel; angles, 
shapes and sections of stainless steel. 720429 
Waste or scrap, of alloy steel, other than 
stainless   
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Stainless steel (HS 1992) Alloyed steel (HS 1992) Oil and gas pipe line steel (HS 1992) 
HS code Description HS code Description HS code Description 
7223 Wire of stainless steel. 720521 Powders, alloy steel   
Table 21 – HS codes of alloyed steel, stainless steel, and oil and gas pipeline steel trade data 
Source: UN Comtrade 
9.2 Origin of metal price and production data refractory and other minor metals 
Refractory 
metals 
Intermediate 
form 
1960 
-1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Chromium Chromite ore 
 
Ferro-
chromium 
 
Chromium 
metal USGS (2004a), p.1 USGS (2008a), p.1 USGS(2010a), p.1 
Molybdenum 
Molybdenum 
concentrate USGS (2004e), p.1 USGS (2008e), p.1 USGS(2010d), p.1 
Nio- 
bium 
Ferro-
niobium USGS (2004f), p.1 USGS (2008g), p.1 
Estimated based on average 
value of global imports 
Manga- 
nese 
Manganese 
ore, 48%- 
50% 
 manganese 
content 
Price: USGS (1998a), p.1ff. 
USGS (2004c), p.1 USGS (2008c), p.1 USGS(2010c), p.1 
 
Ferro-
manganese 
Not 
avai- 
lable 
Estimated based on 
average (1997-2008) 
ratio of ferro-
manganese price 
and manganese ore 
price 
USGS 
(1997b), 
p.1ff. 
USGS(1998c), 
p.1ff. 
USGS (1999b), p.1ff.; 
USGS (2000b), p.1ff.; 
USGS (2001b), p.1ff.; 
USGS (2002b), p.1ff. 
USGS (2003b), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2004d), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2005b), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2006b), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2007a), 
p.1ff.  
Vanadium 
Vanadium 
pentoxide USGS (1998a), p.1ff. USGS (2004g), p.1 USGS(2008i), p.1 USGS(2010e), p.1 
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Refractory 
metals 
Intermediate 
form 
1960 
-1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Ferro-
vanadium 
Not 
avai- 
lable 
USGS (1994a), p.1ff.; 
USGS (1995a), p.1ff.; 
USGS (1996b), p.1ff.; 
USGS (1997c), p.1ff. 
USGS(1998d), 
p.1ff. 
USGS (1999c), p.1ff.; 
USGS (2000c), p.1ff.; 
USGS (2001c), p.1ff.; 
USGS (2002c), p.1ff. 
USGS (2003c), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2004h), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2005c), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2006c), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2007b), 
p.1ff. 
USGS 
(2008k), 
p.1ff. 
Cobalt 
Cobalt 
cathode USGS (1998a), p.1ff. USGS (2004j), p.1. USGS (2008n), p.1 USGS(2010g), p.1 
Tungsten 
Tungsten tri- 
Oxide USGS (1998a), p.1ff. USGS (2004i), p.1. USGS (2008l) USGS (2010f) 
Titanium 
Titanium 
sponge 
metal USGS (1998a), p.1ff. USGS (2004k), p.1. USGS (2008p) USGS(2010h) 
Table 22 – Origin of price data of refractory metals 
Source: Own illustration 
Refractory 
metals 
1980 
-1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Chromite ore  1980 to 1983: USGS (2008b); 1984 to 2007: Raw Materials Group (RMG) (2008) USGS 
(2010a) 
Manganese USGS (2008d) 
Molybdenum USGS (2008f) 
Niobium USGS (2008h) 
Vanadium USGS (2008j) 
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Refractory 
metals 
1980 
-1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cobalt USGS (2008o) 
Tungsten USGS (2008m) 
Titanium 
metal 
Not 
available 
USGS 
(1996c), 
p.2 
USGS 
(1997d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(1998e), 
p.2 
USGS 
(1999d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2000d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2001d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2002d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2003d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2004k), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2005d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2006d), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2007c), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2008p), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2009), 
p.2 
USGS 
(2010i), 
p.2 
Table 23 – Origin of production data of refractory metals 
Source: Own illustration 
Other 
minor 
metals 
Intermediate 
form 
1960 
-1993 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Antimony Antimony 
metal 
(99.30% to 
99.50%) 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004l), p.1 USGS (2008q), p.1 USGS (2010j), p.1 
Beryllium 1960 to 
1998: 
Beryllium 
metal 
(97% to 
98.5%). 1999 
to 2008 
beryllium 
copper-
master alloy, 
per beryllium 
content 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004m), p.1 USGS (2008s), p.1 USGS (2010k), p.1 
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Other 
minor 
metals 
Intermediate 
form 
1960 
-1993 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bismuth Bismuth 
metal 
(99.99%) 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004n), p.1 USGS (2008u), p.1 USGS (2010l), p.1 
Cadmium Cadmium 
metal 
(99.95%) 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004o), p.1 USGS (2008w), p.1 USGS (2010m), p.1 
Gallium Gallium 
metal 
(99.9999%) 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004p), p.1 USGS (2008y), p.1 USGS (2010n), p.1 
Germanium Germanium 
metal 
(99.9%) 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004q), p.1 USGS (2008za), p.1 USGS (2010o), p.1 
Indium Indium metal 
(99.97%) 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004r), p.1 USGS (2008zc), p.1 USGS (2010p), p.1 
Rare 
Earths 
Bastnäsite 
concentrate, 
REO basis 
Unavailable for 
1960 to 1990. 
1991 to 1994: 
USGS (1996d), 
p.1 
USGS (2000e), p.1 USGS (2004s), p.1 USGS (2008ze), p.1 USGS (2010q), p.1 
Tantalum Tantalum 
pentoxide 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004t), p.1 USGS (2008zg), p.1 USGS (2010r), p.1 
Rhenium Rhenium 
metal 
(99.99%) 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004u), p.1 USGS (2008zi), p.1 USGS (2010s), p.1 
Thallium Thallium 
metal (99.9% 
USGS (1998a), p.1ff USGS (2004v), p.1 USGS (2008zk), p.1 USGS (2010t), p.1 
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Other 
minor 
metals 
Intermediate 
form 
1960 
-1993 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
to 99.999%) 
Table 24 – Origin of price data of other minor metals 
Source: Own illustration 
Other minor metals 
1980 – 2008 
Antimony USGS (2008r) 
Beryllium USGS (2008t) 
Bismuth USGS (2008v) 
Cadmium USGS (2008x) 
Gallium USGS (2008z) 
Germanium USGS (2008zb) 
Indium USGS (2008zd) 
Rare Earths USGS (2008zf) 
Tantalum USGS (2008zh) 
Rhenium USGS (2008zj) 
Thallium USGS (2008zl) 
Table 25 – Origin of production data of other minor metals 
Source: Own illustration 
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9.3 Apparent consumption calculation 
 Specific adaptations   
Country Chromium Manganese Molybdenum Niobium Vanadium Cobalt 
Argentina   
Mirror reports used for ferro-
molybdenum imports (2005)    
Australia  
Mirror reports used for 
exports (1994-2008)   
Mirror reports used for all 
imports and exports (2000 to 
2003)  
Austria   
Mirror reports used for imports of 
roasted and unroasted molybdenum 
oxides (1998-2007)    
Belgium       
Brazil   
Mirror reports used for imports of 
unroasted molybdenum (1995, 1996) 
and for ferro-molybdenum (1995)    
Canada       
Chile  
Production of manganese 
ore  from 1995 to 1997 
interpolated     
China   Mirror reports used for exports (1994)  
Mirror repports used for all 
exports and imports (1994-2008)  
Czech  
Republic    
2007 apparent consumption based 
on trade value relative to price of 
ferro-niobium 
Mirror repports used for all 
exports and imports (1994-1998)  
Finland   
Mirror reports used for  imports of 
roasted molybdenum oxide and ferro-
molybdenum (2005)    
France       
Germany       
Hungary   
Mirror reports used for exports of 
ferro-molybdenum (1994)    
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 Specific adaptations   
Country Chromium Manganese Molybdenum Niobium Vanadium Cobalt 
India 
Mirror reports used for 
exports (1994-2008)  
Mirror reports used for exports of   
unroasted molybdenum oxide (2005, 
2006, 2008)    
Indonesia  
Mirror reports used for  
exports (1994-2008)     
Italy       
Japan   
Mirror reports used for imports of 
roasted molybdenum oxide (2005)    
Malaysia   
Mirror reports used for ferro-
molybdenum imports (1999, 2006, 
2007) for imports of molybdenum 
articles including waste and scrap 
(1999, 2001, 2006, 2007) and exports 
of molybdenum articles including 
waste and scrap (1999) 
2006 apparent consumption based 
on trade value relative to price of 
ferro-niobium   
Mexico   
Mirror reports used for imports of 
ferro-molybdenum (2005 to 2008)    
Netherlands   
Mirror reports used for exports of  
roasted molybdenum (2002, 2005)    
Norway       
Poland       
Portugal   
Mirror reports used for  imports of 
ferro-molybdenum  (2005)    
Russia    
Mirror reports used for imports of 
ferro-niobium (2006, 2007) 
Mirror repports used for all 
exports and imports (1994-2008)  
South Africa 
Mirror reports used for 
exports (1994-2008)      
South Korea       
Spain    
Mirror reports used for imports of 
ferro-niobium (2007)   
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 Specific adaptations   
Country Chromium Manganese Molybdenum Niobium Vanadium Cobalt 
Sweden       
Thailand   
Mirror reports used for imports of 
molybdenum articles including waste 
and scrap (2007)    
Turkey       
Ukraine  
Mirror reports used for 
exports (1996-1999)     
United  
Kingdom       
USA   
2004, 2005 calculation based on 
molybdenum contained in imports, 
exports reported by USGS    
Venezuela   
Mirror reports used for imports of  
unroasted molybdenum (1995) and 
exports of ferro-molybdenum  (2002)    
Table 26 – Country and metal specific adaptations to calculate apparent consumption 
Source: Own illustration 
9.3.1 Chromium 
HS code Description Chromium content estimation Remark 
2610 Chromium ores and concentrates 
2819 Chromium oxides, hydroxides 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram 
relative to chromite ore price (compare also chapter 4.2) times 
average chromium oxide content in chromite ore times 
chromium content in chromium oxide 
S. Table 28 for chromium oxide content in 
chromite ore and chromium content in 
chromium oxide 
720241 Ferro-chromium, >4% carbon Average chromium content of 60 percent USGS (1998a), p.29 
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HS code Description Chromium content estimation Remark 
720249 Ferro-chromium, <4% carbon Assumed average chromium content of 60 percent USGS (1998a), p.29 
720250 Ferro-silico-chromium Assumed average chromium content of 60 percent USGS (1998a), p.29 
811220 
Chromium, articles thereof, waste or 
scrap/powders 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram 
relative to chromium metal price (compare also chapter 4.2)  
Not available Chromite ore production Based on average chromium oxide content S. Table 29 
Table 27 – Overview chromium content estimation 
Source: Own illustration 
Chromium content in chromite ore Data source 
Contained elements g/mol Factor Subtotal Share of total weight  
Cr 52 2 104 68% 
Average chromium 
content in chromium 
oxide (Cr2O3) O 16 3 48 32% 
Chromium content in  
chromium oxide (Cr2O3):  
68%  
Average chromium oxide content in chromite ore used for trade data 
45% Based on USGS (1998a), p.28 
Average chromium content in chromite ore 
45% * 68% = 31%  
Table 28 – Chromium content in chromite ore 
Source: Own calculation 
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Producer of chromite ore Average 1996 to 2008 chromium oxide content Source 
Afghanistan 44% 
Albania 48% 
Australia 17% 
Brazil 31% 
Burma 26% 
China 36% 
Cuba 31% 
Finland 41% 
Greece 46% 
India 40% 
Iran 49% 
Kazakhstan 39% 
Madagascar 49% 
Oman 42% 
Pakistan 25% 
Philippines 55% 
Russia 47% 
South Africa 43% 
Sudan 81% 
Turkey 52% 
Vietnam 46% 
Zimbabwe 47% 
USGS (1996a), Appendix;  
USGS (1997a), Appendix; 
 USGS (1998b), Appendix; 
USGS (1999a), Appendix; 
USGS (2000a), Appendix; 
USGS(2001a), Appendix; 
USGS (2002a), Appendix; 
USGS (2003a), Appendix; 
USGS (2004b), Appendix; 
USGS (2005a),Appendix; 
USGS (2006a) Appendix 
Table 29 – Average chromite oxide content by producer 
Source: Own calculation 
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Thousand metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 3.6   3.6   5.2  6.1  7.5  7.9  8.6  6.4   8.4  7.5  7.8  8.8  8.8  7.7  11.2   
Australia 8.3   9.8   7.2  6.4  14.8  13.4  10.7  9.0   7.2  38.8  25.1  20.9  16.0  9.0  37.7   
Austria 20.0   18.7   22.2  27.8  21.3  18.9  25.5  28.2   19.6  25.4  30.8  29.1  27.4  39.7  35.9   
Belgium 0.0   68.0   58.2  55.7  66.7  60.6  81.3  67.8   79.1  95.7  111.1  115.7  186.3  242.0  208.5   
Brazil 69.7   86.1   77.1  55.4  104.4  87.8  125.2  85.9   64.2  93.6  134.3  131.4  133.2  139.8  119.5   
Canada 38.9   45.4   44.8  43.7  38.2  36.0  29.8  25.3   34.2  29.3  19.2  23.2  20.7  19.0  22.4   
Chile 3.0   3.6   3.2  4.3  5.8  3.1  5.2  5.2   4.0  6.5  3.4  5.4  4.1  4.9  6.4   
China 13.4   38.4   59.3  89.6  69.8  109.9  96.9  115.6   168.7  304.6  489.7  544.1  776.6  1,607.7  1,576.2   
Czech Republic 5.7   23.2   13.5  17.3  22.9  20.5  28.9  26.1   28.7  11.3  12.4  13.0  14.1  22.2  16.8   
Finland 87.1   100.8   98.8  104.1  106.9  116.0  151.7  114.7   113.5  139.2  144.7  140.7  141.7  101.0  139.7   
France 148.1   163.1   130.4  166.5  176.4  176.8  191.2  157.3   190.6  162.6  139.8  120.6  101.8  64.9  67.7   
Germany 218.0   272.7   210.6  248.8  274.5  252.4  248.2  239.7   234.1  298.7  275.1  287.1  291.8  295.7  345.2   
Hungary 1.1   1.5   2.2  1.1  1.0  1.1  1.4  1.3   1.4  0.6  0.6  0.9  1.3  1.1  0.8   
India 134.1 261.8 214.4 213.1 203.6 261.3 351.2 298.1 386.0 344.2 519.5 587.2 651.2 481.3 500.0 
Indonesia 0.5   0.7   0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.9  1.1   1.1  1.1  0.8  1.0  1.1  0.4  3.0   
Italy 120.7   81.4   124.1  148.5  166.9  188.1  184.7  190.1   228.8  223.1  239.8  262.5  278.2  255.5  238.3   
Japan 442.4   572.5   529.7  561.3  431.7  408.4  524.9  487.3   504.2  573.3  622.2  625.8  546.5  610.4  615.3   
Malaysia 0.7   0.8   0.8  0.8  0.7  3.3  1.2  2.8   1.1  1.5  1.7  1.2  2.2  5.7  7.5   
Mexico 4.3   5.1   7.3  7.5  7.2  9.2  7.0  5.0   8.1  10.2  12.1  10.9  16.1  19.9  12.9   
Netherlands 8.2   72.1   78.9  46.6  69.2  91.2  58.0  55.9   60.4  10.4  63.1  50.9  65.8  141.3  103.3   
Norway 0.4   0.5   0.4  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.5   0.3  0.4  0.5  1.0  1.4  0.9  0.6   
Poland 2.6   7.5   11.0  8.0  8.9  8.7  10.1  8.8   6.2  8.1  9.4  8.3  10.0  12.9  13.9   
Portugal 1.2   1.5   1.1  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.6   1.6  1.4  1.3  0.9  1.2  1.3  1.1   
Russia n/a n/a 60.8  84.9  46.5  66.5  82.0  86.8   76.7  103.1  67.5  96.7  221.1  171.1  282.6   
South Africa 416 696 593 631 825 813 799 534 711 846 807 824 720 918 823 
South Korea 112.7   123.3   143.0  188.0  183.8  240.9  226.0  201.8   225.5  308.1  364.9  325.5  266.7  262.4  263.3   
Spain 94.6   94.3   92.7  118.6  118.0  137.1  133.7  156.9   141.2  350.7  133.6  125.7  153.3  139.9  126.5   
Sweden 21.3   49.4   41.0  47.5  48.1  47.8  53.9  56.7   67.2  52.2  44.8  52.1  51.5  76.1  69.6   
Thailand 3.2   2.5   3.5  3.6  2.8  3.4  6.2  4.1   4.6  6.5  7.8  10.5  12.1  15.0  14.3   
Turkey 335.4   540.3   350.8  535.7  382.4  145.1  104.7  93.6   46.2  11.6  54.4  68.5  40.1  -14.9  -71.3   
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Thousand metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Ukraine n/a n/a 17.9  19.3  14.7  17.6  30.1  26.9   21.8  28.3  24.8  22.9  22.4  27.8  22.4   
United Kingdom 101.5   67.5   79.6  77.1  73.3  70.2  75.9  65.4   60.1  50.5  73.0  42.0  39.8  34.2  51.5   
USA 210.8   342.6   281.3  281.7  286.1  390.6  202.1  99.0   123.2  149.4  158.6  272.7  271.7  148.3  233.8   
Venezuela 0.7   0.6   0.5  0.9  0.7  0.2  -2.2  0.1   0.3  -5.0  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.5  -0.6   
Total 2,657.9   3,785.7   3,392.5  3,868.2  3,831.8  3,843.2  3,934.6  3,307.2   3,665.1  4,427.9  4,780.6  4,850.1  5,128.6  5,940.1  6,119.9   
Table 30 – Chromium apparent consumption 
Source: Own estimation 
Metric tons of chromium/ 
thousand metric tons of 
steel production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 1.1   1.0   1.3  1.5  1.8  2.1  1.9  1.6   1.9  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.4  2.0   
Australia 1.0   1.2   0.9  0.7  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.3   1.0  5.1  3.4  2.7  2.0  1.1  4.9   
Austria 4.5   3.7   5.0  5.4  4.0  3.6  4.5  4.8   3.2  4.1  4.7  4.1  3.8  5.2  4.7   
Belgium n/a 4.8   4.4  4.2  4.8  4.5  5.7  5.0   5.6  6.9  7.7  9.2  12.9  17.9  15.7   
Brazil 2.7   3.4   3.1  2.1  4.1  3.5  4.5  3.2   2.2  3.0  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.1  3.5   
Canada 2.8   3.1   3.0  2.8  2.4  2.2  1.8  1.7   2.1  1.8  1.2  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.5   
Chile 2.9   3.6   2.7  3.7  4.9  2.4  3.9  4.2   3.2  4.7  2.2  3.5  2.5  3.0  4.2   
China 0.1   0.4   0.6  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.8  0.8   0.9  1.4  1.7  1.5  1.8  3.3  3.2   
Czech Republic 0.8   3.2   2.1  2.6  3.5  3.7  4.6  4.1   4.4  1.7  1.8  2.1  2.1  3.2  2.6   
Finland 25.5   31.7   29.9  27.9  27.0  29.3  37.0  29.1   28.4  29.2  29.9  29.7  28.0  22.8  31.6   
France 8.2   9.0   7.4  8.4  8.8  8.8  9.1  8.1   9.4  8.2  6.7  6.2  5.1  3.4  3.8   
Germany 5.3   6.5   5.3  5.5  6.2  6.0  5.4  5.4   5.2  6.7  5.9  6.4  6.2  6.1  7.5   
Hungary 0.6   0.8   1.2  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6   0.7  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.4   
India 7.0   11.9   9.0  8.7  8.7  10.8  13.0  10.9   13.4  10.8  15.9  12.8  13.2  9.1  8.7   
Indonesia 0.2   0.2   0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4   0.4  0.5  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.8   
Italy 4.6   2.9   5.2  5.7  6.5  7.6  6.9  7.2   8.8  8.2  8.4  8.9  8.8  8.0  7.8   
Japan 4.5   5.6   5.4  5.4  4.6  4.3  4.9  4.7   4.7  5.2  5.5  5.6  4.7  5.1  5.2   
Malaysia 0.3   0.3   0.3  0.3  0.3  1.2  0.3  0.7   0.2  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.9  1.2   
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Metric tons of chromium/ 
thousand metric tons of 
steel production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mexico 0.4   0.4   0.6  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.4   0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  1.0  1.1  0.7   
Netherlands 1.3   11.2   12.5  7.0  10.9  15.0  10.2  9.3   9.9  1.6  9.2  7.4  10.3  19.2  15.1   
Norway 0.9   1.1   0.8  0.8  0.7  0.4  0.8  0.8   0.5  0.5  0.7  1.4  2.1  1.2  1.0   
Poland 0.2   0.6   1.1  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.0   0.7  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.4   
Portugal 1.7   1.8   1.3  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.3  2.1   1.8  1.4  0.9  0.6  0.9  0.9  0.8   
Russia n/a n/a 1.2  1.8  1.1  1.3  1.4  1.5   1.3  1.7  1.0  1.5  3.1  2.4  4.1   
South Africa 48.8   79.6   74.1 76 103.7 103.5 94.2 60.5 78.2 89.2 84.9 86.8 74.1 100.9 99.5 
South Korea 3.3   3.4   3.7  4.4  4.6  5.9  5.2  4.6   5.0  6.7  7.7  6.8  5.5  5.1  4.9   
Spain 7.0   6.8   7.6  8.7  8.0  9.2  8.4  9.5   8.6  21.5  7.6  7.1  8.3  7.4  6.8   
Sweden 4.3   10.0   8.4  9.2  9.3  9.4  10.3  10.3   11.7  9.1  7.5  9.1  9.4  13.4  13.4   
Thailand 2.2   1.2   1.6  1.7  1.5  2.2  2.9  1.9   1.8  1.8  1.7  2.0  2.3  2.7  2.7   
Turkey 26.6   41.0   25.7  37.0  27.0  10.1  7.3  6.2   2.8  0.6  2.7  3.3  1.7  -0.6  -2.7   
Ukraine n/a n/a 0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.9  0.8   0.6  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6   
United Kingdom 5.9   3.8   4.4  4.2  4.2  4.3  5.0  4.8   5.1  3.8  5.3  3.2  2.9  2.4  3.8   
USA 2.3   3.6   2.9  2.9  2.9  4.0  2.0  1.1   1.3  1.6  1.6  2.9  2.8  1.5  2.6   
Venezuela 0.2   0.2   0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  -0.6  0.0   0.1  -1.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.1   
Table 31 – Chromium material composition of product 
Source: Own estimation 
9.3.2 Manganese 
HS code Description Manganese content estimation Remark 
2602 Manganese ores, concentrates, iron ores >20% Manganese Assumed average manganese content of 49% USGS (1998a), p.86 
2820 Manganese oxides 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
manganese ore price Compare chapter 4.2 
720211 Ferro-manganese, >2% carbon 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
ferro-manganese price Compare chapter 4.2 
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720219 Ferro-manganese, <2% carbon 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
ferro-manganese price Compare chapter 4.2 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
ferro-manganese price Compare chapter 4.2 
722720 Bar/rod, of silico-manganese steel, irregular coils 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
ferro-manganese price Compare chapter 4.2 
722820 Bar/rod of silico-manganese steel not in coils 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
ferro-manganese price Compare chapter 4.2 
722920 Wire of silico-manganese steel 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
ferro-manganese price Compare chapter 4.2 
8111 Manganese, articles thereof, waste or scrap 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
ferro-manganese price Compare chapter 4.2 
Table 32 – Overview manganese content estimation 
Source: Own illustration 
Thousand metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 33   33   41  61  26  33  41  39   47  49  54  67  75  54  66   
Australia 225   216 96 134 -24 88 117 107 166 22 78 112 174 161  312 
Austria 33   26   32  40  44  39  22  29   23  40  42  67  57  85  67   
Belgium 104   125   129  93  131  126  137  140   143  126  120  136  139  161  110   
Brazil 277   282   343  179  683  779  633  565   540  623  352  343  755  215  408   
Canada 120   108   147  90  94  90  64  74   71  103  110  101  106  144  130   
Chile 16   17   17  21  21  18  23  24   27  26  28  31  30  15  14   
China 562   1,125   1,444  1,272  921  533  492  779   831  891  2,073  2,156  2,558  4,369  3,559   
Czech Republic 58   59   56  64  55  39  32  40   32  56  47  34  65  49  49   
Finland 40   43   17  28  28  26  31  30   39  27  33  23  29  35  36   
France 262   363   342  289  374  250  370  256   181  144  155  143  120  140  204   
Germany 313   354   304  320  318  283  301  314   335  289  276  332  337  362  337   
Hungary 12   14   11  13  15  16  17  17   19  18  13  16  25  26  31   
India 449   443   479  536  485  521  410  450   399  474  539  731  739  886  1,122   
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Thousand metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Indonesia 68   108   112  86  41  29  54  29   51  53  56  54  51  8  -13   
Italy 224   191   180  153  207  168  194  172   249  234  294  263  334  335  258   
Japan 739   826   776  822  766  796  701  766   767  881  913  832  955  1,022  911   
Malaysia 28   34   49  41  13  49  56  41   35  45  61  47  52  64  33   
Mexico 91   145   173  178  175  141  135  120   129  147  184  188  151  158  215   
Netherlands 14   25   29  29  61  35  18  -1   21  64  58  75  81  108  71   
Poland 100   93   98  95  87  73  125  102   107  120  149  64  89  146  87   
Portugal 10   12   13  14  13  12  13  16   25  26  15  26  39  39  23   
Russia 0   0   262  192  187  346  499  453   410  452  380  378  483  567  481   
South Korea 281   319   313  344  304  312  330  325   359  362  395  332  309  476  473   
Spain 238   154   104  52  83  58  90  70   89  108  153  76  100  132  233   
Sweden 15   33   30  30  44  59  53  36   26  39  32  36  41  60  53   
Thailand 22   34   36  28  24  24  24  23   27  35  40  38  49  47  43   
Turkey 119   125   133  147  150  146  159  132   220  228  215  221  222  268  215   
Ukraine 0   0   321  419  15  211  223  288   442  729  884  717  830  639  961   
United Kingdom 190   244   221  216  210  180  162  147   165  146  126  152  167  153  141   
USA 762   767   913  745  855  928  988  747   761  709  941  802  1,082  772  845   
Venezuela 32   25   20  15  19  8  24  32   23  13  48  30  21  41  34   
Total 5,418   6,347   7,271  6,796  6,457  6,534  6,665  6,502   6,879  7,450  8,991  8,754  10,406  11,964  11,640   
Table 33 – Manganese apparent consumption 
Source: Own estimation 
 
Metric tons manganese/ 
thousand metric tons of 
steel production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 10   9   10  15  6  9  9  10   11  10  11  12  13  10  12   
Australia 27   26 11 15 -3 11 16 15 22 3 10 14 22 20 41 
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Metric tons manganese/ 
thousand metric tons of 
steel production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 8   5   7  8  8  8  4  5   4  6  6  10  8  11  9   
Belgium 7   9   10  7  9  9  10  10   10  9  8  11  10  12  8   
Brazil 11   11   14  7  26  31  23  21   18  20  11  11  24  6  12   
Canada 9   8   10  6  6  6  4  5   4  6  7  7  7  9  9   
Chile 16   17   14  18  18  14  17  19   21  19  18  20  18  9  9   
China 6   12   14  12  8  4  4  5   5  4  7  6  6  9  7   
Czech Republic 8   8   9  9  8  7  5  6   5  8  7  5  10  7  8   
Finland 12   14   5  8  7  6  8  8   10  6  7  5  6  8  8   
France 15   20   19  15  19  12  18  13   9  7  7  7  6  7  11   
Germany 8   8   8  7  7  7  6  7   7  6  6  7  7  7  7   
Hungary 6   7   6  8  8  9  9  9   9  9  7  8  12  11  15   
India 23   20   20  22  21  21  15  16   14  15  17  16  15  17  19   
Indonesia 21   26   27  23  15  10  19  10   21  26  15  15  14  2  -3   
Italy 9   7   8  6  8  7  7  6   10  9  10  9  11  10  8   
Japan 8   8   8  8  8  8  7  7   7  8  8  7  8  8  8   
Malaysia 14   14   15  14  7  18  15  10   7  11  11  9  9  11  5   
Mexico 9   12   13  12  12  9  9  9   9  10  11  12  9  9  12   
Netherlands 2   4   5  4  10  6  3  -0   3  10  9  11  13  15  10   
Poland 9   8   9  8  9  8  12  12   13  13  14  8  9  14  9   
Portugal 14   15   15  15  14  12  12  23   27  26  11  19  28  28  16   
Russia n/a n/a 5  4  4  7  8  8   7  7  6  6  7  8  7   
South Korea 8   9   8  8  8  8  8  7   8  8  8  7  6  9  9   
Spain 18   11   9  4  6  4  6  4   5  7  9  4  5  7  13   
Sweden 3   7   6  6  9  12  10  6   4  7  5  6  7  11  10   
Thailand 15   16   17  13  13  16  11  11   11  10  9  7  9  9  8   
Turkey 9   9   10  10  11  10  11  9   13  12  10  11  10  10  8   
Ukraine n/a n/a 14  16  1  8  7  9   13  20  23  19  20  15  26   
United Kingdom 11   14   12  12  12  11  11  11   14  11  9  12  12  11  10   
USA 8   8   10  8  9  10  10  8   8  8  9  8  11  8  9   
 257 
Metric tons manganese/ 
thousand metric tons of 
steel production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Venezuela 9   7   5  4  5  2  6  8   5  3  10  6  4  8  8   
Table 34 – Manganese material composition of product 
Source: Own estimation 
9.3.3 Molybdenum 
HS code Description Molybdenum content estimation Remark 
261310 Molybdenum concentrates, roasted 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
molybdenum oxide price Compare chapter 4.2 
261390 Molybdenum ores and concentrates except roasted 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
molybdenum oxide price Compare chapter 4.2 
720270 Ferro-molybdenum 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
molybdenum oxide price Compare chapter 4.2 
8102 Molybdenum and articles thereof, waste or scrap 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
molybdenum oxide price Compare chapter 4.2 
282570 Molybdenum oxides and hydroxides 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
molybdenum oxide price Compare chapter 4.2 
284170 Metallic molybdates 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to 
molybdenum oxide price Compare chapter 4.2 
Table 35 – Overview molybdenum content estimation 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 417   321   392  368  490  394  473  774   640  506  506  847  749  613  812   
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Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Australia 836   562   747  650  831  563  615  663   536  413  345  496  471  359  475   
Austria 1,144   898   918  994  -759  -1,172  867  755   914  916  1,028  761  1,997  1,762  2,123   
Brazil 2,762   1,287   1,457  2,345  2,757  2,029  2,435  2,679   2,245  2,621  2,310  2,530  2,698  2,739  2,770   
Canada 6,953   6,655   6,717  5,599  6,343  5,467  6,510  6,107   5,537  6,048  6,747  5,030  4,683  5,837  5,110   
Chile 864   6,912   4,504  7,416  3,894  9,666  12,546  7,211   11,022  17,436  21,040  22,854  14,583  16,094  8,198   
China 4,214   8,965   15,570  14,844  2,717  6,434  2,940  3,499   5,599  5,615  14,105  23,786  26,071  41,293  66,498   
Czech Republic 508   410   326  198  432  226  415  627   501  630  756  1,022  979  1,010  1,148   
Finland 2,951   2,112   1,914  2,129  2,840  2,245  2,560  2,468   2,463  3,085  2,823  2,586  2,846  2,702  2,187   
France 6,996   4,713   4,079  4,476  7,481  4,161  5,157  5,002   4,164  3,976  3,339  3,788  3,917  3,599  4,515   
Germany 11,802   7,205   7,137  7,098  14,598  10,031  10,532  12,562   10,485  7,874  8,204  9,950  12,448  11,726  11,357   
Hungary 51   174   223  140  221  103  244  181   250  201  157  171  249  207  171   
India 2,463   928   1,110  1,408  1,614  1,377  1,265  1,683   1,751  1,689  1,470  1,658  2,293  2,068  2,207   
Indonesia 84   78   107  43  83  124  397  194   103  53  28  37  72  88  145   
Italy 5,991   3,549   3,577  3,951  6,711  4,349  4,464  4,724   4,122  3,916  4,712  5,294  5,394  5,396  5,930   
Japan 18,308   14,360   13,551  15,888  19,770  12,560  15,852  15,801   14,143  14,824  14,312  18,384  19,768  17,570  19,683   
Malaysia 91   35   78  59  106  195  144  79   77  66  39  32  48  40  43   
Mexico 795   1,231   432  378  1,281  2,897  4,051  2,772   1,273  2,214  1,610  1,448  2,389  368  56   
Netherlands 1,885   3,697   2,711  4,588  5,846  4,867  4,648  5,070   -459  736  2,423  3,514  2,272  1,667  7,079   
Norway 38   47   52  51  62  28  38  48   48  66  52  52  21  45  37   
Poland 566   439   417  413  620  380  520  508   441  414  570  617  633  674  784   
Portugal 71   57   92  80  114  87  88  94   72  56  62  60  37  42  33   
Russia n/a n/a 83  95  -528  1,027  1,784  1,379   2,111  2,234  2,356  2,423  1,892  2,209  2,556   
South Africa 1,556   1,133   1,183  1,275  1,973  1,544  1,517  1,384   1,730  1,761  1,117  876  1,355  1,418  1,226   
South Korea 2,602   2,140   2,284  2,052  3,454  3,456  3,177  3,763   4,182  4,096  3,869  5,177  4,906  4,869  3,293   
Spain 4,077   2,613   2,856  3,156  3,597  2,444  2,637  3,318   3,463  3,325  2,595  2,962  3,767  3,657  3,480   
Sweden 6,931   4,524   3,873  4,949  7,090  4,489  4,788  4,820   4,410  4,464  4,329  4,957  5,773  5,066  5,116   
Thailand 83   84   137  94  108  139  185  158   113  140  112  126  137  111  173   
Turkey 267   218   279  272  402  307  296  397   377  376  331  598  485  694  872   
Ukraine n/a n/a 418  -147  301  99  866  788   241  775  1,019  1,147  884  785  1,226   
United Kingdom 375   1,379   1,832  2,215  1,605  2,041  1,121  1,789   1,738  -85  -767  -363  1,199  2,177  2,538   
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Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
USA 22,702   42,537   43,820  45,361  38,248  34,360  36,254  29,834   28,264  25,977  40,375  50,093  44,474  46,763  39,333   
Venezuela 69   53   57  73  47  41  56  43   36  24  23  40  24  21  26   
Total 108,450   119,317   122,934  132,511  134,350  116,960  129,442  121,175   112,593  116,443  141,996  172,954  169,511  183,667  201,200   
Table 36 – Molybdenum apparent consumption 
Source: Own estimation 
 
Grams molybdenum/ 
Metric tons of steel production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 127   90  96  88  116  104  106  188  147  100  99  157  135  114   147   
Australia 99   66  89  74  93  69  86  94  71  55  47  64  60  45   62   
Austria 260   180  207  192  -144  -225  152  129  148  146  157  108  280  233   280   
Brazil 107   51  58  90  107  81  87  100  76  84  70  80  87  81   82   
Canada 500   462  456  360  398  337  392  400  346  380  414  328  302  371   344   
Chile 831   6,816  3,823  6,354  3,325  7,487  9,280  5,783  8,618  12,662  13,325  14,869  8,963  9,661   5,383   
China 45   94  154  136  24  52  23  23  31  25  50  67  62  84   133   
Czech Republic 72   57  50  29  66  40  67  99  77  93  108  165  143  143   180   
Finland 863   665  580  570  719  568  625  627  615  647  584  546  563  610   495   
France 388   260  231  226  372  206  246  259  206  201  161  194  197  187   253   
Germany 289   171  179  158  331  238  227  280  233  176  177  223  264  242   248   
Hungary 26   93  119  83  122  57  130  93  122  101  80  87  119  93   82   
India 128   42  47  58  69  57  47  62  61  53  45  36  46  39   38   
Indonesia 26   19  26  11  31  43  140  70  42  26  8  10  19  22   37   
Italy 229   128  150  153  261  175  167  178  158  145  165  180  171  169   194   
Japan 186   141  137  152  211  133  149  154  131  134  127  163  170  146   166   
Malaysia 44   14  24  20  56  70  40  19  16  17  7  6  8  7   7   
Mexico 78   101  33  27  90  190  259  208  91  146  96  89  146  21   3   
Netherlands 305   577  429  691  917  801  820  840  -75  112  354  508  357  226   1,033   
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Grams molybdenum/ 
Metric tons of steel production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Norway 83   94  101  86  98  47  56  74  69  94  71  74  30  64   66   
Poland 51   37  40  36  63  43  50  58  53  46  54  74  63  63   81   
Portugal 95   68  107  89  121  83  81  130  79  56  45  43  26  30   24   
Russia n/a n/a 2  2  -12  20  30  23  35  36  36  37  27  31   37   
South Africa 183   130  148  153  248  197  179  157  190  186  118  92  139  156   148   
South Korea 77   58  59  48  87  84  74  86  92  88  81  108  101  95   61   
Spain 303   189  235  231  243  164  166  201  211  204  147  166  205  193   187   
Sweden 1,395   913  789  961  1,376  886  916  874  766  782  724  866  1,056  893   984   
Thailand 56   39  64  45  59  91  88  74  45  39  25  24  26  20   33   
Turkey 21   17  21  19  28  21  21  27  23  21  16  29  21  27   33   
Ukraine n/a n/a 19  -6  12  4  27  24  7  21  26  30  22  18   33   
United Kingdom 22   78  102  120  93  125  74  132  149  -6  -56  -27  86  152   188   
USA 249   447  459  461  388  353  356  331  309  277  405  528  451  476   431   
Venezuela 20   15  15  18  13  13  15  11  9  6  5  8  5  4   6   
Table 37 – Molybdenum material composition of product 
Source: Own estimation 
9.3.4 Niobium 
HS code Description Niobium content estimation Remark 
720293 Ferro-niobium 
Assumed average niobium content of 65 percent (average content 
US imports 2003 to 2007) 
USGS (2003f), Appendix;  
USGS (2004w), Appendix; 
USGS (2005e), Appendix;  
USGS (2006e), Appendix;  
USGS (2007e), Appendix 
Table 38 – Overview niobium content estimation 
Source: Own illustration 
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Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 27   21   54  38  44  95  63  36   72  45  76  109  107  83  89   
Australia 111   61   237  98  210  59  25  6   4  23  36  234  246  73  161   
Austria -66   -84   145  240  403  252  235  353   506  1,084  607  585  622  587  731   
Belgium 0   374   446  431  462  401  565  687   570  519  518  613  717  1,094  1,237   
Brazil 1,740   2,516   6,258  2,615  5,697  4,618  3,647  8,821   8,587  16,022  15,903  24,173  9,555  10,602  10,701   
Canada 3,337   2,620   1,810  1,840  2,193  2,141  1,851  1,742   1,499  432  464  425  494  313  2,046   
Chile 33   78   88  71  69  27  45  0   0  0  9  16  14  15  1   
China 50   187   176  96  369  610  800  933   1,068  2,072  2,324  6,256  7,713  9,694  15,312   
Czech Republic 28   31   26  32  37  27  16  17   59  65  209  183  178  165  246   
Finland 221   237   210  233  292  275  305  277   315  321  306  311  321  371  492   
France 624   596   779  726  832  775  851  877   873  883  1,154  1,613  1,300  1,194  1,494   
Germany 1,070   1,267   1,636  2,003  1,997  1,206  1,410  1,580   1,750  1,615  1,812  2,239  3,252  3,268  3,388   
Hungary 18   0   14  0  0  0  0  0   0  54  0  0  0  0  88   
India 12   87   59  67  107  141  123  249   170  269  431  551  994  1,099  1,209   
Indonesia 29   54   49  129  44  20  64  0   1  13  21  89  24  83  11   
Italy 704   912   775  914  907  741  834  942   996  925  911  1,594  1,404  1,875  1,771   
Japan 2,367   3,247   3,093  3,234  4,234  4,430  3,616  4,072   4,420  5,303  4,579  4,684  6,120  5,755  7,113   
Malaysia 6   1   1  2  1  2  10  20   7  9  125  98  90  93  107   
Mexico 91   213   283  323  454  474  527  400   461  500  627  1,089  1,371  1,544  1,218   
Norway 0   0   0  3  2  3  17  17   1  16  2  1  0  36  2   
Poland -5   47   20  27  44  42  34  15   33  40  52  68  140  115  129   
Portugal 1   1   1  2  3  8  4  7   7  4  4  3  2  2  3   
Russia n/a n/a -4  90  192  38  255  -32   88  83  50  23  -27  36  -3   
South Africa 66   112   59  58  145  37  76  97   88  52  99  201  322  393  277   
South Korea 306   231   250  410  506  709  443  619   802  995  838  1,689  1,637  2,367  2,288   
Spain 203   193   268  239  283  142  141  158   210  200  334  575  257  60  327   
Sweden 278   169   185  282  390  385  430  400   479  471  546  729  735  696  468   
Thailand 0   1   1  1  1  0  2  1   2  3  2  4  18  21  38   
Turkey 1   2   0  12  44  51  19  30   108  122  137  256  283  234  396   
Ukraine n/a n/a 102  36  154  102  87  249   227  558  733  904  1,224  1,257  832   
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Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
United Kingdom 540   487   584  542  684  589  936  754   639  708  773  713  659  936  834   
USA 2,440   3,328   2,872  4,484  5,233  4,689  4,617  4,944   4,220  4,123  5,040  5,340  7,843  7,400  8,735   
Venezuela 2   18   11  4  8  3  12  38   20  26  33  103  81  71  7   
Total 14,233   17,006   20,489  19,280  26,042  23,092  22,061  28,308   28,281  37,556  38,756  55,471  47,696  51,531  61,749   
Table 39 – Niobium apparent consumption 
Source: Own estimation 
Grams niobium/ 
Metric ton of steel 
production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 8.2   5.8   13.3  9.0  10.5  25.0  14.1  8.9   16.6  8.9  14.7  20.2  19.3  15.3  16.1   
Australia 13.1   7.2   28.2  11.0  23.5  7.2  3.6  0.8   0.5  3.0  4.8  30.2  31.2  9.2  21.2   
Austria -15.0   -16.8   32.6  46.3  76.3  48.4  41.1  60.2   81.8  173.2  93.0  83.1  87.2  77.5  96.2   
Belgium  32.2   41.2  40.1  40.4  36.7  48.5  63.8   50.2  46.7  44.3  58.9  61.7  102.4  115.9   
Brazil 67.6   100.3   248.0  100.0  221.2  184.7  130.9  330.2   290.0  514.4  483.2  764.7  309.2  313.8  317.4   
Canada 240.1   181.7   122.8  118.3  137.7  131.9  111.6  114.0   93.7  27.1  28.5  27.7  31.9  19.9  137.8   
Chile 31.9   76.9   74.5  61.0  58.6  21.1  33.2  0.0   0.0  0.0  5.9  10.4  8.8  9.1  0.9   
China 0.5   2.0   1.7  0.9  3.2  4.9  6.3  6.2   5.9  9.3  8.3  17.6  18.2  19.8  30.6   
Czech Republic 4.0   4.3   4.0  4.7  5.8  4.7  2.6  2.7   9.0  9.7  29.7  29.5  25.9  23.4  38.5   
Finland 64.6   74.5   63.5  62.4  73.9  69.6  74.4  70.3   78.8  67.4  63.3  65.6  63.5  83.6  111.4   
France 34.6   32.9   44.2  36.7  41.3  38.4  40.6  45.3   43.1  44.7  55.6  82.8  65.5  62.0  83.6   
Germany 26.2   30.1   41.1  44.5  45.3  28.7  30.4  35.3   38.9  36.0  39.1  50.3  68.9  67.3  73.9   
Hungary 9.2   0.0   7.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0   0.0  27.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  41.9   
India 0.6   4.0   2.5  2.8  4.6  5.8  4.6  9.1   5.9  8.5  13.2  12.0  20.1  20.7  20.9   
Indonesia 9.1   13.1   11.9  33.7  16.4  7.0  22.6  0.0   0.4  6.4  5.6  24.2  6.4  21.0  2.8   
Italy 26.9   32.8   32.4  35.4  35.3  29.8  31.1  35.5   38.2  34.2  31.8  54.3  44.4  58.6  57.9   
Japan 24.1   31.9   31.3  30.9  45.3  47.0  34.0  39.6   41.0  48.0  40.6  41.6  52.7  47.9  59.9   
Malaysia 2.9   0.5   0.2  0.8  0.7  0.5  2.6  4.8   1.5  2.2  21.9  18.5  15.4  15.1  16.7   
Mexico 8.9   17.6   21.4  22.7  31.9  31.0  33.7  30.1   32.9  33.0  37.5  67.3  84.1  87.9  70.8   
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Grams niobium/ 
Metric ton of steel 
production 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Norway 0.3   0.0   0.0  5.0  3.7  4.3  25.2  26.4   1.9  23.4  3.0  0.9  0.4  50.9  2.9   
Poland -0.4   4.0   1.9  2.3  4.4  4.8  3.3  1.6   3.9  4.4  4.9  8.1  14.0  10.8  13.2   
Portugal 0.9   1.3   1.5  1.8  3.0  7.3  3.6  10.2   7.8  3.9  2.8  2.3  1.8  1.2  2.5   
Russia n/a n/a -0.1  1.8  4.4  0.7  4.3  -0.5   1.5  1.4  0.8  0.3  -0.4  0.5  -0.0   
South Africa 7.7   12.8   7.4  6.9  18.2  4.8  9.0  11.0   9.6  5.5  10.4  21.2  33.1  43.2  33.5   
South Korea 9.1   6.3   6.4  9.6  12.7  17.3  10.3  14.1   17.7  21.5  17.6  35.3  33.8  46.1  42.7   
Spain 15.1   14.0   22.0  17.5  19.1  9.5  8.9  9.6   12.8  12.3  18.9  32.3  14.0  3.2  17.5   
Sweden 56.0   34.1   37.7  54.8  75.7  76.0  82.2  72.6   83.2  82.4  91.3  127.4  134.5  122.6  90.1   
Thailand  0.6   0.5  0.3  0.8  0.3  1.0  0.5   0.6  0.9  0.4  0.7  3.5  3.9  7.3   
Turkey 0.1   0.2   0.0  0.9  3.1  3.6  1.3  2.0   6.6  6.7  6.7  12.2  12.1  9.1  14.8   
Ukraine n/a n/a 4.6  1.4  6.3  3.7  2.7  7.5   6.7  15.1  18.9  23.4  29.9  29.3  22.3   
United Kingdom 31.2   27.7   32.5  29.3  39.5  36.1  61.8  55.7   54.8  53.3  56.1  53.8  47.5  65.4  61.7   
USA 26.7   35.0   30.1  45.5  53.0  48.1  45.4  54.9   46.1  44.0  50.6  56.3  79.6  75.4  95.6   
Venezuela 0.5   5.1   2.7  1.0  2.3  1.0  3.1  9.9   4.8  6.7  7.3  21.0  16.6  14.1  1.7   
Table 40 – Niobium material composition of product 
Source: Own estimation 
9.3.5 Cobalt 
HS code Description Cobalt content estimation Remark 
2605 Cobalt ores and concentrates 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to cobalt 
cathode price Compare chapter 4.2 
2822 Cobalt oxides and hydroxides 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to cobalt 
cathode price Compare chapter 4.2 
282734 Cobalt chloride 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to cobalt 
cathode price Compare chapter 4.2 
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HS code Description Cobalt content estimation Remark 
810510 Cobalt, unwrought, matte, waste or scrap, powders 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to cobalt 
cathode price Compare chapter 4.2 
810590 Cobalt, articles thereof, nes 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to cobalt 
cathode price Compare chapter 4.2 
Table 41 – Overview cobalt content estimation 
Source: Own illustration 
Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 56   29   75  67  66  77  73  77   91  87  86  119  98  62  63   
Australia 2,271   2,254   2,834  2,612  2,385  2,738  3,285  3,246   4,565  2,286  1,398  2,834  2,433  2,667  3,493   
Austria 298   96   266  294  299  292  494  375   231  315  527  525  405  569  608   
Belgium 0   365   1  73  141  299  83  99   251  450  470  137  -3,793  -3,716  -3,768   
Brazil 663   678   660  608  562  614  805  948   1,087  1,112  863  1,013  936  1,193  1,505   
Canada 1,576   2,085   1,389  296  -146  103  1,084  1,006   -360  -989  -1,815  -739  -4  1,628  1,367   
Chile 13   12   15  16  11  13  11  16   9  14  10  9  7  5  5   
China -66   1,402   894  571  351  1,342  2,314  4,009   7,078  5,883  5,716  9,179  9,904  7,980  15,003   
Czech Republic 14   -13   57  56  77  53  53  67   55  5  99  89  73  73  63   
Finland -2,328   -2,538   -3,058  -3,315  -1,574  -1,661  -3,176  -2,845   -2,655  -5,392  -1,744  -4,367  -2,379  -2,722  -1,083   
France 730   914   909  1,222  995  1,097  1,212  1,259   1,342  1,280  1,506  1,346  1,661  1,112  1,328   
Germany 749   1,061   1,057  795  1,408  1,033  1,526  1,729   1,806  1,783  1,446  2,093  2,570  1,401  1,942   
Hungary 13   13   17  16  19  16  16  18   25  15  17  18  15  13  15   
India 298   314   368  414  456  425  493  580   569  670  744  934  975  734  1,021   
Indonesia 32   81   86  97  52  100  131  141   130  124  125  100  107  65  74   
Italy 910   973   1,190  1,152  1,243  1,077  1,167  1,237   1,232  1,089  1,007  1,142  1,201  901  654   
Japan 5,197   5,453   7,042  7,197  7,120  9,013  11,489  8,472   9,960  13,289  15,583  12,617  12,334  9,503  11,885   
Malaysia 135   266   162  68  329  735  656  616   2,362  3,469  1,610  2,142  4,603  1,509  -255   
Mexico 146   133   185  216  232  214  225  217   188  194  143  178  199  129  132   
Netherlands 122   247   -538  -206  72  307  -1,352  -1,636   -663  -2,084  -536  228  865  -97  164   
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Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Norway -2,146   -2,387   -2,659  -2,918  -3,299  -3,795  -3,228  -2,935   -3,111  -3,648  -3,627  -4,128  -4,031  -2,540  -2,637   
Poland -21   67   62  74  67  55  74  52   73  63  63  71  43  46  50   
Portugal 29   33   39  38  38  35  34  31   33  40  37  32  39  25  23   
Russia 3,000   3,500   1,039  -499  271  -691  -1,586  850   1,269  905  465  2,397  753  2,024  2,070   
South Africa 370   290   350  465  435  450  606  684   552  -146  -204  -1,126  -387  -120  -358   
South Korea 756   891   697  720  658  1,033  1,491  1,261   1,947  2,635  3,494  3,530  5,030  4,200  756   
Spain 351   450   565  714  887  898  1,144  1,205   1,263  1,368  1,076  1,070  1,124  730  105   
Sweden 35   -12   582  699  783  502  616  699   430  469  501  509  610  421  486   
Thailand 37   39   90  157  139  204  313  228   253  192  192  250  311  207  223   
Turkey 50   69   93  107  93  95  120  104   143  216  218  232  250  201  214   
United Kingdom 737   660   945  972  645  1,348  750  875   1,394  700  865  1,408  1,715  1,217  1,229   
USA 4,169   4,640   4,946  5,776  5,469  6,465  5,892  6,092   5,254  4,311  4,964  6,333  6,725  5,336  5,718   
Venezuela 24   24   22  24  8  20  19  16   11  9  31  49  34  22  17   
Total 18,221   22,086   20,382  18,580  20,292  24,506  26,832  28,792   36,815  30,713  35,329  40,223  44,427  34,781  42,111   
Table 42 – Cobalt apparent consumption 
Source: Own estimation 
9.3.6 Vanadium 
HS code Description Vanadium content estimation Remark 
720292 Ferro-vanadium 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to ferro-vanadium 
price Compare chapter 4.2 
282530 Vanadium oxides and hydroxides 
Based on specific trade value in US dollars per kilogram relative to vanadium 
pentoxide price Compare chapter 4.2 
262050 Ash or residues containing mainly vanadium 
Based on ratio of specific trade value relative to specific trade value of vanadium 
oxides and hydroxides in US dollars per kilogram multiplied with the calculated 
vanadium content in vanadium oxides and hydroxides Compare chapter 4.2 
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HS code Description Vanadium content estimation Remark 
811240 Vanadium, articles thereof, waste or scrap/powders Assumed same content as ferro-niobium trade Compare chapter 4.2 
Table 43 – Overview vanadium content estimation 
Source: Own illustration 
Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 44   121   80  135  56  150  73  116   131  136  98  71  116  184  138   
Australia 184   188   196  227  233  249  1,643  876   -1,601  -347  267  323  264  171  127   
Austria -3,050   -2,365   -3,722  -3,587  -4,810  -3,938  -3,559  -4,085   -3,365  -3,355  -2,951  -3,321  -4,414  -5,516  -4,096   
Belgium 0   5,042   3,219  3,072  1,609  1,912  2,587  2,097   2,400  35  -3  19  441  431  338   
Brazil 485   736   737  517  902  579  749  826   766  1,105  718  802  1,190  1,390  1,111   
Canada 737   2,001   1,732  2,012  1,774  1,357  891  697   715  817  914  809  874  714  1,096   
Chile 13   0   4  2  3  10  12  -0   0  0  16  2  13  4  3   
China 3,756   7,581   8,569  8,404  8,225  4,387  4,485  6,909   9,136  7,748  14,432  9,514  7,508  3,377  6,738   
Czech Rep. -527   -1,791   203  -27  -777  2,410  2,669  3,024   1,532  2,223  2,200  1,488  2,451  1,744  2,622   
Finland 139   135   187  101  180  150  109  162   160  179  136  166  186  234  192   
France 684   760   973  1,597  1,521  1,023  956  1,033   1,010  1,034  800  1,021  1,579  1,707  1,366   
Germany 3,275   2,488   2,404  2,965  3,899  3,007  3,125  3,896   2,644  3,238  1,636  2,089  3,427  3,155  2,713   
Hungary 0   259   247  218  185  0  46  27   54  42  38  0  33  21  19   
India 28   12   23  50  171  120  364  193   184  234  285  127  464  346  199   
Indonesia 210   130   178  215  17  93  100  70   -342  25  35  116  120  41  0   
Italy 1,257   1,513   1,388  1,413  1,292  1,037  -914  836   434  1,132  1,284  1,124  1,455  1,717  1,352   
Japan 2,962   5,879   5,871  6,529  7,169  5,567  6,659  6,125   6,257  6,951  5,581  6,317  6,621  5,816  5,964   
Malaysia 398   232   226  205  41  108  269  228   378  172  328  101  138  237  0   
Mexico 191   690   303  546  373  493  534  398   448  418  479  521  568  281  583   
Netherlands -21   622   114  -275  1,639  362  1,200  271   2,070  965  850  521  662  579  52   
Norway 21   33   20  15  17  40  59  50   50  53  39  33  48  23  19   
Poland 146   315   217  197  220  254  363  286   240  161  289  204  347  282  208   
Portugal 6   9   6  2  1  4  3  7   40  18  0  0  5  18  2   
 267 
Metric tons 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Russia 6,246   8,175   8,004  7,030  7,205  2,222  704  683   1,211  1,963  6,263  10,390  10,461  10,136  9,831   
South Africa 10,001   5,802   6,323  7,627  11,382  6,974  9,322  10,868   17,858  14,275  10,253  17,210  11,898  13,001  12,331   
South Korea 805   1,583   1,913  2,499  2,283  2,821  2,671  2,294   2,442  2,700  1,949  2,380  3,399  6,900  3,545   
Spain 505   468   596  193  110  438  370  657   538  519  644  428  509  715  472   
Sweden 749   668   588  561  1,108  818  681  656   481  837  828  619  845  615  518   
Thailand 114   162   174  37  17  33  37  30   34  33  43  42  53  -61  68   
Turkey 135   110   84  159  119  95  131  184   591  374  173  132  308  327  291   
Ukraine n/a n/a 709  243  459  388  848  818   709  1,443  1,388  1,259  1,521  1,613  1,087   
United Kingdom 380   457   539  523  -142  317  -810  114   137  12  82  805  853  160  37   
USA 318   2,579   460  2,031  2,047  1,950  2,892  2,575   1,689  230  1,459  2,424  3,364  3,366  5,077   
Venezuela 47   120   76  30  161  98  201  148   143  208  90  207  262  143  0   
Total 30,237   44,712   42,642  45,464  48,690  35,529  39,468  43,068   49,174  45,575  50,642  57,941  57,569  53,872  54,005   
Table 44 – Vanadium apparent consumption 
Source: Own estimation 
9.4 Chinese export tariffs 
Export tariff 
Metal group Metal HS code Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Refractory metals Chromium 26100000 Chrome ores and concentrates 0% 0% 10% 15% 15% 
  81122100 Unwrought chromium 0% 0% 15% 15% 15% 
  81122200 Chromium scrap 0% 0% 15% 15% 15% 
  72024100 Ferro-chrome (C 4% min) 0% 5% 10% 20% 20% 
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Export tariff 
Metal group Metal HS code Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  72024900 Ferro-chrome (C 4% max) 0% 5% 10% 20% 20% 
  72025000 Silico-chrome 0% 0% 10% 20% 20% 
 Manganese 26020000 Manganese ores and concentrates 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 
  81110010 Unwrought manganese 0% 0% 15% 20% 20% 
  72023000 Silico-manganese 0% 5% 10% 20% 20% 
  72021100 Ferro-manganese 0% 5% 10% 20% 20% 
 Molybdenum 26139000 Molybdenum ores and concentrates 0% 0% 10% 15% 15% 
  26131000 Roasted molybdenum ores and concentrates 0% 0% 10% 15% 15% 
  81021000 Molybdenum powder 0% 0% 15% 15% 10% 
  81029400 Unwrought molybdenum 0% 0% 15% 15% 15% 
  81029700 Molybdenum scrap 0% 0% 15% 15% 15% 
  28257000 Molybdenum oxides and hydrates 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 
  28417010 Ammonium molybdate 0% 0% 0% 15% 10% 
  72027000 Ferro-molybdenum 0% 0% 10% 20% 20% 
 Niobium 72029300 Ferro-niobium 0% 0% 10% 20% 20% 
 Vanadium 28253010 Vanadium pentoxide 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 
  72029290 Ferro-vanadium (V max 75%) 0% 0% 10% 20% 20% 
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Export tariff 
Metal group Metal HS code Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  72029210 Ferro-vanadium (V min 75%) 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 
 Cobalt 26050000 Cobalt ores and concentrates 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 
Non-ferrous base metals Aluminum 26060000 Aluminum ores and concentrates 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 
  76011010 Unwrought aluminium,containing by weight 99.95% or more of aluminium 0% 0% 0% 15%  
  76011090 Unwrought aluminium,other 0% 0% 15% 15%  
  76012000 Unwrought aluminium,aluminium alloys 0% 0% 0% 15%  
 Copper 26030000 Copper ores and concentrates 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 
  74031111 refined copper and copper alloys, unwrought, containing by weight more 
than 99.9935% of copper 
0% 0% 10% 5%  
 Lead 78011000 unwrought lead, refined lead 0% 0% 10% 10%  
 Tin 26090000 Tin ores and concentrates 0% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
 Zinc 26080000 zinc ores and concentrates 0% 0% 0% 0%  
  79011190 unwrought zinc, other 0% 0% 5% 5%  
  79012000 unwrought zinc, zinc alloys 0% 0% 0% 0%  
 Table 45 – Chinese export tariffs 
Source: China Customs 2005; China Customs 2006; China Customs 2007; China Customs 2008; China Customs 2009; 
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